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Abstract
Transitioning to financially stable and environmentally sustainable economic growth
is a major development challenge for developing economies awash in unsustain-
able public debt. Tackling the twin development crises, public debt and climate
distress, would help developing countries move towards a sustainable development
trajectory. As developing economies struggle to contain an increasing debt, mea-
sures to confront debt crises may collide with climate protection efforts.
To this end, this thesis aims to provide a framework that will guide the pol-
icy makers pursuit a rational and sustainable economic development. The thesis
comprises of three main chapters. The first chapter investigates the public debt–
growth nexus, while the second and third chapters evaluate the success of existing
climate change policies in developing economies.
The first chapter explores the public debt–growth nexus to examine the ex-
istence of debt thresholds in developing economies. Soaring debt can dampen
financial stability, thus maintaining sustainable debt thresholds could foster eco-
nomic growth. Empirical studies have focused mainly on developed countries and
implicitly include strong homogeneity assumptions. This chapter fills this gap by
focusing on developing countries and on various heterogeneities across geographic
location, income, and governance quality. Using a dynamic panel threshold re-
gression technique on 111 developing economies over the period 1993–2017, the
chapter finds debt threshold effects are not common across developing countries.
In addition, heterogeneous debt threshold effects are observed across income and
governance quality. Beyond the debt threshold, high debt does not impede growth
for developing economies, however, the accumulation of larger debt stocks is dis-
ix
couraged as a sensible policy measure for sustainable debt management.
The second chapter investigates the effectiveness of the United Nations Pro-
gramme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD)
in conserving tropical forests for emissions reduction. Studies on REDD policy
show limited use of quantitative methods and good quality forest cover data. This
chapter fills this gap by employing a novel econometric methodology, a staggered
difference–in–differences approach, on Earth observation satellite data on forest
cover. The results indicate that REDD is successful in curbing tropical deforesta-
tion and emissions. It takes time for the policy effect to be materialised: smaller
policy effects are observed in the first few years, while much larger policy effects
are seen as time progresses. Heterogeneous effects are also observed across regions
and income levels. In particular, strong policy effect is seen only in the region of
Latin America and the Caribbean while upper–middle income and high income
countries also benefit from the policy compared to low income countries. Incor-
porating such heterogeneous effects in the policy–making decisions could amplify
the global efforts in protecting tropical forests.
The third chapter examines the effectiveness of Kyoto’s Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) on emissions reduction in developing countries. Impact assess-
ment studies on the CDM have typically used mean–type regression estimations
and been limited to aggregate effects. This chapter fills this gap by using a condi-
tional quantile difference–in–differences strategy to understand the policy effects
along the emissions distribution and across various heterogeneities. The chapter
finds that the CDM is effective in reducing emissions at the lower quantiles while
it has not been so effective in high–emitting developing countries. Decomposi-
tion by emission type and sectors indicates that CDM has the expected positive
impact only on fluorinated gases and agriculture and industrial sectors at the up-
per tail. Geographic location– and income–based heterogeneities suggest policy
impact is stronger in the Latin America and the Caribbean region and the low
income economies only. Overall, the CDM has not been a very successful climate
policy for developing countries. As such, it is important to adapt the design and
implementation changes that are required to deliver better outcomes in future.
x
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Transitioning to financially stable and environmentally sustainable economic growth
is a major development challenge for developing economies awash in unsustainable
public debt. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank esti-
mate about 50% of the world’s poorest countries are at high risk of debt distress,
while an annual investment of USD 2.4 trillion is required to halt global warming.
As developing economies struggle to contain an increasing debt which is accu-
mulated at a faster rate than ever, along with seeing their economies contracting
further through the COVID-19 pandemic era, measures to confront debt crises
may collide with climate protection efforts. Conversely, environmental challenges
are often compounded by high indebtedness, creating a vicious economic cycle
that constrains the capacity of developing countries to effectively address their
vulnerabilities. Monitoring sustainable debt along with international cooperation
to mitigate climate change would help developing countries move towards a sus-
tainable development trajectory. This thesis aims to provide a framework that will
guide policy makers pursuit a rational and sustainable economic development. To
achieve this goal, the thesis covers two important topics widely recognised as some
of the most difficult challenges facing the world – public debt–economic growth
nexus and climate change.
Empirical studies on the public debt–growth nexus have focused mainly on
developed countries (Baum et al., 2013, Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2012,
Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010) and assumed strong homogeneity across countries.
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Impact assessments on international climate policies, on the other hand, have
mostly followed qualitative evaluation approaches (Agung et al., 2014, Bayrak
and Marafa, 2016, Minang et al., 2014, Pistorius, 2012) and lacked availability of
good quality forestry data (Köthke et al., 2013, Rudel et al., 2000). The findings
of most of these studies are limited to the average aggregate effects, thus ignoring
heterogeneities across geographical location, levels of economic development and
quality of governance.
To this end, the first chapter of this thesis investigates the public debt–growth
nexus, while the second and third chapters evaluate the success of existing climate
change policies in developing economies. Public debt in the developing world has
surged by 28% over the period 2008–2017. These large debt stocks are often es-
calated by climate risks (Feyen et al., 2020). Further, Dell et al. (2012) suggest
that temperature shocks have substantial negative impacts on poor countries, for
instance, a 10C increase in temperature reduces economic growth by 1.3%. In
addition, higher temperatures have negative impact not only on national produc-
tion, agricultural and industrial outputs, but also on political stability (Burke and
Leigh, 2010). Climate change imposes significant economic and social costs and
has the potential to reverse the development gains made in developing economies.
Empirical evidence, however, suggests that investments in climate adaptation en-
hance economic well being (Dell et al., 2008, Stern, 2008, Tol, 2009). As resource–
constrained economies often require external financial assistance to overcome their
development challenges, the thesis examines the effectiveness of these two mecha-
nisms.
To be specific, the thesis contains three main chapters, each employing a
recent econometric methodology that accounts for heterogeneity analyses across
countries, with cross–country data collected from various sources. The number of
countries and time period studied in each chapter vary due to data availability.
As mentioned above, the first chapter examines the relationship between public
debt and economic growth in developing economies by investigating the existence
of debt threshold effects in these economies. Identifying the debt thresholds is
important as the existence of such threshold implies that countries can monitor
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their debt to avoid the levels of their debt that will negatively impact on economic
growth. It is widely argued in the literature that a soaring debt can dampen
financial stability, thus maintaining sustainable debt thresholds could foster eco-
nomic growth in developing economies. Empirical studies have focused mainly
on developed countries and implicitly include strong homogeneity assumptions.
This chapter fills this gap by focusing on developing countries and on various
heterogeneities across geographic location, income, and governance quality. Pub-
lic debt data are extracted from the IMF’s global debt database, which includes
total gross debt of 190 countries worldwide (Mbaye et al., 2018). The other vari-
ables are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI,
2019). In particular, the study uses data on 111 developing economies over the
period 1993–2017. The chapter employs the dynamic panel threshold regression
technique which advances the static panel threshold estimation model of (Hansen,
1999) and the dynamic cross–sectional threshold model of (Caner and Hansen,
2004). Kremer et al. (2013) have used a similar approach in studying the in-
flation thresholds in the inflation–growth nexus. The dynamic panel threshold
regression technique is a novel approach used in estimating threshold effects. It
estimates threshold effects and the marginal impact of debt at low– and high–
debt levels simultaneously. The findings provide strong evidence for the presence
of a debt threshold only in Latin America and the Caribbean region at 25% of
debt–to–GDP. Amongst developing countries, therefore, the debt threshold ef-
fect is uncommon. Heterogeneous debt threshold effects are however, observed
across income and governance quality. In particular, debt thresholds are seen for
the lowest income countries at 37% of debt–to–GDP and the lowest governance
quality at 38% of debt–to–GDP. Counter to conventional concerns, the marginal
impact of debt in the high–debt regime seems growth–enhancing. That is, be-
yond the debt–threshold, increase in economic growth for low–income and lowest
governance quality countries is 0.01%. These findings suggest high–debt does not
necessarily impede the economic development process, however, the accumulation
of larger debt stocks is discouraged as a sensible policy measure for sustainable
debt management in developing countries.
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The second chapter investigates the impact of global environmental policies
on conservation of tropical forests and climate change mitigation. In particu-
lar, the chapter evaluates the effectiveness of the United Nations Programme on
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) – the
world’s largest payment for ecosystem service – in forested developing countries.
Most of the early studies on REDD policy suffer from the limited use of quan-
titative methods (Agung et al., 2014, Bayrak and Marafa, 2016, Minang et al.,
2014, Pistorius, 2012) and low accuracy and comparability of forest cover data
(Köthke et al., 2013, Zabala, 2018). This chapter fills this gap by investigating
whether the changed forest governance that is triggered by the adoption of the
REDD policy has been able to reduce deforestation and emissions in developing
countries. The chapter contributes to the literature by: (1) employing a novel
econometric technique – a staggered difference–in–differences approach recently
developed by Athey and Imbens (2018) – to evaluate the success of the REDD
policy at the national level; (2) using Earth observation satellite data on forest
cover that are spatially more accurate and derived through internally consistent
approach in the analyses; and (3) examining the heterogeneous impact of the pol-
icy effect across regions and income. Specifically, this chapter uses country–level
data from 102 developing countries in a balanced panel setting over the period
2001–2018. Deforestation and emissions data were obtained from the Global For-
est Watch web platform (GFW, 2019) and all the other explanatory variables are
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI, 2019). The results
indicate that REDD is successful in curbing deforestation and emissions in devel-
oping countries. Although the monetary incentives received from REDD have led
developing countries towards positive forest cover changes, it takes time for the
policy effect to be materialised. As such, smaller policy effects on deforestation
and emissions are observed in the first few years, while much larger policy effects
are seen as time progresses. Heterogeneous effects are also observed across regions
and income levels. In particular, strong policy effect is seen only in the region of
Latin America and the Caribbean while upper–middle income and high income
countries also benefit from the policy compared to low income countries. Incor-
4
porating such heterogeneous effects in the policy–making decisions could amplify
the global efforts in protecting tropical forests.
The third chapter examines the effect of international climate policies on the
climate change abatement in developing countries. In particular, this chapter
investigates the impact of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), pledged
under the Kyoto protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, on emissions reduction in developing countries. Impact assessment
studies on the CDM have typically used mean–type regression estimations and
been limited to aggregate effects, thus ignoring the effects at disaggregated levels
and other heterogeneities. The chapter evaluates whether the CDM has been an
effective global policy in reducing emissions. The data used is a balanced panel
of 104 developing countries over the period 1996–2016. The emissions data were
obtained from the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool developed by the World Re-
source Institute (WRI, 2017). Carbon intensity data were obtained from the Our
World in Data web platform (OWD, 2020). The other variables are extracted
mainly from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank (WDI, 2019)
and financial openness is from Chinn and Ito (2006). Using a conditional quan-
tile difference–in–differences strategy developed by Powell (2016), the study finds
notable heterogeneity across the emissions distribution. A similar approach of Am-
pofo and Doko Tchatoka (2019) on the the effectiveness of wage policies in Ghana
has been closely followed in this chapter. Reductions in emissions from the CDM
are only seen in countries at the lower quantiles of emissions. Thus, the CDM has
not been so effective in reducing emissions in high–emitting developing countries.
Decomposition by emission type and sectors indicates that CDM has the expected
positive impact only on fluorinated gases and agriculture and industrial sectors
at the upper tail. Geographic location– and income–based heterogeneities suggest
policy impact is stronger in the Latin America and the Caribbean region and the
low–income economies only. Overall, the CDM has not been a very successful cli-
mate policy for developing countries. As such, it is important to adapt the design
and implementation changes to deliver better outcomes in future.
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 investigates the
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link between public debt and economic growth to examine the existence of debt
thresholds in developing economies. Chapter 3 examines the effectiveness of the
United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforesta-
tion and Forest Degradation on conserving tropical forests and emissions reduc-
tion. Chapter 4 explores the effectiveness of Kyoto’s Clean Development Mech-
anism on emissions reduction in developing countries. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are
presented as independent papers with separate references and appendices and are
followed by concluding remarks in Chapter 5.
6
References
Agung, P., Galudra, G., Van Noordwijk, M. and Maryani, R. (2014), ‘Reform
or reversal: the impact of redd+ readiness on forest governance in indonesia’,
Climate Policy 14(6), 748–768.
Ampofo, A. and Doko Tchatoka, F. (2019), ‘Reducing public-private sector pay
differentials: The single spine pay policy as a natural experiment in ghana’,
Economic Inquiry 57(1), 283–315.
Athey, S. and Imbens, G. W. (2018), Design-based analysis in difference-in-
differences settings with staggered adoption, Technical report, National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Baum, A., Checherita-Westphal, C. and Rother, P. (2013), ‘Debt and growth:
New evidence for the euro area’, Journal of International Money and Finance
32, 809–821.
Bayrak, M. and Marafa, L. (2016), ‘Ten years of redd+: A critical review of the
impact of redd+ on forest-dependent communities’, Sustainability 8(7), 620.
Burke, P. J. and Leigh, A. (2010), ‘Do output contractions trigger democratic
change?’, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 2(4), 124–57.
Caner, M. and Hansen, B. E. (2004), ‘Instrumental variable estimation of a thresh-
old model’, Econometric Theory 20(5), 813–843.
Checherita-Westphal, C. and Rother, P. (2012), ‘The impact of high government
debt on economic growth and its channels: An empirical investigation for the
euro area’, European economic review 56(7), 1392–1405.
7
Chinn, M. D. and Ito, H. (2006), ‘What matters for financial development? cap-
ital controls, institutions, and interactions’, Journal of development economics
81(1), 163–192.
Dell, M., Jones, B. F. and Olken, B. A. (2008), Climate change and economic
growth: Evidence from the last half century, Technical report, National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Dell, M., Jones, B. F. and Olken, B. A. (2012), ‘Temperature shocks and economic
growth: Evidence from the last half century’, American Economic Journal:
Macroeconomics 4(3), 66–95.
Feyen, E., Utz, R., Zuccardi Huertas, I., Bogdan, O. and Moon, J. (2020), Macro-
Financial Aspects of Climate Change, The World Bank.
GFW (2019), ‘Global forest watch open data portal’, http://data.
globalforestwatch.org/. Accessed December 10, 2019.
Hansen, B. E. (1999), ‘Threshold effects in non-dynamic panels: Estimation, test-
ing, and inference’, Journal of econometrics 93(2), 345–368.
Köthke, M., Leischner, B. and Elsasser, P. (2013), ‘Uniform global deforestation
patterns—an empirical analysis’, Forest Policy and Economics 28, 23–37.
Kremer, S., Bick, A. and Nautz, D. (2013), ‘Inflation and growth: new evidence
from a dynamic panel threshold analysis’, Empirical Economics 44(2), 861–878.
Mbaye, S., Badia, M. M. M. and Chae, K. (2018), Global debt database: Method-
ology and sources, International Monetary Fund.
Minang, P. A., Van Noordwijk, M., Duguma, L. A., Alemagi, D., Do, T. H.,
Bernard, F., Agung, P., Robiglio, V., Catacutan, D., Suyanto, S. et al. (2014),
‘Redd+ readiness progress across countries: time for reconsideration’, Climate
policy 14(6), 685–708.
OWD (2020), ‘Our world in data’, https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/
co2-intensity/. Accessed July, 2020.
8
Pistorius, T. (2012), ‘From red to redd+: the evolution of a forest-based miti-
gation approach for developing countries’, Current Opinion in Environmental
Sustainability 4(6), 638–645.
Powell, D. (2016), ‘Quantile regression with nonadditive fixed effects’, Quantile
Treatment Effects pp. 1–28.
Reinhart, C. M. and Rogoff, K. S. (2010), ‘Growth in a time of debt’, American
Economic Review 100(2), 573–78.
Rudel, T. K., Flesher, K., Bates, D., Baptista, S., Holmgren, P. et al. (2000), ‘Trop-
ical deforestation literature: geographical and historical patterns’, UNASYLVA-
FAO- pp. 11–18.
Stern, N. (2008), ‘The economics of climate change’, American Economic Review
98(2), 1–37.
Tol, R. S. (2009), ‘The economic effects of climate change’, Journal of economic
perspectives 23(2), 29–51.
WDI (2019), ‘World development indicators’, https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/. Accessed December 10, 2019.
WRI (2017), ‘Climate data explorer 2017’, https://www.climatewatchdata.
org/ghg-emissions/. Accessed July, 2020.
Zabala, A. (2018), ‘Comparing global spatial data on deforestation for institutional






LAKMINI FERNANDO FIRMIN DOKO TCHATOKA




This chapter explores the link between public debt and economic growth to ex-
amine the existence of debt thresholds in developing economies. Using a dy-
namic panel threshold regression technique on a balanced panel of 111 developing
economies over the period 1993–2017, we find evidence for a debt threshold effect
only in Latin America and the Caribbean region. As such, the existence of a pub-
lic debt threshold effect cannot be generalised to developing economies worldwide.
In addition, heterogeneous debt threshold effects are observed across income and
governance quality. In particular, debt thresholds are found at 37% and 38% of
debt–to–GDP for countries with the lowest income and lowest quality of gover-
nance, respectively. We also find that high debt is growth–enhancing for these
two country groups. Beyond the debt threshold, more debt has increased growth
by 0.01% for both low income economies and the economies with lowest gover-
nance quality. This indicates high debt does not necessarily impede the economic
development process in developing economies.
Keywords: Public debt; Economic growth; Threshold effects; Dynamic panel
threshold analysis
JEL classification: H63, O40, E62, C20
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2.1 Introduction
Sustainable debt management is a major policy concern as mounting public debt
can stymie the economic growth of nations. Since the Great Financial Crisis,
public debt has surged in many countries and is expected to increase further,
given the current policies in those countries. The belief that reducing debt to a
safe threshold can foster economic growth and help achieve development targets
has gained increasing consensus. This debt threshold, if it exists, is publicised
as the level above which the marginal impact of debt turns negative (Reinhart
and Rogoff, 2010), and it appears to vary across countries (Baum et al., 2013,
Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2012, Kumar and Woo, 2010). Maintaining
debt at a common threshold across countries, therefore, is not a viable economic
strategy. Given the high cost involved in sustaining debt, only robust evidence will
persuade policy makers to set thresholds for public debt. Despite the considerable
increase in public debt in developing economies, recent literature on the public
debt–growth nexus focuses mainly on developed economies, with inconclusive re-
sults. Furthermore, most of these studies build on the assumption that nations are
homogeneous, which is often not supported by actual data. Most recent literature
is skewed toward external borrowing. However, there is a clear trend that develop-
ing countries are moving away from external borrowing and instead move towards
domestic borrowing as the former involves high risks and definite debt repayment
commitments. Further, public debt is the total debt portfolio of a country and
contains both foreign currency denominated debt and local currency denominated
debt. Hence, the analysis on how pubic debt affect economic growth over time is
important.
This chapter aims to fill this gap and take a new look at the empirical rela-
tionship between debt and growth in developing countries, by providing an holistic
analytical view and by allowing for heterogeneities across different regions, income,
and quality of governance. In particular, our study investigates the existence of
debt thresholds in 111 developing countries, using the dynamic panel threshold
regression framework to identify the existence of threshold effect. We find strong
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evidence for the debt threshold effect only in Latin America and the Caribbean.
As such, the existence of a public debt threshold effect cannot be generalised to
developing nations worldwide. In addition, heterogeneous debt threshold effects
on economic growth are observed across income and governance quality levels.
In particular, higher public debt often results in higher growth for low income
countries and for countries with the lowest quality of governance. A number of
robustness exercises are performed, but do not significantly affect our findings.
Our findings are similar to those of Herndon et al. (2014), who find no evidence
for the existence of a public debt threshold in advanced economies. Further, they
reveal increased economic growth with public debt loads greater than 90% of
GDP. Minea and Parent (2012) claim that decline in growth is not static and is
limited to between 90% and 115% of GDP, beyond which growth increases. Future
growth prospects depend not only on the level of debt but on the debt trajectory
(Pescatori et al., 2014). High debt and low debt countries attain faster growth,
given their debts are on a downward trajectory and are supported by credible fiscal
policy. According to Kourtellos et al. (2013), the public debt threshold effects are
determined by the degree of institutional quality: at lower levels of institutional
quality, high debt reduces growth while higher institutional quality seems to be
growth neutral.
Our results do not follow the debt overhang hypothesis in general, which pos-
tulates that fiscal deterioration caused by high-debt can lead to poor real economic
conditions. In empirical studies focused on advanced economies, Reinhart et al.
(2012) and other experts Baum et al. (2013), Checherita-Westphal and Rother
(2012) debate the relationship between fiscal position and growth, confirming that
high levels of debt cause low growth. Studies based on both advanced and emerg-
ing economies also claim that debt overhang exists, but at different degrees for
different country groupings (Caner et al., 2010, Kumar and Woo, 2010). The
reasons for such growth deterioration are, firstly, that a high level of debt places
upward pressure on the interest rates; and secondly, that inefficient government
expenditure widens the fiscal deficit, distorting private sector decision making
on investments. Eventually, the crowding out of investment results in stagnant
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economies.
By empirically investigating the existence of public debt threshold in develop-
ing economies, our study contributes, firstly, to the existing literature on the public
debt overhang hypothesis, and also sheds a new light on the disparity between de-
veloped and developing countries on this topic. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first comprehensive study to empirically examine the debt threshold
effect in developing countries using the novel dynamic panel threshold regression
techniques as proposed by Hansen (1999), Caner and Hansen (2004) and Kremer
et al. (2013). Secondly, most studies on the debt–growth nexus have been limited
to a selected smaller number of developing countries. By contrast, our analysis of
the debt threshold uses a larger data set of developing countries, which includes
countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. Thirdly, by
allowing for heterogeneities in income and governance quality, we show that the
debt threshold effect is not uniform across these characteristics.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces
the data, then provides a brief description on public debt trends and a descriptive
analysis of data. Section 2.3 details our empirical strategy. Section 2.4 discusses
the research findings and in Section 2.5 we provide some robustness checks. Section
2.6 concludes the chapter by highlighting the policy implications.
2.2 Public debt data, trends and threshold ef-
fects
As described above, this chapter complements existing studies of debt thresholds in
developed countries. Like those papers, we frame our analysis of economic growth
as a straightforward Solow specification augmented with public debt. To motivate
our analysis we provide details of data in our sample in subsection 2.2.1, public




In this study, we use a balanced panel of 111 developing countries in Africa (47),
Asia (38), and Latin America and the Caribbean (26) covering the period 1993–
2017. The selection of a larger sample of countries is a significant improvement to
the existing literature on the debt–growth nexus in developing countries (see e.g.
Caner et al. (2010), who use 74 countries)1.
We employ a Solow–growth specification augmented with public debt to esti-
mate the threshold effects in developing economies. Our analysis therefore contains
a set of standard Solow growth determinants: trade openness, public investment,
population growth and secondary school enrolment (Panizza and Presbitero, 2013,
Presbitero, 2012). The dependent variable is the real GDP growth rate and it is
measured as the log difference in the real GDP (constant 2000 US$). The treat-
ment variable is public debt, which is used as the single regime–dependent variable
and also the threshold variable in the threshold analysis. For the majority of coun-
tries, public debt is reported as the central government debt, measured as a share
of GDP2. A set of control variables is used as the other explanatory variables:
trade openness (defined as exports plus imports as a share of GDP), public invest-
ment (defined as the gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP), population
growth (measured as the annual population growth rate) and secondary school
enrolment (given as duration in years).
The majority of the countries in our sample are primary commodity exporters
and are vulnerable to external shocks. Following the literature, we include the
trade openness variable to control the degree of openness to external trade. The
more the countries are open the higher is their long–term growth rate of real
income (Sachs et al., 1995). Public investment and population growth are the
two proxy variables used to represent two factor inputs of the production process,
1The list of developing countries in our sample is in the Table A.1 in the Appendix. Selection
of the sample of developing countries is based on the United Nations report on world economic
situation prospects 2019 (UN, 2019). We exclude 15 developing countries owing to poor data
availability.
2For a few countries the general government debt is used.
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namely, capital and labour. Secondary school enrolment is used as the proxy for
the quality of human capital (Barro and Lee, 2013). We use another 13 variables
for the robustness tests based on the theoretical and empirical growth literature.
They are foreign direct investment, inflation, unemployment rate, labour force,
labour force participation ratio, age dependency ratio, life expectancy at birth,
fertility rate, population, urban population, land area, human development index
and primary education. A description of all the variables is provided in Table A.4
in the Appendix. Public debt data were obtained from the Global Debt Database
and the Historical Debt Database published by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) (IMF, 2019). All the other variables are from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI, 2019).
In this study, gross government debt is used as the indicator for public debt.
The IMF’s Global Debt Database defines debt as the gross outstanding stock of all
liabilities that are debt instruments, in line with the System of National Accounts
2008 (Mbaye et al., 2018); however, net debt is the more appropriate measure for
indebtedness (Panizza and Presbitero, 2013). Net government debt is calculated by
subtracting gross debt from the assets held by the government. Measuring financial
assets and liabilities held by a country is a cumbersome process; consequently the
data on net debt are generally scarce and incomplete. Therefore, following the
existing literature, gross government debt is used as the indicator for public debt.
The gross government debt is reported as either central government debt or
general government debt, which includes the debt issued by both the central gov-
ernment and the regional authorities. Our main indicator choice for public debt is
central government debt. However, due to reporting issues we use general govern-
ment debt in nine cases (Cambodia, China, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Ethiopia, Mauritius, Panama, Philippines, Tanzania and the United Arab Emi-
rates). Considering all these limitations and the unavailability of a homogeneously
defined debt variable, the two selected indicators are treated as comparable indi-
cators for public debt. However, this assumption leads to another concern, that
the relationship between debt and growth may be affected by the composition of
public debt.
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To assess whether the debt–growth relationship is influenced by the quality of
governance, we use country ratings and statuses published by the annual Freedom
in the World Survey which was first compiled in the year 1972 (Freedom House,
2018). The two indicators used in the survey are the political rights (PR) and
civil liberties (CL). The indicators are measured on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1
representing the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest. The countries are
then categorised into three statuses based on combined average ratings for PR and
CL. Those that fell between 1.0 and 3.0 were designated as ‘free’; between 3.0 and
5.5 ‘partly free’; and between 5.5 and 7.0 ‘not free’. We also use the ‘scores’ of
the Freedom of the Press data published by the same institution as a robustness
check for the governance quality. The countries with scores between 0 and 30 are
designated as free; between 31 and 60 as partly free and between 61 and 100 as
not free.
2.2.2 Public debt trends
Debt in developed countries is responsible for most of the global debt. The av-
erage debt–to–GDP level in developed countries is much higher than that of the
developing countries and the economies in transition (Figure 2.1). Nevertheless,
the debt increase in developed and developing countries over the period 2008–2017
is 34% and 28% respectively. This means that over the past decade, developing
countries have contributed to global debt as much as the developed countries.
The historical debt data show that public debt in developing countries has
decreased sharply for many reasons, including the debt write–off offered by the
IMF. However, 2009 is a remarkable year, after which the declining trend in debt
is reversed and continues to increase. Moreover, the countries in Africa show
debt levels that are higher than the developing country debt average (Figure 2.1).
Barbados, Lebanon and Eritrea are the top three most indebted countries, with
debt–to–GDP ratios of 159, 147 and 131 respectively in 20173. The average debt–
3In 2017, the top ten most indebted developing countries in terms of public debt–to–GDP ratios were Bar-
bados (159%), Lebanon (147%), Eritrea (131%), Republic of Congo (130%), Cabo Verde (126%), Sudan (122%),
Singapore (112%), Bhutan (106%), Egypt (104%) and Jamaica (103%). Most indebted countries in the world are
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Figure 2.1: Public debt trends, 1995–2017
to–GDP ratio is 60% for the entire sample (Africa: 71.2%, Asia: 51.1% and Latin
America and the Caribbean: 51.4%). (Descriptive statistics of all the variables
are given in Table A.5 in the Appendix). The average debt of 44 countries (i.e.
40% of the countries in the sample) is higher than the developing country average
debt of 60%. As such, the debt levels in the majority of the developing countries
are still at a low–to–moderate level. However, given the increasing trend in debt
accumulation, it is safer to take precautionary measures beforehand.
The distribution of average public debt and average real GDP growth rates
over the period 1993–2017 indicates periods of high public debt have been followed
by lower average growth rates and vice versa (Panel A of Figure A.2 in the Ap-
pendix). Median growth also shows a similar pattern of change. Therefore, we can
assume a negative correlation between growth and public debt. Growth slowed
down sharply in 2009, when public debt approximates 44% of debt–to–GDP. High
shown in Figure A.1 in the Appendix
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growth accompanies subsequent debt decrease in early 2000 and lower growth is
preceded by high debt accumulation, where the direction of causality is difficult
to disentangle. Panel B of Figure A.2 in the Appendix shows country distribution
for which the public debt–to–GDP ratios are within the four debt regimes as ex-
plained by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). The average debt levels of the majority of
the developing countries lie in the debt regime of 30–60% of debt–to–GDP. There
are very few countries (less than 10) recording debt levels higher than 90% for any
given time period after 2005. This indicates that public debt levels are still at a
low to moderate level for the majority of the countries in our sample.
A simple correlation analysis indicates a negative and significant relationship
between public debt and economic growth (see Table A.6 in the Appendix). How-
ever, negative correlation does not necessarily mean that high debt causes low
growth. All the other main control variables seems to foster economic growth.
Next, the relationship between public debt and economic growth is examined us-
ing a series of scatter plots. We aggregate the data into one big cross-section
covering the period 1993–2017 to show the correlation of real GDP growth against
the ratio of public debt–to–GDP. It suggests that in developing countries debt and
growth are negatively associated with economic growth, although not strongly (see
Figure A.3 in the Appendix). This is even true for the other regions, except the
Asian region (see Figure A.4 in the Appendix).
2.2.3 Debt threshold effects
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) discuss the presence of a debt threshold at 90% of
the debt–to–GDP ratio, after which economic growth dramatically declines in ad-
vanced economies. Similarly, we analyse our data set to understand the existence
of any such debt threshold for the developing countries. We plot the average and
median growth variations under two different debt regime specifications using sim-
ple descriptive statistics. Firstly, following Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) we set four
debt regimes at much wider debt intervals of (1) < 30% of GDP, (2) 30− 60% of
GDP, (3) 60 − 90% of GDP and (4) > 90% of GDP. Secondly, we set ten debt
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regimes, each at a 10% interval. The use of a large number of debt regimes at
shorter intervals minimises aggregation bias, which may result from using wider
intervals, as done by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010).
Table 2.1 shows the growth variation in the aforementioned debt regime spec-
ifications. According to the first specification, for the pooled sample of developing
countries and for the two sub samples that represent Africa and Asia, a debt
threshold exists at 90% of debt–to–GDP, whereas it is at 60% of debt–to–GDP for
Latin America and the Caribbean (Panel A of Table 2.1 and Figure 2.2). However,
in the second specification with ten debt regimes, we did not observe such system-
atic variation in growth over increasing debt levels for any of the samples (Panel
B of Table 2.1 and Figure 2.3). This indicates that under the first specification
we may have observed debt thresholds caused by an aggregation effect. When the
narrower debt regimes are used in the second specification, debt thresholds are no
longer visible, as the use of shorter debt intervals minimises the aggregation bias.
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Table 2.1: Economic growth variation in different debt regimes
Debt Regimes
GDP growth rate (percentage)
Developing Africa Asia Latin America
& the Caribbean
Average Median Average Median Average Median Average Median
A: Four debt regimes (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010)
(1) < 30 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.2 4.2 2.8 3.3
(2) 30− 60 3.8 4.1 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.5 3.1 3.5
(3) 60− 90 5.5 4.5 4.2 4.7 5.5 5.8 2.5 2.5
(4) > 90 3.4 4.0 3.3 4.5 3.9 4.0 2.8 2.9
B: Ten debt regimes
(1) 10− 20 3.5 4.3 3.7 3.8 3.2 3.5 3.8 4.5
(2) 20− 30 3.8 3.7 4.1 4.5 5.0 4.4 2.5 2.8
(3) 30− 40 3.6 4.1 - - 4.6 4.2 3.1 3.8
(4) 40− 50 3.7 4.1 4.0 4.3 4.0 5.0 2.1 2.3
(5) 50− 60 4.1 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.9 4.0 4.1
(6) 60− 70 4.1 4.5 4.0 4.5 4.7 5.3 2.6 3.0
(7) 70− 80 5.0 5.4 4.3 3.6 6.1 6.9 3.5 3.3
(8) 80− 90 4.6 4.5 4.6 4.7 6.3 6.1 1.5 1.2
(9) 90− 100 3.4 4.1 2.7 4.0 3.8 4.1 - -
(10) > 100 3.3 3.7 3.5 4.1 4.3 3.2 2.8 3.5
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Figure 2.2: Growth variation in four (wide) debt regimes
Figure 2.3: Growth variation in ten (narrow) debt regimes




We explore the public debt–growth nexus to examine the presence of debt thresh-
olds in developing countries. Using the dynamic panel threshold model, that
advances the static panel threshold estimation model of Hansen (1999) and the
dynamic cross–sectional threshold model of Caner and Hansen (2004), we investi-
gate the presence of debt threshold effects. A similar setting was used by Kremer
et al. (2013) to analyse inflation thresholds in the inflation–growth nexus. In our
analysis, we adopt a Solow–growth specification augmented with public debt to
estimate the following specification:
∆gdpit = χ∆gdpi,t−1 + β1ditI(dit ≤ γ) + β2ditI(dit > γ) + α′Xit + ηt + µi + eit
(2.3.1)
where the subscript i = 1, ..., N indexes the country and the subscript t = 1, ..., T
indexes the time. The outcome variable is real GDP growth rate of country i at
time t, ∆gdpit, measured by the log difference in real GDP. The lagged dependent
variable is ∆gdpi,t−1. Our variable of interest is dit, the public debt of country
i at time t with two coefficients of interest: β1 and β2. It is considered as both
the threshold variable and the regime–dependent regressor. I(.) is the indicator
function specifying the regime by the threshold variable, dit, and the threshold
level, γ. The threshold variable (dit) splits the sample into two ‘regimes’ based
on whether the threshold variable is lower or higher than the threshold level (γ).
Therefore, the indicator function takes the value 0 if dit ≤ γ (Regime 1) and the
value 1 if dit > γ (Regime 2). Here, we do not know which observation belongs to
which regime (i.e. we do not know the threshold value, γ), but we can observe the
threshold variable, dit. The parameters of interest are β1 and β2, which are the two
regime regression slopes. β1 is the marginal impact of the threshold variable when
the threshold variable is less than or equal to the threshold value, and β2 is the
marginal impact of threshold variable when the threshold variable is greater than
the threshold value. Xit is a vector of control variables considered to be regime
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independent. It contains a set of standard Solow growth determinants (trade
openness, public investment, population growth and secondary school enrolment)
and its coefficient vector α estimates the effect of a change in each of these variables
on real GDP growth rate. The unobserved heterogeneity is controlled using year–
and country–specific fixed effects, ηt and µi, respectively. The year fixed effects
account for various economic and political changes that evolve over time (e.g.
global business cycle changes). The country–specific fixed effects capture the effect
on economic growth of time–invariant traits such as culture, population preferences
and history and are the same in both regimes (Hansen, 1999). Omission of these
unobservable characteristics might affect the identification of debt thresholds.
The general specification in equation 2.3.1 allows us to study only two debt
regimes (one threshold parameter). However, the model can be studied with more
than two regimes and the estimation procedure of Hansen (1999) facilitates a
specification with k regimes. A threshold model with three regimes (two threshold
parameters) takes the following form:
∆gdpit = χ∆gdpi,t−1 + α′Xit + β1ditI(dit ≤ γ1) + β2ditI(γ1 < dit ≤ γ2)+
β3ditI(dit > γ2) + ηt + µi + eit
(2.3.2)
where we assume that the threshold parameters γj satisfy γ1 < γ2.
2.3.2 Estimation
The dynamic panel threshold regression (DPTR) model has been used extensively
in studying the debt–growth nexus but has remained scarce in similar literature
focusing on developing countries. It is considered a superior technique in esti-
mating nonlinear functions as it allows simultaneous estimation of the threshold
level, its significance, the coefficients of the different regimes and their significance.
In this section we describe how we employ the DPTR model in our analysis. In
particular, we allow for a dynamic panel framework that allows for endogeneity
in a way that estimates both the threshold and the coefficients either side of the
threshold.
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Converting to dynamic panel framework by eliminating fixed effects
Caner and Hansen (2004) develop their model to endogenous variables and an
exogenous threshold variable under a cross–sectional approach. To apply this
framework to deal with country–specific fixed effects, we first need to eliminate
the fixed effects via a fixed effects transformation without violating the distribu-
tional assumptions in Hansen (1999) and Caner and Hansen (2004). The standard
within–group transformation does not eliminate dynamic panel bias and leads to
inconsistent estimates, as the transformed lagged dependent variable negatively
correlates with the transformed error term (Nickell, 1981). Therefore, to elim-
inate the individual fixed effects we use forward orthogonal transformation, as
suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995). This ensures the uncorrelatedness of the
error terms and allows the use of static model of Hansen (1999) and cross sectional
model of Caner and Hansen (2004) into a dynamic panel threshold setting.
Dealing with endogeneity
Structural equation (2.3.1) requires a set of suitable instruments to solve the prob-
lem of endogeneity. As there is no clear guideline on identification restrictions,
we use T -1 moment conditions (i.e. use all available lags of the dependent vari-
able) as instruments. Then, following Caner and Hansen (2004), we estimate the
reduced form regression by ordinary least squares for the endogenous variable us-
ing all available lags of the dependent variable as instruments. Next, we replace
the original values of the dependent variable, gdpi,t−1, in equation (2.3.1) with its
predicted values, ˆgdpi,t−1, and estimate the threshold point using least squares.
Estimating the threshold value
The specific threshold value is determined following the strategy proposed by
Hansen (1999), which involves the following three main steps.
1. We conduct a series of least squares minimisations. That is, we estimate
equation (2.3.1) with two–stage least squares for each value of the thresh-
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old series. The corresponding estimates of the parameters and the sum of
squared residuals are kept.
2. We select the threshold value of dit as the value that best minimises the sum
of square residuals (S(γ)), γ̂ = argmin S(γ). Then, the confidence interval
for the threshold variable, dit can be constructed as Γ = γ : LR(γ) ≤ C(α)
where Γ is an asymptotic confidence region for γ; C(α) is the percentile
asymptotic confidence interval for threshold values of the asymptotic likeli-
hood ratio statistics, LR(γ).
3. We test for the significance of the chosen threshold value. The threshold
parameter is not identified under the null hypothesis of a linear model i.e.
no threshold effect (H0 : β1 = β2), therefore classical tests have non-standard
distributions (known as the ‘Davies’ Problem’). Hence, we use a bootstrap
method to simulate the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood ratio test.
Estimating the slope coefficients
Finally, with the selected threshold value, γ̂, which splits the sample into low debt
and high debt regimes, the slope coefficients of both regimes are estimated using
generalised methods of moments (GMM). The GMM estimators are easily seen to
be efficient estimators of β1 and β2. We can allow for the possibility of more than
one threshold, which gives rise to more than two debt regimes in the estimation
procedure. However, since, the first threshold is not significant in the majority of
the specifications, we ignore the possibility of the existence of multiple thresholds
in our data.
The DPTR chooses the estimate that minimises the residual sum of squares
as the debt threshold (Hansen, 1999). The statistical significance of the threshold
estimates is examined using LR statistic, measured as the difference between the
residual sum of squares of the model for a generic value of the threshold and the
corresponding estimated threshold (scaled by the variance of the sample residuals).
Testing for the threshold is similar to testing for whether or not the coefficients are
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the same in each regime. We use bootstrap on the critical values of the F -statistic
to test the significance of the threshold effect. At the threshold, LR = 0. The
coverage rate of the threshold estimator gets wider as n or T increases (Wang,
2015).
2.3.3 Threats to identifying a significant debt–growth nexus
Higher public debt acts as a drag on economic growth. However, causality may run
in the other direction, where slow growth reduces the tax revenue and increases
the need for more public expenditure, widening the fiscal deficit. The causality can
be assessed based on different timings of the change in growth and public debt ra-
tio: contemporaneous growth (indicates causality is ambiguous); five–year forward
(leading) average growth (indicates causality running from debt to growth); and
five–year past (lagging) average growth (indicates reverse causality from growth
to debt).
Autocorrelation in the error term for growth means negative shocks to growth
are persistent and the shock is passed to the debt process, increasing the level of
debt in the long run. Therefore, in a contemporaneous regression, autocorrelation
in the growth equation will erroneously lead to the conclusion that public debt is
bad for growth. Averaging growth in to the future over several years reduces this
bias. Therefore, we focus mainly on the forward five–year average growth in our
analysis so as to mitigate bias in the estimates.
The endogeneity bias of the lagged dependent variable makes the estimates
inconsistent. This issue is addressed by using lags of the dependent variable
(∆gdpi,t−1, ..., ∆gdpi,t−p) as instruments (Arellano and Bover, 1995). The choice
of number of instruments (p) creates bias/efficiency trade–off in finite samples
(Roodman, 2009); hence, we consider two regressions: First, with all available
lags of the dependent variable (p = t) to increase efficiency; and second, with one
lag (p = 1) only, to avoid overfit of instrument variables. The results indicate
there is no significant difference between the choice of instruments.
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The DPTR considers two sets of variables: exogenous (or pre–determined)
and endogenous. The model addresses only the endogeneity bias of the lagged de-
pendent variable as discussed above and ignores the simultaneity bias of the other
remaining variables, (e.g. the exogeneity assumption of the threshold variable).
This is dealt with by using their first lags in the estimation as it is difficult to find
external instruments that are uncorrelated with the regressors and error term.
The estimation procedures can be affected by the presence of cross–sectionally
correlated errors (Pesaran, 2006). One caveat is the unavailability of a method to
control for cross–section dependence in the DPTR, which may serve as scope for
future research.
2.4 Results
This section provides the DPTR estimates on public debt–growth nexus. Section
2.4.1 presents the estimates on the presence of debt thresholds. Then, the hetero-
geneous debt threshold effects across income and governance quality are shown in
sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3, respectively.
2.4.1 Presence of debt thresholds
Table 2.2 shows the DPTR estimates on the relationship between public debt
and growth in developing countries based on the baseline specification in equation
(2.3.1). The estimates in Panel A of Table 2.2 with no individual controls provide
evidence for a debt threshold effect of 26% of debt–to–GDP only for Latin America
and the Caribbean. Including controls for trade openness, public investment,
population growth and secondary school enrolment, reduces this debt threshold
to 25% of debt–to–GDP (Panel B of Table 2.2 and Figure 2.4).
The change in the size of the debt threshold shows the importance of inclusion
of control variables in the estimation. We observe threshold effects only for Latin
America and the Caribbean, as such, the existence of a public debt threshold effect
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Table 2.2: DPTR estimates of debt on forward growth
Developing Africa Asia Latin America
& the Caribbean
A-Forward growth excluding controls
Threshold estimates γ̂ 76.099 75.730 26.461 25.750
95% confidence interval [73.06 76.64] [72.87 75.94] [26.05 26.66] [25.03 26.15]
Threshold effect test: p-value 0.451 0.495 0.297 0.062
Threshold effect No No No Yes
Impact of debt on growth
β̂1 0.021*** 0.027*** 0.090*** -0.060***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.018) (0.012)
β̂2 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.025*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Regime independent controls No No No No
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries/Observations 111/2,331 47/987 38/798 26/546
B-Forward growth including controls
Threshold estimates γ̂ 37.549 31.690 39.552 25.160
95% confidence interval [37.07 37.70] [30.82 31.95] [36.09 39.56] [24.75 25.19]
Threshold effect test: p-value 0.157 0.331 0.675 0.010
Threshold effect No No No Yes
Impact of debt on growth
β̂1 -0.007 -0.021** 0.002 -0.050***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
β̂2 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.021*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Regime independent controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries/Observations 111/2,331 47/987 38/798 26/546
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications are shown in parentheses. ***, **,
and * indicate significant p values at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Figure 2.4: Public debt thresholds
Note: The figure illustrates the public debt thresholds in developing economies. A threshold
effect of 25% debt–to–GDP is significant only in Latin America and the Caribbean region.
cannot be generalised to developing economies worldwide.
The regime–dependent coefficient at high debt regime is positive for Latin
America and the Caribbean (Panel B of Table 2.2). This indicates although the
debt approaches high levels (or beyond the threshold level of 25% of debt–to–
GDP), it does not impede economic growth. Therefore, we can conclude that
irrespective of accumulating high debt stocks, public debt is growth–enhancing
for Latin America and the Caribbean region.
Our analysis is based on the forward overlapping five–year average growth as
this indicates causality running from debt to growth and aids in mitigating the
bias in the estimates. As a robustness exercise, we estimate the equation (2.3.1)
on non–overlapping forward five–year growth averages (1993–1997, 1998–2002,
2003–2007, 2008–2012, 2013–2017) (Table A.7 in the Appendix). This reduces the
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number of data points in our sample to five (t = 5). The results are quite similar
to overlapping five–year growth averages, with strong evidence for the existence
of debt thresholds only for the Latin America and the Caribbean region. We then
re–estimate the equation (2.3.1) on contemporaneous growth. However, the results
show no evidence for the presence of threshold effects for developing economies or
for any of the regional sub–groups. (Table A.8 in the Appendix). The rest of our
study therefore, focuses mainly on the forward overlapping five–year averages of
growth and public debt as it indicates that causality may run from public debt to
growth. It may assist in disentangling the relationship between debt and growth
effectively.
2.4.2 Heterogeneity across income
Table 2.3 shows the income–based heterogeneity analysis on the existence of
threshold effects in developing countries. The list of developing countries by level
of income is given in Table A.2 in the Appendix. The debt threshold effect is seen
only amongst low income countries at 37% of debt–to–GDP (Panel B of Table
2.3). The marginal impact of debt in the high debt regime for the low income
countries is significant and positive. This indicates that as the public debt level
exceeds the threshold value of 37% debt–to–GDP, a 100% increase in public debt
leads to a 1% increase in economic growth for the low income countries.
Figure A.5 in the Appendix visually presents the debt threshold effects in the
developing economies for the income based four sub–groups. The debt threshold
effect visible in the lower income category is no longer observed with increasing
income. Approximately 85% of the countries in the low income group comprises
of countries in Africa4. As the production structures significantly vary across the
level of development paradigm, the presence of debt thresholds may have impacted
by the existing structural differences.
Low income economies have accumulated substantially larger debt stocks in
4Low income country group comprises of countries in the regions of Africa (23), Asia (3) and
Latin America and the Caribbean (1).
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Table 2.3: DPTR estimates of debt on growth, by income
Low Income Lower–Middle Upper–Middle High Income
Income Income
A-Forward growth excluding controls
Threshold estimates γ̂ 37.367 64.674 69.855 19.384
95% confidence interval [36.87 37.67] [54.33 65.17] [67.49 70.24] [19.17 19.58]
Threshold effect test: p-value 0.294 0.809 0.041 0.993
Threshold effect No No Yes No
Impact of debt on growth
β̂1 -0.061*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.061*
(0.017) (0.005) (0.006) (0.032)
β̂2 0.003 0.011*** 0.003 0.013*
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007)
Regime independent controls No No No No
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries/Observations 27/567 38/798 30/630 16/336
B-Forward growth including controls
Threshold estimates γ̂ 37.367 64.674 72.863 60.895
95% confidence interval [37.09 37.66] [59.30 65.17] [69.96 73.77] [54.21 60.98]
Threshold effect test: p-value 0.019 0.760 0.081 0.348
Threshold effect Yes No No No
Impact of debt on growth
β̂1 -0.050*** 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.049***
(0.013) (0.004) (0.005) (0.010)
β̂2 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.003 0.026***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006)
Regime independent controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries/Observations 27/567 38/798 30/630 16/336
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications are shown in parentheses. ***, **,
and * indicate significant p values at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
recent years. The increase in median public debt is as high as 20% of GDP
since 2013 which is comprised mainly of non–concessional and privately sourced
debts (Essl et al., 2019). Therefore, interest payments are absorbing an increas-
ing proportion of government revenues. The majority of low income countries are
susceptible to weakening in trade or global financial conditions given high levels
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of external debt, lack of fiscal space, low foreign currency reserves, and undiver-
sified exports. As such, proactive efforts in identifying and reducing debt–related
vulnerabilities is a top priority for developing economies. In this context, the
governments should be encouraged to mobilize domestic resources, improve debt
transparency, and strengthen debt management practices. Furthermore, it is ad-
visable to complement these by focusing on ways to strengthen fiscal frameworks,
improve the efficiency of public expenditures and public investment management,
and develop domestic financial systems.
2.4.3 Heterogeneity across governance quality
Table 2.4 shows the DPTR estimates across the quality of governance. The list
of developing countries by level of governance quality is given in Table A.3 in
the Appendix. When we allow the debt–growth relationship to vary according to
governance quality, we find that governance quality indeed matters. In particular,
we observe the presence of debt thresholds only in the countries with the lowest
governance quality (‘not free’). The public debt threshold for the country group
‘not free’ is at 38% of debt–to–GDP. Beyond this debt threshold, a 100% increase
in debt leads to 1% increase in growth. As in the previous case, high debt is
not growth–reducing for countries with the poorest quality of governance. If the
debt ratio is above the threshold value, the marginal impact of debt on growth is
positive. This indicates that once a debt threshold is surpassed, public debt for
developing countries with poor governance quality is growth–enhancing.
The effect of public debt on growth depends not only on the level of indebt-
edness but also on other country characteristics, such as institutional quality,
and governance quality (Kourtellos et al., 2013). If the debt–growth relationship
depends on characteristics other than indebtedness, separate DPTR regressions
based on three geographical regions: Africa, Asia and Latin America and the
Caribbean would not be meaningful here, as they would split the sample along
the same dimensions as before. Therefore, we estimate the equation (2.3.1) on
sub–samples based on the level of governance quality, i.e. according to the com-
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Table 2.4: DPTR estimates of debt on growth, by governance quality
Free Partly Free Not Free
A-Forward growth excluding controls
Threshold estimates γ̂ 77.054 105.986 49.996
95% confidence interval [75.20 77.73] [104.09 106.65] [49.73 50.71]
Threshold effect test: p-value 0.138 0.318 0.139
Threshold effect No No No
Impact of debt on growth
β̂1 0.038*** 0.011*** -0.045***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.013)
β̂2 0.016*** 0.001 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Regime independent controls No No No
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Countries/Observations 29/609 57/1,197 25/525
B-Forward growth including controls
Threshold estimates γ̂ 77.019 71.543 37.533
95% confidence interval [74.53 77.05] [69.39 71.62] [37.26 37.74]
Threshold effect test: p-value 0.101 0.119 0.012
Threshold effect No No Yes
Impact of debt on growth
β̂1 0.034*** 0.019*** -0.060***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.013)
β̂2 0.017*** 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Regime independent controls Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Countries/Observations 29/609 57/1,197 25/525
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications are shown in parentheses. ***, **,
and * indicate significant p values at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
bined average ratings for political rights and civil liberties, as reported in the
annual Freedom in the World Survey (Freedom House, 2018).
Finally, we can conclude that the findings emphasise the role individual factors
play in determining the debt–growth relationship when the estimation is controlled
using an indicator for the quality of governance. We find governance quality better
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explains the non–linearity between public debt and economic growth, suggesting
the existence of debt thresholds for developing economies.
Despite the importance of governance quality in determining the nature of the
debt–growth relationship, poor governance quality has not been identified a reason
for reduced growth in developing countries. This may partly explain why very
high levels of debt may not matter for economic growth in developing countries.
Our findings are similar to those of Cordella et al. (2010), who found that very
high debt levels have not hampered the economic growth in heavily indebted
poor countries. Further, they confirmed that net transfers and investment do not
depend on the stock of debt. We therefore conclude that, in developing economies,
debt reduction would be growth–enhancing irrespective of the level of governance
quality. However, this does not necessarily encourage the accumulation of high
debt or prevalence of poor governance quality as opposed to low debt and good
governance quality. Moreover, there can be other channels through which public
debt affects growth, an important area for future research. Overall in our analysis,
we find that high debt has not reduced economic growth in developing countries.
The negative effects of public debt are not yet that drastic, possibly because debt
levels may not be as high in developing countries as in the case of developed
countries.
2.5 Robustness checks
We conduct a number of robustness tests to ensure that our results are robust
throughout a range of specifications. These include estimation with additional
variables; analysis with heterogeneity along each of the cross–sectional and time
dimensions; and estimation with alternative measures for governance quality. For
the majority of these tests the results are supportive of our primary analysis.
The DPTR estimation for public debt and forward five–year average growth
rate is carried out including an additional thirteen explanatory variables selected
based on the available theoretical and empirical growth literature. These are for-
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eign direct investment, inflation, unemployment rate, labour force, labour force
participation ratio, age dependency ratio, life expectancy at birth, fertility rate,
population, urban population, land, human development index and primary ed-
ucation. All variables are used as one–period lagged variables to avoid further
endogeneity in the model. The results are robust over all these regressors for the
full sample of developing countries and the three sub–samples representing Africa,
Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean.
Given the importance of including both low– and high debt countries in the
analysis, restricting the sample is problematic for the objective of our study. Yet,
as an econometric robustness check, we eliminate countries one at a time from the
sample, starting with the debt outliers: ten countries with the highest and the
lowest, average and median debt. We find the estimation results are robust across
all these specifications. We also conduct robustness checks with restricted samples
along time dimensions: for five–year periods; and for the periods before and after
the financial crisis. The debt threshold values deviate slightly before and after the
financial crisis, yet the significance and the direction of results are robust for the
high debt regime.
To check the robustness of the existence of a debt threshold in countries with
the worst governance quality, we run the DPTR estimation using other indicators
for governance quality: freedom of press and individual variables on civil liberty
and property rights. Results obtained using ‘freedom of press’ as an indicator are
more statistically significant, and the pattern that emerges survives for the high
debt regime in all the specifications.
To examine the sensitivity of the type of public debt (whether it is the general
government debt which we used as the main indicator for public debt or the
central government debt) on our results, we re-estimate (2.3.1) by excluding the
nine countries that measure public debt as general government debt. Except for
a slight change in estimate magnitudes, there is no substantial difference in the
level of statistical significance compared to our baseline results. This indicates
that the use of general government debt has no substantial qualitative impact on
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our findings.
2.6 Policy implications and concluding remarks
The idea that debt reduction may induce economic growth and help achieve the
development targets of the developing countries is gaining increasing consensus.
In this chapter, we examine the relationship between public debt and economic
growth and the existence of debt thresholds in developing countries by considering
heterogeneities across regions, income and quality of governance.
Although research on the debt–growth nexus has been revamped since the
financial crisis, it has focused mainly on developed countries, despite the increasing
debts in developing countries. The main objective of our study is to carry out a
comprehensive debt analysis to better understand the relationship between public
debt–growth nexus and the presence of debt thresholds in developing economies.
Using a larger annual data set of 111 developing countries over the period 1993–
2017, we employ the DPTR model to estimate debt thresholds. Our study provides
the first evidence of applying this econometric technique to a large number of
developing countries covering the three regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin America
and the Caribbean. The study has an extant value as developing countries show
increased preference for domestic borrowing, due to lower costs and fewer risks,
compared to the external borrowing.
Employing the DPTR, we show that there is no evidence for debt thresholds for
the developing countries except for the Latin America and the Caribbean region,
where the debt turning point lies at around 25% of debt–to–GDP. Our results
are similar to Chudik et al. (2017), Pescatori et al. (2014) and Bentour (2021)
who find no evidence of a threshold effect. Pescatori et al. (2014) found the debt
trajectory is important in understanding future growth prospects, as countries
with high but declining debt appear to grow equally as fast as countries with low
debt. We observe a similar pattern as high debt has not reduced the growth of
developing economies. Further, estimating region–specific or country–specific debt
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thresholds might be useful rather than estimating common debt thresholds for all
the developing countries. Further, contemporary literature suggests that threshold
analysis is extremely sensitive to the econometric technique, sample selection and
the time period. Therefore, the results need to be interpreted with caution.
The public debt–growth nexus may depend not only on the level of indebt-
edness but also on other country characteristics (Kourtellos et al., 2013). As re-
gional country categories based on geographical location do not provide meaningful
analytical groups when investigating the impact of other country characteristics
(income and governance quality) on the public debt–growth nexus, we differenti-
ate countries firstly into four sub–groups according to their income (low income,
lower–middle income, upper–middle income and high income) and secondly into
three sub–groups based on level of governance quality (free, partly free and not
free). This classification of countries drives different results for the value of the
debt threshold, yet high public debt is growth–enhancing in all these specifications.
We find strong evidence for debt threshold effects based on income and governance
quality, which indicates that marginal impact of debt on growth starts to differ-
entiate at a debt threshold of 37% debt–to–GDP for countries in the low income
group and at 38% debt–to–GDP for countries with poorer governance quality. It
is worth noting that the majority of countries in these two groups represent the
African region.
Our finding that beyond the debt threshold, high debt is not growth–reducing,
does not necessarily encourage debt accumulations or dismisses the need to im-
prove the quality of governance in developing countries. Moreover, the absence of
significance at the marginally high levels of debt does not imply that the absence
of average debt reduction may have no impact on growth. Although small reduc-
tions in debt shows no impact, large reductions might still significantly improve
the growth performance. Thus, further analysis considering the heterogeneities
across sub–regions and single country studies may also beneficial in deriving sen-
sible policies to ensure sustainable debt management in developing economies.
39
Appendix A
Figure A.1: Most indebted countries in the world - 2017
Figure A.2: Public debt trends in developing countries
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Figure A.3: Public debt and real GDP growth: pooled developing countries
Figure A.4: Public debt and real GDP growth: regional differences
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Figure A.5: Public debt thresholds, income heterogeneity
Note: The figure illustrates the presence of a significant public debt threshold (red) of 37%
debt–to–GDP for the low income countries.
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Table A.1: List of developing countries
Africa Asia Latin America
and the Caribbean
North Africa Southern Africa East Asia Western Asia Caribbean
Algeria Angola Cambodia Bahrain Bahamas
Egypt Botswana China Israel Barbados
Mauritania Eswatini Fiji Jordan Belize
Morocco Lesotho Indonesia Kuwait Guyana
Sudan Malawi Kiribati Lebanon Jamaica
Tunisia Mauritius Laos Oman Suriname
Namibia Malaysia Qatar Trinidad & Tobago
Central Africa South Africa Mongolia Saudi Arabia
Cameroon Zambia Myanmar Syria Mexico & Central America
Central African Rep. Zimbabwe PNG Turkey Costa Rica
Chad Philippines UAE Dominican Rep.
Congo West Africa Rep. of Korea Yemen El Salvador
Gabon Benin Samoa Guatemala
Sao Tome & Principe Burkina Faso Singapore Haiti
Cabo Verde Solomon Islands Honduras
East Africa Cote d’Ivoire Thailand Mexico
Burundi Gambia Vanuatu Nicaragua
Comoros Ghana Vietnam Panama
Congo, Dem.Rep. Guinea
Djibouti Guinea-Bissau South Asia South America
Eritrea Mali Bangladesh Argentina
Ethiopia Niger Bhutan Bolivia
Kenya Nigeria India Brazil
Madagascar Senegal Iran Chile
Rwanda Sierra Leone Maldives Colombia





Note: The United Nations World Economic Situation Prospects 2019 Report classifies countries
into three groups: developed economies, economies in transition and developing economies.
There are 126 developing countries: 53 in Africa, 46 in Asia and 27 in Latin America and the
Caribbean region. We exclude 15 countries from the sample due to unavailability of reliable debt
data.
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Table A.2: List of developing countries, by income
Low Income Lower-Middle Income Upper-Middle Income High Income
Benin Angola Algeria Argentina
Burkina Faso Bangladesh Belize Bahamas
Burundi Bhutan Botswana Bahrain
Central African Republic Bolivia Brazil Barbados
Chad Cabo Verde China Chile
Comoros Cambodia Colombia Israel
Congo, Dem. Rep. Cameroon Costa Rica Korea, Rep.
Eritrea Congo, Rep. Dominican Republic Kuwait
Ethiopia Cote d’Ivoire Ecuador Oman
Gambia Djibouti Fiji Panama
Guinea Egypt Gabon Qatar
Guinea-Bissau El Salvador Guatemala Saudi Arabia
Haiti Eswatini Guyana Singapore
Madagascar Ghana Iran Trinidad and Tobago
Malawi Honduras Jamaica UAE




Senegal Lao PDR Mauritius


















Table A.3: List of developing countries, by governance quality
Free Partly Free Not Free
Argentina Bangladesh Malaysia Algeria
Bahamas Bhutan Maldives Angola
Barbados Bolivia Mali Bahrain
Belize Burkina Faso Mauritania Burundi
Benin Central African Republic Mexico Cambodia
Botswana Colombia Morocco Cameroon
Brazil Comoros Nepal Chad
Cabo Verde Congo, Dem. Rep. Nicaragua China
Chile Cote d’Ivoire Niger Congo, Rep.
Costa Rica Djibouti Nigeria Egypt
Dominican Republic Ecuador Pakistan Eritrea
El Salvador Ethiopia PNG Eswatini
Ghana Fiji Paraguay Iran
Guyana Gabon Peru Lao PDR
Israel Gambia Philippines Myanmar
Jamaica Guatemala Senegal Oman
Kiribati Guinea Sierra Leone Qatar
Korea, Rep. Guinea-Bissau Singapore Rwanda
Mauritius Haiti Solomon Islands Saudi Arabia
Mongolia Honduras Sri Lanka Sudan
Namibia India Tanzania Syria
Panama Indonesia Thailand UAE
Samoa Jordan Togo Vietnam
Sao Tome and Principe Kenya Tunisia Yemen
South Africa Kuwait Turkey Zimbabwe
Suriname Lebanon Uganda




Table A.4: Basic information of the variables
Variable Description Source
Outcome variable
∆gdp Real GDP growth rate (%) WB
Threshold variable
d Public debt–to–GDP ratio (as a % of GDP) IMF
Explanatory variables: main analysis
open Exports and imports of goods and services (as a % of GDP) WB
i Gross fixed capital formation (as a % of GDP) WB
gpop Population growth (annual, %) WB
edu Secondary education, duration (years) WB
pr Political rights, degree of freedom, (Scale 1-7; 1=highest; 7=lowest) Freedom House
cl Civil liberties, degree of freedom, (Scale 1-7; 1=highest; 7=lowest) Freedom House
Explanatory variables: robustness checks
fdi Foreign direct investment, net inflows (as a % of GDP) WB
inf Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) WB
unemp Unemployment rate, total (% of total labor force) WB
lf Labour force, total (people ages 15 and older who supply labor) WB
lfpr Labour force participation rate, total (% of total population ages 15+) WB
(modeled International Labour Organization estimate)
dr Age dependency ratio (% of working-age population) WB
life Life expectancy at birth, total (years) WB
ferti Fertility rate, total (births per woman) WB
pop Population, total WB
upop Urban population (% of total population) WB
land Land area (Sq.km) WB
hdi Human development index WB
pedu Primary education, duration (years) WB
press Freedom of press, degree of freedom, (Scale 0-30; 0=highest; 30=lowest) Freedom House
Note: IMF = Global debt database published by the International Monetary Fund; WB = World
Development Indicators published by the World Bank.
46
Table A.5: Descriptive statistics, annual data
Variables Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max
Developing countries
Real GDP growth rate 2,775 3.91 4.17 5.17 -69.81 34.20
Debt to GDP ratio 2,775 59.67 47.91 50.37 0.00 677.18
Trade openness 2,775 77.72 71.23 43.68 12.07 402.25
Public investment 2,775 22.56 20.78 9.88 1.60 80.25
Population growth 2,775 2.06 1.94 1.36 -6.18 16.33
Secondary school enrolment 2,775 6.16 6.00 0.78 4.00 8.00
Africa
Real GDP growth rate 1,175 3.95 4.20 6.10 -69.81 34.20
Debt to GDP ratio 1,175 71.24 56.68 59.45 0.00 677.18
Trade openness 1,175 67.69 56.68 31.29 12.07 160.98
Public investment 1,175 22.19 20.32 10.82 1.60 74.36
Population growth 1,175 2.39 2.57 0.92 -6.19 7.91
Secondary school enrolment 1,175 6.27 6.00 0.74 4.00 8.00
Asia
Real GDP growth rate 950 4.53 4.86 4.79 -42.78 29.26
Debt to GDP ratio 950 51.06 43.93 33.83 0.00 216.04
Trade openness 950 91.76 83.55 55.66 16.01 402.25
Public investment 950 23.89 22.42 9.84 4.65 64.34
Population growth 950 2.14 1.77 1.89 -3.11 16.33
Secondary school enrolment 950 6.30 6.00 0.82 4.00 8.00
Latin America and the Caribbean
Real GDP growth rate 650 2.94 3.31 3.52 -17.00 16.79
Debt to GDP ratio 650 51.35 37.36 48.60 4.09 446.57
Trade openness 650 75.32 72.29 31.76 12.53 181.64
Public investment 650 21.30 19.77 7.68 6.66 80.25
Population growth 650 1.34 1.35 0.68 -0.35 3.84
Secondary school enrolment 650 5.74 6.00 0.64 4.00 7.00
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Table A.6: Correlation matrix
∆gdp ∆gdpt−1 d open i gpop edu
∆gdp 1.0000
∆gdpt−1 0.2252* 1.0000
d -0.0781* -0.1049* 1.0000
open 0.0552* 0.0634* -0.0403* 1.0000
i 0.1361* 0.1478* -0.0772* 0.2200* 1.0000
gpop 0.1465* 0.1436* 0.0129 0.0380* -0.0029 1.0000
edu 0.0007 0.0017 -0.0452* -0.2025* -0.0180 0.0873* 1.0000
Note: *Denotes statistical significance at 10% level.
Table A.7: DPTR estimates of debt on forward growth, non-overlapping
Developing Africa Asia Latin America
and the Caribbean
Threshold estimates γ̂ 63.808 38.363 44.336 22.013
95% confidence interval [61.54 63.82] [31.45 38.88] [44.32 44.96] [21.55 22.26]
Threshold effect test: P-value 0.147 0.370 0.554 0.019
Threshold effect No No No Yes
Impact of debt
β̂1 0.036*** -0.013 -0.015 -0.132***
(0.009) (0.021) (0.025) (0.035)
β̂2 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.010 -0.008
(0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006)
Regime independent controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries/Observations 111/555 47/235 38/190 26/130
Note: The estimates are of the baseline specification including the controls. Bootstrapped stan-
dard errors with 1000 replications are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significant
p values at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table A.8: DPTR estimates of debt on contemporaneous growth
Developing Africa Asia Latin America
& the Caribbean
Threshold estimates γ̂ 48.589 48.901 32.452 20.031
95% confidence interval [46.63 48.86] [48.74 48.98] [32.39 32.48] [20.03 20.04]
Threshold effect test: P-value 0.172 0.435 0.452 0.938
Threshold effect No No No No
Impact of debt
β̂1 0.034*** 0.046*** 0.077*** 0.041
(0.009) (0.015) (0.022) (0.028)
β̂2 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.028*** 0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
Regime independent controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries/Observations 111/2,775 47/1,175 38/950 26/650
Note: The estimates are of the baseline specification including the controls. Bootstrapped stan-
dard errors with 1000 replications are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significant
p values at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Chapter 3
The Effectiveness of the
UN-REDD Programme as a
Guardian of Tropical Forests in
Developing Countries
LAKMINI FERNANDO FIRMIN DOKO TCHATOKA STEPHANIE McWHINNIE




This paper examines the effectiveness of the United Nations Collaborative Pro-
gramme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN-
REDD) in Developing Countries. We employ a novel staggered difference-in-
differences approach recently proposed by Athey and Imbens (2018) to analyse
deforestation and carbon dioxide emissions data from 2001 to 2018. We show that
on average adoption of UN-REDD reduces deforestation and associated emissions,
but that these effects take 9-10 years to be seen. In addition, heterogeneous pro-
gramme effects are observed across geographical regions and economic develop-
ment levels. Latin America and the Caribbean countries have a strong reduction
in both deforestation and associated emissions, while countries in Africa and Asia-
Pacific have no deforestation reductions and slightly increased emissions. Across
income levels, only upper-middle income countries have lower deforestation and
associated emissions while emissions rose in low income countries.
Keywords: UN-REDD; Deforestation; Emissions; Staggered difference–in–differences,
Heterogeneous programme effects.
JEL classification: O13, O19, Q23, Q50, C54.
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3.1 Introduction
The role of tropical forests in combating climate change and preserving biological
diversity has made the conservation of forests a major policy challenge for de-
veloping countries (Amelung, 1993, Dawson et al., 2018, Skutsch and Turnhout,
2020). Historically, national policies have not been enough to curtail deforesta-
tion and success in combating climate change requires coupling them with in-
ternational agreements. The United Nations Programme on Reducing Emissions
from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (henceforth, UN-REDD programme)
is recognized as the first global joint initiative on tackling climate change. UN-
REDD works with developing partner countries to implement REDD+ activities
that provides incentives for protecting the environment by valuing carbon stored
in forests.
Existing studies on the impact evaluation of the UN-REDD programme have
employed qualitative approaches or limited quantitative policy evaluation tech-
niques (Agung et al., 2014, Bayrak and Marafa, 2016, Minang et al., 2014, Pisto-
rius, 2012). We evaluate the UN-REDD programme impact by employing a novel
econometric technique; the staggered difference–in–differences (henceforth, stag-
gered DID), to identify whether changes to forest governance triggered by REDD+
activities have reduced deforestation and associated emissions in developing coun-
tries. The staggered DID approach has several advantages. First, it allows to
quantify the impact of the UN-REDD programme over time, which is not possible
in the standard DID setting. Second, it enables to identify the causal effects of
the UN-REDD programme even in the presence of confounding factors that may
have also contributed to changes in deforestation and emissions during the sample
period. Third, it is well known that in the assessment of environmental policies,
the accuracy and comparability of spatial data on deforestation is paramount (see
e.g. Zabala, 2018), as new information is often revealed by the choice of good data
(Köthke et al., 2013, Rudel et al., 2000). However, the lack of good quality data is
widely acknowledged in the forest literature and previous studies often use ques-
tionable spatial data on forests from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)
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which are collected across countries following different methodologies (Hansen and
DeFries, 2004, Hansen et al., 2013). Furthermore, Hansen et al. (2013) find that
the UN-REDD programme outcomes depend on the institutional investment and
scientific capacity to utilise global observation records. By contrast, our analysis
of the UN-REDD policy employs satellite data which are spatially more accu-
rate and derived through an internally consistent approach. Unequivocally, using
these satellite contributes to improve existing knowledge of global forest changes.
Unequivocally, use of satellite data contributes to the improvements in existing
knowledge of global forest changes.
By emphasising on identifying the causal effect of the UN-REDD programme
over time, our study contributes to the existing literature on global environmental
policies, and also sheds new light on the disparities across developing countries
related to this topic. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first cross-country
study that investigates the effect of a global environmental policy in developing
countries by employing recent programme evaluation econometric techniques.
Results show that overall the UN-REDD programme has reduced both defor-
estation and emissions in developing countries over time. While smaller impacts
on deforestation and emissions are observed in the first few years of the pro-
gramme adoption, much larger effects are evidenced over longer periods. This
time varying nature of the UN-REDD programme impact can only be evidenced
in our staggered DID framework. Furthermore, heterogeneous programme effects
are also observed across regions and economic development levels. In particular,
the UN-REDD programme has been relatively successful in Latin America and
the Caribbean region compared to Africa and Asia-Pacific. Similarly, among the
developing world, upper-middle and high income countries are better off compared
to lower-middle and low income countries. By distinguishing these heterogeneous
groups, our results show clearly that the effects of the UN-REDD programme is
not uniform across geographical locations and levels of economic development.
The success of the UN-REDD programme has been at the core of numerous de-
bates among economists and scientists recently. Although the impact assessments
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on payments for environmental services (PES) schemes in Brazil (Simonet et al.,
2019) and Uganda (Jayachandran et al., 2017) provide strong evidence in support
of the UN-REDD programme success, Bluffstone et al. (2013) argue that insecure
and poorly defined community forest tenure in developing countries makes it dif-
ficult to envision it as a successful forest-climate policy. The UN-REDD program,
they argue, could become another contingency-based aid like structural adjust-
ment programme rather than a cost-effective carbon sequestration mechanism. A
critical evaluation of the UN-REDD programme by Pistorius (2012) reveals that
its effectiveness and integrity is at stake, despite increased country participation.
Clearly, the complexities in forest governance and the absence of clear implementa-
tion and funding modalities for the UN-REDD programme impede its achievement
of the intended goals. Despite the growing number of countries adopting the pro-
gramme, the ambiguity of its performance could jeopardise its fate as an effective
global environmental policy (Reinecke et al., 2014). However, our results indicate
that the longer a country is exposed to the UN-REDD programme, the stronger
the programme effect is. This finding supports the belief that as time evolves, the
UN-REDD programme incentives override its transaction costs to deliver a positive
policy effect (Libecap, 2014). Such transaction costs include negotiation, monitor-
ing (verification) and enforcement costs between forest users, governments, and
donors (Corbera, 2012). Understanding and minimising these transaction costs
in the UN-REDD programme implementation process is critical for its success,
as existing institutional structures of developing countries often impede on the
performance of PES schemes; see, e.g., Alston and Andersson (2011). Our results
on regional differences are also in line with the literature on PES assessments on
deforestation, which demonstrates the existence of substantial regional variations
in deforestation (Jayachandran et al., 2017, Libecap, 2014, Robalino and Pfaff,
2013, Scullion et al., 2011). Contextual factors and policy design are vital in
determining PES outcomes (Börner et al., 2017). Low levels of pre–programme
compliance, low opportunity cost of participation and well–established property
rights are some of the contextual factors that ensure PES success. Scullion et al.
(2011) suggest the inclusion of risk-integrated payments, robust monitoring and
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enforcement programmes ensures environmental policies effectiveness. However,
PES schemes are different from traditional policy instruments that are abide by
legal regulations, sanction mechanisms or taxes (Börner et al., 2017). As such,
a careful design of the UN-REDD programme is crucial to deliver the expected
outcomes effectively. Our finding on the heterogeneous programme effects across
economic development levels aligns with the literature on growth impacts on in-
come inequality and environmental degradation (Ota, 2017). Indeed, low income
economies often have competing needs over conservation and economic/social wel-
fare. Economic growth impacts on environment degradation are generally larger
for countries with lower income. Environmental policies are almost non-existent
in many low income countries, and some developing nations in their quest to
economic prosperity through increased income often triggers the introduction of
environmental regulations at varying degrees. This may explain why deforesta-
tion and emissions have reduced in UN-REDD programme adopting upper-middle
and high income countries but have increased in UN-REDD programme adopting
lower-middle and low income countries.
Indeed, low income economies often have competing needs over conservation
and economic/social welfare. Growth impact on environment degradation is gen-
erally larger for countries with lower income. As environmental policies are almost
non-existent in most low income countries, increasing income triggers the intro-
duction of environmental regulations at varying degrees. This could explain why
we observe a positive policy effect for high income economies.
The remainder of the study is organised as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the
UN-REDD programme background. Section 3.3 details our empirical strategy,
and Section 3.4 describes the data and the variables. Section 3.5 contains the




According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, greenhouse gas
emissions have increased to unprecedented levels in the past few decades (IPCC,
2016). Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions are the leading cause of the earth’s
rapidly changing climate, while the burning of fossil fuels is the primary source
of human-induced emissions. A second major source is deforestation – logging,
clear-cutting, fires and other forms of forest deforestation – contributing to 20%
of global emissions. Tropical deforestation and forest degradation alone accounts
for 11% of these emissions, which is a larger contribution than the entire global
transport sector. Forests are the most cost-effective and immediate solution to
climate change. Reducing emissions from tropical forests will substantially avert
the disastrous climate change. In 2018, global forest cover fell below 4 billion
hectares, emitting 8 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere (see Table
3.1). Between 2001 and 2018, the rate of deforestation in developing countries
ranked highest, at 10.7 million hectares per annum – twice as large as developed
countries – and total forest cover decreased by 3.5% to 2,120 million hectares.
Although the highest annual rate of deforestation occurs in the Asia-Pacific (0.6%)
the area of tropical forests cleared in Latin America and the Caribbean, 5.1 million
hectares, is almost as large as the forest area cleared in Africa and the Asia-Pacific
put together.5
Launched in 2008, the UN-REDD programme is the first global joint UN ini-
tiative on climate change and deploys the support of three agencies: the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations De-
velopment Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP). The overall development goal of the programme is to enhance carbon
stocks in tropical forests while contributing to national sustainable development.
Specifically, the UN-REDD programme aims to provide national deforestation ref-
erence levels, develop monitoring systems and promote the adoption of national
5Figure B.1 in the Appendix shows the global and regional deforestation trends between 2001
and 2018.
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Table 3.1: Deforestation and emissions trends, 2001-2018
Region
Forest cover CO2 emissions Annual deforestation
(million ha) (gigatonnes) (2001-2018)
2001 2018 2001 2018 (million ha) %
World (150) 4,034.6 3,973.3 3.7 8.2 19.7 0.5
Developed countries (36) 983.6 992.4 1.0 1.5 5.7 0.6
Economies in transition (12) 852.3 859.1 0.3 1.1 3.3 0.4
Developing countries (102) 2,198.7 2,121.8 2.5 5.6 10.7 0.5
Africa (46) 659.0 607.0 0.5 1.7 2.3 0.4
Asia–Pacific (34) 565.4 590.4 0.7 1.7 3.4 0.6
Latin Am. & Caribbean (22) 974.4 924.4 1.3 2.3 5.1 0.5
Source: Global Forest Watch (GFW, 2019)
Note: In the region column, the numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of countries that
have adopted the policy.
strategies to facilitate the implementation of the programme (Davis et al., 2009).
In addition, it drives the establishment of good governance, which is a prereq-
uisite for the sustainable use of forest resources. This includes clarity on tenure
of forest lands, enforcement of forest laws and empowerment of forest-dependent
communities to participate in forest management. Participating countries receive
results-based payments complemented by technical assistance, capacity building,
and policy advice for their efforts in implementing REDD+. From 2009-2018,
62 developing countries adopted this policy. Among them, more than 30 coun-
tries have advanced their national REDD+ strategies or action plans, 40 countries
were supported in developing national forest monitoring systems, and 15 coun-
tries developed country-based approaches to meet the social and environmental
safeguards requirements of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC); see UNREDD (2008).
In our sample, deforestation increases from an annual average tree cover loss
of 71,000 hectares in 2001 to 127,000 hectares in 2018, as shown in Figure 3.1.
During that time, countries have substantially adopted the UN-REDD policy. The
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black dotted line in the figure shows the rise in countries adopting the policy since
2009. The prevalence of deforestation observed in the blue graph suggests the
adoption of the UN-REDD programme may not have been persistent enough to
curb deforestation. A similar pattern in terms of change in annual average emis-
sions is displayed in Figure B.2 in the Appendix. Between 2001-2018, emissions
have more than doubled, from 24 megatonnes to 56 megatonnes.
Figure 3.1: Tropical deforestation trends in UN-REDD policy adoption
Note: Average deforestation is shown against the number of developing countries that have
adopted the UN-REDD policy between 2009-2018. Average deforestation is expressed in
hundred thousand hectares of tree cover loss.
The unsustainable exploitation of natural resources is inevitable in the con-
text of using ecosystem services for human well being. The introduction of pay-
ment schemes for ecosystem services curbs the loss of tropical forests (Pistorius,
2012) and success at the local and national level encourages the up–scaling of
these ecosystem payment schemes to the international level. The UN-REDD pro-
gramme, negotiated under the UNFCCC, is such an international financial mech-
anism. The mandate of this convention frames the loss of forests as a climate mit-
igation issue. Thus, the implementation of an international compensation mecha-
nism for developing countries that succeed in reducing their forest sector emissions
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slows down climate change. Despite the belief that the UN-REDD programme is a
promising option for addressing the depletion of forests, the modalities for partici-
pation and compensation payments remain unclear. The programme goes beyond
a simple compensation mechanism and entails technical and political complexities
with the main concerns over the establishment of developing countries’ emission
targets and accounting responsibilities. Consequently, the opportunity for the UN-
REDD programme to become the future climate agreement under the convention
is at stake. As such, the positive incentives of the programme will encourage
voluntary participation only if they do not impair countries’ own development
ability.
3.3 Empirical econometric strategy
To identify the impact of the UN-REDD programme on the climate variables, we
employ a staggered difference-in-differences (DID) approach. This method was
proposed recently by Athey and Imbens (2018) and, in contrast to the standard
DID estimation, it accounts for the variation in timing of a policy (or programme)
adoption. We first detail the empirical specification in Section 3.3.1, and then
discuss the threats to identifying the programme impact in Section 3.3.2.
3.3.1 Model specification
We consider the staggered DID setting under the potential outcome framework for
causal inference (see Athey and Imbens, 2018). The population of interest con-
sists of N countries (units). Each of these N countries is characterized by a set of
potential outcomes in T periods for T + 1 treatment levels, Yit(a), i ∈ {1, . . . , N}
indexes the countries, t ∈ T = {1, . . . , T} indexes the time period, and the argu-
ment of the potential outcome function Yit(·), a ∈ A = T ∪ {∞} = {1, . . . , T,∞}
indexes the discrete treatment, the date that the binary policy (here the UN-
REDD programme) was first adopted by country. Countries can adopt the policy
at any period t = 1, . . . , T or not adopt the policy at all during the entire period
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T , in which case the adoption date is set at ∞. Once the country adopts the
programme, it remains exposed to the treatment for all periods afterwards. Con-
sequently, the date of policy adoption varies across countries.6 This contrasts to
most of the DID literature where the binary indicator whether a unit is exposed to
the treatment in the current period indexes the potential outcomes. We observe
for each country in the sample the adoption date Ai ∈ A and the sequence of T
realized outcomes, Yit ≡ Yit(Ai), for a given time period t ∈ T and a given coun-
try i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. We assume that countries are not affected by the treatments
(adoption dates) of other countries, the potential outcomes are deterministic, and
the adoption dates and realized outcomes are stochastic. As such, the distribu-
tions of estimators depend on adoption date distribution, number of countries and
number of time periods. This distribution is referred to as a randomisation or
design-based distribution.
Our goal is to measure the causal impact of the UN-REDD programme on two
outcome variables, so hereafter, Yit refers to either deforestation and emissions. For
this purpose, we focus on the parametric setting in which the potential outcome
satisfies (similar to Wolfers, 2006):









Countryi × Timet + εit
(3.3.1)
where the outcome Yit refers to either deforestation and emissions of country i
at time t, REDDi is country i binary treatment and POSTit its post treatment
adoption date dummy, Xit is a vector of covariates (real GDP growth, population
growth, trade openness, agricultural exports, share of rural population, employ-
ment in agriculture, share of agricultural land and share of arable land), µi and
ηt are country and year fixed effects respectively, the second last summation term
in (3.3.1) represents country-specific linear trends that control for any potential
6This design is a special case of the standard DID approach, which usually estimates the
treatment effect by comparing the pre- and post-treatment differences in the outcome of a
treatment and a control group, where the control group remains untreated at any time period
(i.e., both pre- and post- policy periods), whereas the treatment group is untreated before the
policy but receives treatment after the policy implementation.
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endogeneity in the policy variable of interest, REDDi×POSTit. In (3.3.1), εit are
idiosyncratic errors, β is the coefficient of interest and it capturing the effect of the
UN-REDD programme adoption on deforestation or emissions, γ is the coefficient
vector on covariates and it measures the effect of a change in these covariates on
the outcome variables (deforestation or emissions).
With panel data, the role of cross-country heterogeneity in deforestation can
be explored in more detail, without having to be specific about the sources of het-
erogeneity. Country fixed effects, µi, control for unobserved influences on defor-
estation that vary across countries, so that the effect of the UN-REDD programme
is identified from its variation within a country over time. Clearly, the presence of
µi in (3.3.1) is important to capture country-level unobserved factors that explain
deforestation, such as culture and geography. This mainly motivates our focusing
on cross-country setting which enables us to control for µi (we assembled a panel
of country-level deforestation data over 18 year, where the data record virtually
all deforestation in developing countries). Using longitudinal data also allows the
inclusion of time fixed effects ηt, which control for evolving unobserved national
attributes that affect the likelihood of deforestation and emissions. This includes
common shocks, such as government policy amendments.
Despite the presence of µi and ηt in (3.3.1), the factors that influence defor-
estation may vary within a country over time, thus confounding the estimates of
the country effects. That will also bias the estimate of the treatment parameter
of interest β if the time-varying factors are correlated with the policy adoption
across countries, or if such factors do not change uniformly at the national level
and are picked up by the year fixed effects. Specification (3.3.1) allows for control-
ling such changing influences within a country over time by including a time trend,
Country×Time, which captures linear trends in country-level characteristics that
influence deforestation and emissions, with the slopes of the trends allowed to vary
across countries.
Let Ȳt(a) denote the population average of the potential outcome in period t
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Also, let τt,aa′ be the average causal effect of adoption date a
′ relative to a, on the












Then, the average causal effect of switching the entire population (countries) from
never adopting the UN-REDD policy (a = ∞) to adopting it in the first period










τt,∞1 is a useful benchmark measure compared to τt,aa′ in (3.3.3). Indeed, for any
country i and any time period t, the comparison Yit(1)−Yit(∞) is between potential
outcomes for adoption prior to or at time t (adoption date a = 1) and potential
outcomes for adoption later than t (never adopting a =∞). In contrast, any other
average effect τt,aa′ will for some t involve comparing potential outcomes neither
of which corresponds to having adopted the treatment yet, or comparing potential
outcomes both of which correspond to having adopted the treatment already.
As such, τt,∞1 reflects more on the effect of having adopted the policy than any
other τt,aa′ . In an ideal situation where countries enter the UN-REDD programme
randomly, τt,∞1 (or similarly τt,aa′ ) estimate both the average treatment effect (or
average causal effect of adoption date a′ relative to a) and the average treatment
effect for the treated (countries that have adopted the programme). However,
one might expect that the average treatment effect for countries who choose to
participate in the programme is somewhat larger than the average treatment effect
for all countries together (including those who did not adopt the programme). Put
it differently, on might expect that the decision to participate is partly determined
by the gains from the programme. In this case, alternative ways are needed to
estimate the treatment parameters. A suitable framework to do this is to consider
a parametric specification setting as in (3.3.1). Under mild assumptions on the
model variables and parameters (Athey and Imbens, 2018, see e.g.), the least
squares estimator of β in (3.3.1) consistently estimate the true programme effect.
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3.3.2 Threats to identification
To avoid making erroneous inferences, it is necessary to better understand the
sources of a policy change. A change in deforestation and emissions could be
the result of a series of factors, not necessarily policy change. Another important
factor to consider is the control group (non-adopter of the UN-REDD programme)
with which the treated group is being compared. Being part of the control group
is assumed to be an equally viable option for countries that adopted the UN-
REDD programme. Countries in the control group could be better explained
as ‘untreated’ countries because, while they obviously act as controls, treated
countries do, too.
The success of evaluating the UN-REDD programme using staggered DID
estimation depends on whether the policy can be framed as an experimental design:
policy adoption needs to be independent and time-varying random events and
should not have spillover effects on non-adopting countries. In the ideal situation,
the parametric specification (3.3.1) yields an unbiased estimate of the average
treatment effect, β. However, the setting of the UN-REDD programme deviates
from this baseline assumption, as the programme adoption cannot be viewed as an
independent event, an important caveat in this study. The UN-REDD implements
in five-year strategic frameworks. At both the UN and country delivery, policy
management in the 2016-2020 UN-REDD programme strategic framework has
improved over that in the 2011-2015 framework. Preparation of the 2016-2020
strategic framework was visibly underway, so countries may have responded pre-
emptively, possibly by changing their deforestation propensities before signing onto
the programme or vice versa. Additionally, the assistance received might have
spillover effects– improvements to monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV)
systems– in adopting countries. The staggered DID may not be able to capture
these effects, thereby potentially underestimating the total contribution of policy
change to deforestation and emissions.
In our analysis, we assume that the policy change has two virtues. Firstly, the
policy change is discrete. Secondly, policy adoption by a country is an idiosyncratic
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function of deforestation propensities. Disposition of policy reforms and the timing
of a change to forest governance is likely to be, in part, unanticipated. Hence,
even partly unanticipated policy changes may generate discontinuous impacts on
deforestation. The experimental design in our study identifies the extent of these
discontinuous impacts even though such limitations coexist.
3.4 Data and preliminary analysis
We use data covering the period 2001-2018 from over 102 developing countries:
46 countries from Africa, 34 from Asia-Pacific and 22 from Latin America and
the Caribbean. These countries provide a comparable set of environmental and
economic conditions across the geographical regions. Since the launch of the UN-
REDD programme in 2008, 65 developing countries have adopted the programme
but 3 among them do not available data (i.e., Jamaica, Samoa, and South Sudan).
This leaves us with 62 developing countries (treated group) in our sample that
adopted the programme from 2009-2018.
Table B.4 in the appendix contains all countries in our sample divided into
control and treated groups in each region (Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and
the Caribbean), whereas the treated countries by programme adoption year are
shown in Table B.2. Non-adopting countries are categorised in the control group
because there is a possibility for these countries to adopt the programme in the
future. For non-adopters, the monetary incentives is a clear-cut to participating
in the UN-REDD programme or not. From that perspective, we are interested in
the existence of factors that could result in changes in deforestation and emissions
in favour of both the treatment and control. In our staggered DID setting, all
treated countries except the early adopters are categorised as controls, and then
treated as time involves; see Section 3.3 for further details.
Data on the outcome variables (deforestation and emissions) were obtained
from the Global Forest Watch web platform (GFW, 2019). This data set includes
tree cover, tree cover loss, CO2 emissions and biomass loss at the country-level
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and at first and second sub-national levels. Our analyses use country-level data.
The tree cover data were produced by the Global Land Analysis and Discovery
(GLAD) laboratory from the University of Maryland in partnership with Google
(GLAD, 2019). Above-ground biomass loss estimates are based on the collocation
of above-ground live woody biomass density values for the year 2000 from Baccini
et al. (2012) and annual tree cover loss data from Hansen et al. (2013). The carbon
dioxide emissions data quantify the amount of CO2 emissions to the atmosphere
based on above-ground biomass loss. All values are presented at different percent-
age canopy cover levels (≥10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 50% and 75%). We use a
≥30% canopy cover threshold following the Global Forest Watch website. Here,
“tree cover” includes all vegetation over five meters in height and may take the
form of natural forests or plantations across a range of canopy densities. Defor-
estation is defined as the hundred thousand hectares of tree cover loss - removal or
mortality of tree cover - at the national level by 30% canopy cover. Emissions are
measured per gigatonnes of carbon dioxide release to the atmosphere as a result
of above-ground biomass loss, at the national level by 30% canopy cover.
Accuracy in quantifying the global forest cover change is vital in forest ecosys-
tem studies. Spatially and temporally detailed information on global-scale forest
change does not exist and previous efforts have been either sample-based or em-
ployed coarse spatial resolution data (Hansen and DeFries, 2004, Hansen et al.,
2013, 2010). Using the Earth observation satellite data of Hansen et al. (2013),
our study improves on existing knowledge of global forest cover changes. These
data are spatially explicit, quantify gross forest loss and gain, and provide annual
loss information, and are derived through an internally consistent approach. In
contrast, the widely used forestry data of the FAO suffer from several limitations,
thus making comparability an issue: the FAO quantifies deforestation according
to land use instead of land cover; forest area changes are reported only at net val-
ues, although forest definitions have changed over time. The use of this new data
set offers a unique level of precision on forest losses and is therefore, a significant
contribution of our study to the literature.
Data on covariates were extracted from the World Development Indicators of
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the World Bank (WDI, 2019). A detailed description of these covariates is given
in Table B.5 in the Appendix. In our empirical analysis, we use aggregated data
at the national level. Our choice of covariates follows the Environment Kuznets
Curve (EKC) literature on direct and underlying causes of deforestation (Barbier
and Burgess, 2001, Barbier et al., 2010, 1991, Bhattarai and Hammig, 2001, Foster
and Rosenzweig, 2003, Leblois et al., 2017). Economic development, agricultural
activity and population pressure are thus considered important drivers of defor-
estation at the national level. A simple correlation analysis show that except for
arable land and agricultural exports, all covariates show positive and significant
relationship to deforestation (Table B.7) and emissions (Table B.8). The posi-
tive relationship of arable land and negative relationship of agricultural exports
to deforestation and emissions are both insignificant. All covariates show low
correlation to both outcome variables.
To account for the effect of economic development (at least in quantitative
point of view), we use real GDP growth rate, as it is acknowledged that economic
growth is a possible way to slow down deforestation (Foster and Rosenzweig, 2003).
Slowing down deforestation through economic growth can change the path of forest
transition. The pressure towards deforestation comes from the wider economy
and the level of economic development, not just the forestry sector. Therefore,
as an economy develops, the influences change. In the context of developing
countries, deforestation occurs due to increased demand resulting from economic
growth. The expansion of income leads to high demand for forestland conversion
to generate agricultural and forestry products. Beyond a certain higher income
level, economic growth can reduce the pressure on forests by improving off-farm
employment opportunities. Countries with high incomes may demand that forests
be protected rather than depleted.
Considering the role of population pressure on the tropical deforestation pro-
cess, we use two variables, population growth and rural population, in our analysis.
Through this approach, we highlight the impact of population structure, whether
it is the rural population or the overall population that matters in deforestation. It
is hypothesised that an increase in both these variables leads to an increase in de-
70
forestation in tropical forests. Population growth leads to migration to the forests
by peasants seeking land to clear for subsistence farming. Population growth also
increases the collection of fuel wood, which removes nutrients from forests. If nu-
trient loss is sufficiently intense, the result is slowed regeneration and degradation
of forest cover. Positive population growth is associated with deforestation but
the effect is not immediate (Deacon, 1994).
Empirical evidence at both the national level (Leblois et al., 2017) and the sub-
national level (Faria and Almeida, 2016) shows that openness to trade increases
deforestation. We use the sum of import and export values as a percentage of
total GDP to indicate trade openness in the analysis. Trade-led deforestation
includes export-oriented agricultural production, commercial agriculture and in-
dustrial plantations leading to mass destruction of forested areas in the tropics.
Economic liberalisation may increase global demand and the prices for agri-
cultural exports, accelerating the rate of deforestation (Barbier, 2004). We use
agricultural raw materials exports as a percentage of merchandise exports to con-
trol for the contribution of agricultural exports to deforestation. Employment in
agriculture as a percentage of total employment is used to control for the effect
of agriculture sector employment on deforestation. Agricultural expansion is a
primary cause of forest conversion; thus, we use agricultural land as a percentage
of land area to test the role of cultivated land in deforestation. Arable land as a
percentage of total land area is used to control for the impact of surface area on
deforestation.
Summary statistics for both the pre-UN-REDD programme period (2001-2008)
and the adoption period (2018) are provided in Table B.6 in the Appendix B.
During the programme adoption period, deforestation and emissions are on average
higher, probably because of the mixing of treatment and control groups. However,
the preliminary analysis in Table B.9 of the Appendix comparing the treatment
group to the control group suggests that the UN-REDD programme may have
been successful in reducing deforestation and emissions.
Figure 3.2 shows the plots of average deforestation and average emissions ac-
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counting for differences in the timing of treatment, where 2009 is the first year
of adoption. In each subfigure, the solid blue graph indicates the treated group
whereas the dash dark graph represents the control group. The average deforesta-
tion and emissions were higher in the treated group during the pre-programme
period, signaling the importance of controlling for pre-existing differences between
countries through the inclusion of country specific effects. These differences in out-
come variables (deforestation and emissions) between treated and control countries
provides a coarse comparison of the relative pre-existing trends. It shows a clear
rising trend in deforestation and emissions in treated countries relative to control
countries prior to the programme first adoption year (2009). As such, control-
ling for these trends is paramount to consistently identifying the true programme
impact on deforestation and emissions. As more and more countries enter the
programme after 2009, average deforestation and emissions in the treated group
decrease sharply to level the control group average outcome at the end of the pe-
riod. While both outcome variables (deforestation and emissions) are different, the
graphical representations in Figure 3.2 narrates the same story, thus reinforcing
the perception that the UN-REDD programme may have been successful towards
achieving its goal. Section 3.5 our main results.
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Figure 3.2: Deforestation and Emissions– control group versus treated group
Note: From 2009 (first adoption year) onward, countries that were in the control group switched
to treatment the year following their adoption year. The graphs in Figure 3.2 accounts for this




We first analyse the UN-REDD programme impact with the pooled sample of the
102 countries in Section 3.5.1. We then emphasize on the programme heterogenous
effects across geographical location (Section 3.5.2) and income (Section 3.5.3).
3.5.1 Policy effect over time
Table 3.2 presents the estimates of the UN-REDD programme impact on defor-
estation and emissions over time. As is usually the case in staggered DID analysis,
the impact of the programme is evaluated by year intervals to accommodate all
adoption years within the entire period 2001-2018. Particularly in our case, five
dummies are created and interacted with the treatment variable: one dummy for
the first 2 years, one for each of years 3-4, 5-6, 7-8 and 9-10. This contrasts to
the standard DID estimation that usually includes a single dummy for adoption
year. In the table, we only report the estimated programme effect to shorten the
presentation, i.e., the impact of covariates and fixed effects are left out for briefly.
In the table, Panel A contains the results with no observable covariate included
in the regressions, whereas Panel B shows the results where observed covariates
are controlled for. For each outcome variable (deforestation or emissions) and each
panel, column (1) differs from column (2) through the inclusion of country-specific
linear trend in the latter.
Looking first at the estimated programme effects in Panel A and Panel B, we
see that they substantially differ in both the sign and the magnitude, indicating
the exclusion of covariates is important. Therefore, we shall focus mainly on
the results of Panel B in the remaining of this section. Now, regarding the
programme estimated effects in Panel B, in the specification of both deforestation
and emissions, the sign of the estimates is positive in columns (1) whereas it is
negative in columns (2). Aside the fact some of the estimates are not statistically
significant due probably to a lack of precision (high standard error estimates), these
results clearly highlight the importance of controlling for country-specific linear
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trends, as failing to do so yield positive estimates wrongly suggesting that the
programme may not have been successful in curbing deforestation and emissions.
The plots of the estimated programme effects over time in Figure 3.3 illustrates
clearly the role country-specific linear trends play in the identification of the UN-
REDD programme true impact. In this figure, the DID estimates in both the
deforestation and emissions specifications, with or without country-specific linear
trends, are plotted over time. More specifically, in each subfigure, the blue curve
with dot-markers shows the estimated programme impact over time with country-
specific linear trends controlled for (Table 3.2-Panel B-(2)) whereas the dark curve
with triangle-markers represents the policy estimates over time without country-
specific linear trends controlled for (Table 3.2-Panel B-(1)). In both deforestation
and emissions models, there is a sharp rise over time in the programme estimated
impact when country-specific linear trends are not controlled for (dark curves with
triangle-markers), while there is a deep decrease in the negative territory once
country-specific linear trends are controlled for (blue curves with dot-markers).
This shows clearly that failing to control for country-specific linear trends identify
the wrong programme impact. Thus, a suitable model must control for country-
specific linear trends, as in Table 3.2-Panel B-(2). The remaining of our analysis
focus on these suitable specifications.
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Table 3.2: Estimates of policy effects over time
Deforestation Emissions
Panel A: With no controls (1) (2) (1) (2)
First 2 years 0.340*** 0.071 0.012*** 0.003
(0.099) (0.111) (0.004) (0.004)
Years 3-4 0.372** -0.075 0.013* -0.002
(0.135) (0.158) (0.005) (0.006)
Years 5-6 0.346* -0.358 0.013* -0.012
(0.160) (0.223) (0.006) (0.008)
Years 7-8 0.464 -0.513 0.016 -0.017
(0.245) (0.333) (0.009) (0.012)
Years 9-10 0.633* -0.931* 0.019 -0.034
(0.317) (0.467) (0.013) (0.018)
Deforestation Emissions
Panel B: With controls (1) (2) (1) (2)
First 2 years 0.225 -0.156 0.011 -0.006
(0.253) (0.286) (0.009) (0.010)
Years 3-4 0.300 -0.297 0.013 -0.011
(0.264) (0.287) (0.010) (0.010)
Years 5-6 0.277 -0.579 0.013 -0.021
(0.261) (0.312) (0.009) (0.011)
Years 7-8 0.416 -0.734 0.018 -0.026
(0.334) (0.390) (0.012) (0.014)
Years 9-10 0.600 -1.138* 0.021 -0.042*
(0.377) (0.460) (0.015) (0.017)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*time No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836
Note: Columns (1) do not include country-specific linear trends while columns (2) do. Covari-
ates include real GDP growth, population growth, trade openness, agricultural exports, share of
rural population, employment in agriculture, share of agricultural land and share of arable land.
Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped with 1000 replications. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% nominal level, respectively.
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Figure 3.3: Policy effects on deforestation and emissions overtime
With the exception of years 9-10 estimates, the estimates in the other years
shown in Table 3.2-Panel B: columns (2) are not statistically significant even at
10%, but their magnitude is not very small. Obviously, controlling for country-
specific trends, along with other fixed effects, has affected the precision of the
estimates, thus leading to low t-statistic values despite the estimates themselves
being relatively large. Considering the magnitude of these estimates, we see that
the first 2 year estimated impact of the programme are -0.156 on deforestation and
-0.006 on emissions, and both are insignificant. These estimates translate to an an-
nual average reduction of deforestation about 15,600 hectares and emissions about
6 megatonnes in adopting countries in the first 2 years of the programme adop-
tion. The 15,600 hectares reduction of deforestation, although not statistically
significant, represent a substantial reduction if compared to the pre-programme
period average deforestation of 90,300 hectares of tree cover loss per year. The
reduction of both deforestation and emission have accelerated enormously after
10 years of the programme adoption. In particular, years 9-10 programme esti-
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mated impact deepens to -1.138 on deforestation and -0.042 on emissions and both
are significant at 10% nominal level. A -1.138 estimated impact on deforestation
represent an annual average reduction of deforestation about 113,800 hectares in
adopting countries after 10 years of programme adoption, while a -0.042 estimated
impact on emission represent an annual average reduction of emissions about 42
megatonnes in adopting countries after 10 years of programme adoption. These
results suggest that the longer a country is exposed to the UN-REDD programme,
the stronger the programme effect is. As such, the belief that over the years,
the UN-REDD programme incentives might have overridden transaction costs to
deliver a positive policy effect (Libecap, 2014) is supported.
As discussed previously in (3.3.3)-(3.3.4), years 9-10 estimates is a useful
benchmark measure compared to other years estimators. Indeed, for any country,
the comparison in years 9-10 estimation is between potential outcomes for adop-
tion prior to or at year 10 and potential outcomes for not adoption the UN-REDD
programme at all. For this, years 9-10 estimates reflects more on the effect of hav-
ing adopted the UN-REDD programme than any other years interval estimates.
Therefore, the fact that years 9-10 estimated impact of UN-REDD on both defor-
estation and emissions are significant at 10% nominal level and large in magnitude
suggests that the UN-REDD programme is relatively successful in reducing both
deforestation and carbon dioxide emissions in adopting countries.
The UN-REDD programme was available for adoption by all developing coun-
tries since its inception in 2009. As such, differences in the time of programme
adoption should therefore be independent of the UN-REDD programme availabil-
ity, and it should rather be a decision made by the individual adopting country.
From our estimation in Table 3.2, the favorable programme effect is seen over
longer time periods and as number of countries adopting the programme grows.
Therefore, it is possible that if all the countries had adopted the programme in
2009, we may have observed earlier signs of the positive programme effect rather
than waiting for 9-10 years before the effect manifests clearly.
Controlling for country-specific linear trends appears crucial in identifying
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the impact of the UN-REDD programme on both deforestation and emissions,
as their exclusion leads to misspecify the deforestation patterns and camouflages
the variation induced by the UN-REDD programme. Clearly, assuming constant
country-level deforestation propensities – when they are actually trending– biases
the estimates. In this case, the estimated intercepts reflect the average of the trend
instead of the true intercept. From a methodological viewpoint, we formally test
the presence of country-specific linear trends in the deforestation and emissions
data. We find that the F -test of the hypothesis that country-specific linear trends
are jointly zero is strongly rejected by the data. These test results are presented
in column (2) of Table B.10 in the Appendix for deforestation, and column (2)
of Table B.11 for emissions. The test also indicates that once country-specific
linear trends are controlled for, country individual fixed effects are no longer sig-
nificant. This suggests that country-specific time varying unobserved factors are
more important in explaining their deforestation and emissions policies, rather
than do their time-invariant unobserved factors. Unobserved determinants of de-
forestation and emissions, such as weather, climate, quality of governance and
government policies, often trend over time, thus the inclusion of country individ-
ual fixed effects only capture a small variation of them. Clearly, presuming that
these unobserved factors are either constant within a country over the 18-years
covered in our study or changing over time but uniformly across countries im-
poses restrictions on the regression parameters. While country-year interactions
are completely unrestricted, they are often not feasible (Friedberg, 1998), thus
the use of country-specific linear trends provide a feasible alternative, and more
importantly their inclusion allows the unobserved country factors of deforestation
and emissions to have a linear trend that varies across countries.
Our results also indicate that the REDD programme impact on deforestation
and emissions accelerates substantially over the ensuing decade. The estimated
impact of the programme change does not appear smaller for late adopters, thus
suggesting that anticipatory effects are not particularly important. Furthermore,
the strengthening of the programme effect over time suggests that its benefits
might have overridden its transaction costs. Therefore, we conclude that the
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UN-REDD programme has been relatively effective in reducing deforestation and
emissions, therefore can be seen as a promising guardian of tropical forests.
Table 3.3 reports aggregated policy estimated effect where a single dummy is
used for the whole adoption period, thus ignoring the timing of individual country
REDD programme adoption. From the estimation perspective, this is simply
the standard DID setting. As in Table 3.2, columns (1) of Table 3.3 differ from
columns (2) only through the inclusion of country-specific linear trends in the
latter. A χ2-test indicates the importance of controlling for these trends in the
specification of each outcome variable (deforestation and emission) data; see Table
B.12 for deforestation and Table B.13 for emissions in the Appendix. Focusing
on the estimates in columns (2) in Table 3.3 that control for country-specific
linear trends, we see that the programme estimated impact has the correct sign,
although not significant. Aside this statistical significance, the results suggest that
deforestation and emissions have reduced by 22,900 hectares and 5 megatonnes,
respectively in adopting countries. These results seems to have washed out the
estimated programme impact found in the staggered DID setting (see Table 3.2).
Clearly, the use of a single indicator for adoption year, while this not the case
in the data, fails to capture the full adjustment process of the programme. In
contrast, accounting for heterogeneous adoption years shows discernible changes
in programme effects over time.
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Table 3.3: Estimates of aggregate policy effect
Deforestation Emissions
(1) (2) (1) (2)
REDD × POST 0.446 -0.229 0.021 -0.005
(0.337) (0.436) (0.012) (0.016)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*time No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.896 0.908 0.880 0.897
Observations 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836
Note: Columns (1) do not include country-specific linear trends while columns (2) do. Covari-
ates include real GDP growth, population growth, trade openness, agricultural exports, share of
rural population, employment in agriculture, share of agricultural land and share of arable land.
Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped with 1000 replications. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% nominal level, respectively.
81
3.5.2 Regional differences
Simonet et al. (2019) and Jayachandran et al. (2017) argue that program of pay-
ments for ecosystem services often have heterogeneous impact across regions. In
particular, the assessment of such schemes on deforestation demonstrates the exis-
tence of substantial variation in deforestation across regions (Jayachandran et al.,
2017, Libecap, 2014, Robalino and Pfaff, 2013, Scullion et al., 2011). Contextual
factors and policy design are vital in determining payments for environmental
services schemes outcomes (Börner et al., 2017). Low levels of pre-programme
compliance, low opportunity cost of participation and well-established property
rights are some of the contextual factors that ensure payments for environmental
services schemes success. In this section, we investigate whether such regional
differences prevail after 10 years of the UN-REDD programme adoption. For this,
we regroup developing countries in our sample into three main regions– Africa (46
countries), Asia-Pacific (34 countries), and Latin America and the Caribbean (22
countries); see Tables B.4 & ?? and Figure B.2 in the Appendix.
Table 3.4 shows the results for both deforestation (first part of the table)
and emissions (second part of the table) specification, with country-specific linear
trends controlled for. This table is complemented by the plots in Figure 3.4
depicted the trends in the estimates over time. As seen, the programme effect on
both deforestation and emissions varies across regions and over time.
Considering first deforestation, we see that statistically significant negative
effects are observed only in the Latin America and the Caribbean region. For
the Africa region, the results are statistically insignificant and mixed, with the
first 2 years to years 7-8 of programme adoption showing an insignificant negative
estimates (insignificant reduction of deforestation and emission) while years 9-10
estimate are positive but insignificant as well (increase in deforestation). In the
Asia-Pacific, with the exception of years 5-6 and 9-10 of programme adoption
where statistically insignificant estimates are shown, the programme estimated
impacted is positive but insignificant for the the other years. These heterogeneous
trends in the UN-REDD programme impact are clearly illustrated in the right-
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hand side (RHS) subfigure in Figure 3.4, where only the Latin America and the
Caribbean region has seen a deep decrease in policy estimates over time (blue
curve with dot-markers). This region has seen an annual average about 200,400
hectares reduction of deforestation in UN-REDD programme adopting countries
from the first 2 years of adoption to a stunning annual reduction of about 579,900
hectares in 10 years after the programme adoption. This means that the longer
countries in this regions are exposed to the UN-REDD programme, the larger the
programme impact on deforestation.
Now, looking at the emission results, we see similar patterns as in the case
of deforestation, with the exception that most estimates are now significant in all
regions. More specifically, Africa region has seen a significant increase in emis-
sions over time in adopting countries, whereas there is a significant reduction of
emissions in adopting Latin American and the Caribbean countries. Regarding
the Asia-Pacific region, there has been a significant increase of emissions in pro-
gramme adopting until years 7-8 of the programme adoption, and then a drop in
years 9-10. Again, these heterogeneous impacts are clearly evidenced in the RHS
subfigure in Figure 3.4, the Latin America and the Caribbean region shows a sharp
decrease in policy estimates over time (blue curve with dot-markers), while that
of the Africa region trend upward in the positive territory. Again, the Asia-Pacific
region depicts mixed results.
Undoubtedly, there is evidence of UN-REDD programme success in the Latin
America and the Caribbean region. In 2011, two yeas into the UN-REDD pro-
gramme adoption, 90% of the countries in the Latin America and the Caribbean
region sample had adopted the UN-REDD policy, compared to about 70% in Asia-
Pacific and 50% in Africa. The heterogeneous impact of the programme across
regions is explained by cross-region variations in forest composition, as well as the
rates and drivers of deforestation propensities. Although the Asia-Pacific (0.6%)
has on average the highest rate of deforestation, Latin America and the Caribbean
region (5.1 million hectares) record the largest area of forest cover cleared per
year, followed by the Asia-Pacific (3.4 million hectares) and Africa (2.3 million
hectares) (see Table 3.1). Agricultural land expansion, dominated by commercial
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Figure 3.4: Estimated UN-REDD programme effects over time– Regional differences
agriculture, is the main driver of deforestation in both the Latin America and
the Caribbean and the Asia-Pacific regions (Leblois et al., 2017). For Africa, it
is GDP per capita. Better institutions and political environment play a critical
role in patterns of deforestation across countries (Bhattarai and Hammig, 2001,
Culas, 2007). The majority of tropical countries are rich in natural resources and
use them heavily in their development process. It is institutions and policies that
matter in whether or not resource-based development will be successful in the
long-run. Improvements in institutions towards secure property rights and better
environmental policies halt deforestation without impeding the path for economic
development (Culas, 2007). The Latin America and the Caribbean region has
comparatively better functioning institutions compared to developing Africa and
Asia-Pacific regions. The complementary between institutional factors and forest
sector polices may have reduced deforestation in Latin America and the Caribbean
region. This analysis is consistent for the carbon dioxide emissions too. It is also
possible that the success of the UN-REDD programme in Latin America and the
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Caribbean region compared to Africa and the Asia-Pacific be a direct result of
the financial incentives of the programme. We cannot also ignore the fact that
the accumulation of multiple policies, domestic and global, must have led to the
positive feedback in the Latin America and the Caribbean region.
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Table 3.4: Impact of UN-REDD on deforestation and emissions across regions over
time
Africa Asia–Pacific Latin America & the Caribbean
Deforestation
First 2 years -0.583 0.228 -2.004
(0.472) (0.430) (1.385)
Years 3-4 -0.661 0.404 -2.477
(0.447) (0.376) (1.551)
Years 5-6 -0.445 -0.008 -3.942*
(0.432) (0.427) (2.000)
Years 7-8 -0.298 0.257 -5.777*
(0.478) (0.434) (2.459)
Years 9-10 0.088 -1.113 -5.799*
(0.500) (0.688) (2.253)
R2 0.938 0.938 0.919
Emissions
First 2 years -0.018 0.005 -0.047
(0.018) (0.016) (0.047)
Years 3-4 -0.021 0.013 -0.067
(0.017) (0.014) (0.052)
Years 5-6 -0.013 -0.000 -0.114*
(0.016) (0.015) (0.068)
Years 7-8 -0.008 0.011 -0.187**
(0.018) (0.015) (0.080)
Years 9-10 0.007 -0.039 -0.211***
(0.019) (0.025) (0.077)
R2 0.943 0.942 0.903
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes
Country*time Yes Yes Yes
Observations 828 612 396
Note: Regressions control for year fixed effects (FEs), country FEs, and country-specific linear
trends (Country*time). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% nominal level, respectively.86
3.5.3 Heterogeneity across income levels
Low income economies often have competing needs between preserving the envi-
ronment and achieving economic prosperity. Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) and
Ota (2017) argue that the impacts of economic growth on environment degrada-
tion are generally larger for countries with lower income. Due to almost nonexis-
tent environmental policies in low income countries, pursuing economic prosperity
through increased income often triggers the introduction of environmental regula-
tions at varying degrees. As such, one expects that any environment policy should
have heterogeneous effects across economic development levels. In this section, we
investigate whether such heterogeneous effects are observed with the UN-REDD
programme.
Table 3.5, along with Figure 3.5, show the estimates of the UN-REDD pro-
gramme effect on deforestation and emissions across income levels over time. The
table shows, for each outcome variable (deforestation or emissions) and a given
income level (Low, Lower-middle, Upper-middle, and High), the estimated UN-
REDD programme over time. The classification of countries into the above four
income groups was taken from the World Economic Situation Prospects 2019 re-
port. Table B.3 in the Appendix summarises the regional classification (Africa,
Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean) of the countries in our sample
into these four groups. Of the 102 countries in the sample, 30 are low income,
36 are lower-middle income, 28 are upper-middle income, and 8 are high income
countries. For both the deforestation and emissions models, the results in Table
3.5 and Figure 3.5 indicate sizeable heterogeneous programme impacts over time
and across income levels.
Considering first the deforestation specification (first part of Table 3.5), statis-
tically significant estimates are only observed for upper-middle income countries,
while that of the other income levels appear insignificant although their magnitude
is relatively large. The non statistical significance stems probably from the large
standard error estimates, which may be the result of the small number of observa-
tions due to the disaggregation at income levels. For example, only 8 countries are
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classified as high income countries in our sample, leading to about 144 observations
in the regressions of this income group. Looking at the plots in the RHS graph of
Figure 3.5, there is a deep downward trend in the estimated policy effect on defor-
estation spanning the negative territory for upper-middle income countries (blue
solid curve with triangle-markers). Meanwhile, the programme effect has seen an
upward positive trend in low income countries (dark solid curve with dot-markers).
Clearly, while upper-middle income countries have seen a significant reduction of
deforestation over time after adopting the UN-REDD programme, the adopting
low income countries have seen an opposite effect. The reduction of deforestation
in adopting upper-middle income countries has nearly doubled within 10 years,
from on average 181,800 hectares per year the first 2 years of adoption to 331,100
hectares after 10 years of adoption (see first part of Table 3.5). Aside statistical
significance, both lower-middle and high income countries depicts mixed results as
shown the RHS graph in Figure 3.5. In particular, adopting lower-middle income
countries on average have increased their deforestation up to years 7-8 after pro-
gramme adoption, whereas in adopting high income countries deforestation has
trended upward in the positive territory until years 3-4 after programme adop-
tion. Then, both income level countries have seen a downward trend in policy
estimates after the last positive peak onward, i.e., from years 7-8 for adopting
lower-middle income countries and from years 3-4 for adopting high income; see
the dark dashed curve with dot-markers (for lower-middle income countries) and
the blue dashed curve with triangle-markers (for high income countries) in the
RHS graph of Figure 3.5.
Regarding emissions (second part of Table 3.5), we first see that the estimated
programme effects are statistically significant in low income countries (over the en-
tire period) and upper-middle income countries (from years 7-8 after programme
adoption), whereas in both adopting lower-middle and high income countries the
estimates are insignificant over time. Nevertheless, both upper-middle and high
income countries policy estimates have a negative sign over time, which indicates
the reduction of emission over time. Meanwhile, only sporadic negative numbers
are shown in both adopting low income (in years 3-4) and lower-middle income
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(in years 5-6, 9-10) countries. The left-hand side (LHS) graph in Figure 3.5 il-
lustrates clearly this heterogeneous policy response. More specifically, while a
steady downward trend is observed in adopting upper-middle and high income
countries, adopting low income countries policy estimates have trended slightly
upward in the positive territory and adopting lower-middle income countries pol-
icy estimates do not show a clear trend, although most estimates remain positive
over time. Overall, adopting upper-middle (respectively high income) countries
have reduced their emissions on average from 3 megatonnes per year (respectively
1 megatonne per year) in the first 2 years of UN-REDD programme adoption to
62 megatonnes per year (respectively 16 megatonnes per) in the 10 years after the
programme adoption. Meanwhile, adopting low income countries have increased
their carbon dioxide emissions on average from 10 megatonnes per year in the first
2 years of adoption to 48 megatonnes per year after 10 years of adoption. This
result for low income countries mirrors very well the one found in deforestation
specification for this group of countries.
Overall, our results confirm the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) theory.
The EKC stipulates that environmental degradation is inevitable during the early
stages of development but as income increases, the quality of the environment
should improve. In most low income nations, deforestation mostly is not accom-
panied by forest replacement, or if a replacement occurs, it is often lower than the
harvest rate. However, growing income countries invest more in forest conservation
as their level of income brings changes in their economic structures, thus yielding
alternative sources of energy, which in turn reduces deforestation and increases
their valuation of the ecosystem services. This may explain why in both the de-
forestation and emissions specifications, we observed quite opposite programme
effects between low income and upper-middle income countries. For example, 10
years after the UN-REDD programme adoption, deforestation has reduced signif-
icantly on average by 331,100 hectares per year in adopting upper-middle income
countries, while it has risen by 130,900 hectares per year in adopting low income
countries. These trends are also evidenced in the model for carbon dioxide emis-
sions. Even adopting lower-middle income countries have not seen a strong policy
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Figure 3.5: Estimated UN-REDD programme effects over time– Heterogeneity across
income levels
impact compared to upper-middle income group. In particular, after 10 years of
the UN-REDD programme adoption, the reduction of deforestation (respectively
emissions) in adopting upper-middle countries is roughly 5.1 (respectively 2.6)
times larger than the ones observed in adopting lower-middle income countries.
The EKC theory suggests an economic growth threshold over which a country
can change the path of its forest transition by slowing down deforestation. The
question, however, is whether most deforesting developing nations can achieve
enough per capita income to reach this turning point. Researchers such as ? have
discussed the necessity of such a threshold. He argues that tunnelling through
the EKC can help developing countries avoid the need to achieve a higher per
capita income in order to reach the turning point. For example, an adequate
use of the financial incentives provided by the UN-REDD programe can help to
curb deforestation. Financial incentives from the UN-REDD programme may
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have helped, at least, the upper-middle to high developing income countries to
tunnel through the EKC. However, more unified approaches could make the UN-
REDD programme more successful in adopting low income countries, thereby the
UN-REDD programme will fulfil its role as the guardian of tropical forests and
becomes a forerunner in climate change mitigation.
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Table 3.5: Impact of UN-REDD on deforestation and emissions across income levels
over time
Income levels Low Lower-middle Upper-middle High
Deforestation
First 2 years 0.269 0.287 -1.818 1.551
(1.058) (0.438) (1.150) (6.202)
Years 3-4 -0.024 0.453 -2.099 0.738
(1.057) (0.412) (1.194) (5.986)
Years 5-6 0.500 0.025 -2.697* -0.660
(1.080) (0.453) (1.356) (5.797)
Years 7-8 0.475 0.253 -3.642* -1.321
(1.183) (0.471) (1.690) (5.832)
Years 9-10 1.309 -0.651 -3.311* -1.487
(1.219) (0.554) (1.433) (5.590)
R2 0.945 0.929 0.918 0.915
Emissions
First 2 years 0.022 0.006 -0.041 -0.173
(0.042) (0.016) (0.038) (0.203)
Years 3-4 0.010 0.012 -0.050 -0.185
(0.042) (0.015) (0.038) (0.196)
Years 5-6 0.030 -0.004 -0.071 -0.223
(0.043) (0.016) (0.045) (0.190)
Years 7-8 0.032 0.003 -0.103* -0.235
(0.048) (0.017) (0.054) (0.193)
Years 9-10 0.065 -0.031 -0.105** -0.227
(0.049) (0.020) (0.049) (0.184)
R2 0.949 0.936 0.902 0.895
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*time Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 540 648 504 144
Note: Regressions control for year fixed effects (FEs), country FEs, and country-specific linear
trends (Country*time). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate




The econometric strategy employed to identify the effect of the UN-REDD pro-
gramme on both deforestation and emissions relies on the underlying assumption
that there are no confounding factors during the study period that could actually
affect deforestation and emissions in adopting countries other than the programme
itself, once we control for the observed determinants (covariates) of both outcome
variables, the country-specific unobserved fixed effects, and the country-specific
linear trends. To explicitly check the validity of this assumption, we undertake a
placebo test with the fictitious year 2008 as a falsification strategy. That is, we
use 2008 as the initial year of programme implementation and test the effect of
the UN-REDD on deforestation and emissions. If deforestation and emissions in
adopting countries were significantly increasing or decreased as compared to the
non-adopting countries, then the UN-REDD programme effect would be wrongly
attributed. As such, we expect this pseudo programme to have no significant ef-
fect on deforestation and emissions. Table 3.6 and Figure 3.6 present the results,
where we also show the baseline 2009 starting adoption year. As seen, none of the
2008 estimates is significant over time for both deforestation and emissions, thus
validating our identification strategy.
93
Table 3.6: Placebo test
Deforestation Emissions
2009 2008 2009 2008
First 2 years -0.156 -0.153 -0.006 -0.007
(0.286) (0.281) (0.010) (0.010)
Years 3-4 -0.297 -0.237 -0.011 -0.010
(0.287) (0.277) (0.010) (0.010)
Years 5-6 -0.579 -0.403 -0.021 -0.016
(0.312) (0.337) (0.011) (0.012)
Years 7-8 -0.734 -0.501 -0.026 -0.019
(0.390) (0.395) (0.014) (0.014)
Years 9-10 -1.138* -0.540 -0.042* -0.024
(0.460) (0.461) (0.017) (0.017)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*time Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.908 0.908 0.898 0.897
Observations 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836
Note: 2008 is the falsification (fictitious) year and 2009 is the year the programme was first
impleted. Regressions control for year fixed effects (FEs), country FEs, and country-specific
linear trends (Country*time). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% nominal level, respectively.
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Figure 3.6: Placebo test
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3.6.2 Other robustness checks
Since the early 90s, many developing countries have adopted several global en-
vironmental policies other than the UN-REDD programme. The goal of many
of global environmental policies is to support the REDD+ efforts in adopting
countries. For example, the Bonn challenge (BONN) launched in 2011 and recog-
nised by 38 countries aims to regain ecological functionality and enhance human
well-being across deforested or degraded forest landscapes. The Forest Investment
Programme (FIP) that became operational in 2009 and recognised by 23 coun-
tries aims to provide scaled-up financing for readiness reforms and public/private
investments. And the Global Environment Facility (GEF) established in 1992
provides funds to 99 developing countries in order to meet the objectives of the
international environmental conventions and agreements. It is therefore possible
that the impact of the UN-REDD programme found in the main analysis is biased
because it may also be driven by these other environmental policies. In this sec-
tion, we conduct two robustness checks that support our main analysis in Section
3.5.
First, wee look at whether controlling for the above three global environmental
policies alter the estimated impact the UN-REDD programme found in our main
analysis in Section 3.5. For this, we simultaneously include all the BONN, FIP
and GEF policies variables along with the UN-REDD programme variable in our
regressions. The estimated impact of the UN-REDD programme over time from
these regressions are presented in Table 3.7 for both the deforestation and emis-
sions. As shown in the last three columns of this table, only the BONN and FIP
policies appear marginally significant (First 2 years and years 5-8 for BONN; years
5-6 for FIP), and both policies unexpectedly increase deforestation and emissions
in UN-REDD adopting developing countries. While the GEF policy is clearly
not statistically significant over time, a negative sign is nonetheless observed from
years 7-8 after the UN-REDD programme adoption. Interestingly, in both the
deforestation and emissions models, the signs and magnitudes of the estimated ef-
fects of the UN-REDD policy are identical to the ones obtained from the baseline
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regressions in Part B, columns (2) of Table 3.2.
Second, it is argued in the literature (see, e.g., Andam et al., 2008, Dewi et al.,
2013, Nelson and Chomitz, 2009) that the presence of protected areas help to re-
duce deforestation. Therefore, failing to control for these policies could lead to
overestimate the impact of the UN-REDD programme on deforestation and emis-
sions in adopting countries. The International Union for Conservation of Nature
(IUCN) classifies the protected areas around the world into six categories. These
six categories differ mainly through their management objectives and protection
levels, as shown in Table B.14. To control for these policies in the UN-REDD
programme impact evaluation, dummy variables (PAj, j = 1, 2, . . . 6) indicating
the presence of each type of protection are created in a given country and added
to the baseline specification (3.3.1).
Table 3.8 contains summarised results, where the estimated effect of protected
areas along the UN-REDD programme impact estimated over time are shown for
the deforestation and emissions regressions. Although not statistically significant,
we see that the estimated effect of all type of protections have a positive sign in
both the deforestation and emissions model. Interestingly, the estimated impact
of the UN-REDD programme on deforestation and emissions is larger compared
to the baseline estimates in Section 3.5. This suggests that not controlling for the
presence of protected areas underestimates the UN-REDD programme effect, but
not the other way around.
Brazil has been receiving the REDD+ incentives since 2007, although the
country did not formally adopt the UN-REDD programme. As such, we estimate
the policy effects placing Brazil in the treated country group. We find qualitatively
similar results7 to those reported in Section 3.5. We also express the deforestation
variable firstly as a percentage of forest area, and secondly as a percentage of total
arable land, we find qualitatively similar results to those reported in Section 3.5.
7These results are not reported here in order to shorten the presentation but are available
under request.
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Table 3.7: UN-REDD versus other global environmental policies
Policies UN-REDD BONN FIP GEF
Deforestation
First 2 years -0.156 0.903* 0.187 0.053
(0.286) (0.441) (0.419) (0.094)
Years 3-4 -0.297 0.346 1.223 0.054
(0.287) (0.305) (0.868) (0.121)
Years 5-6 -0.579 0.708* 4.744* 0.036
(0.312) (0.326) (2.316) (0.134)
Years 7-8 -0.734 0.734* 2.343 -0.070
(0.390) (0.358) (1.771) (0.151)
Years 9-10 -1.138* -0.130
(0.460) (0.182)
Adjusted R2 0.908 0.909 0.915 0.908
Emissions
First 2 years -0.006 0.031* 0.001 0.003
(0.010) (0.015) (0.016) (0.003)
Years 3-4 -0.011 0.026 0.037 0.005
(0.010) (0.015) (0.033) (0.004)
Years 5-6 -0.021 0.034** 0.158* 0.006
(0.011) (0.013) (0.077) (0.005)
Years 7-8 -0.026 0.028* 0.134 0.002
(0.014) (0.013) (0.084) (0.005)
Years 9-10 -0.042* 0.001
(0.017) (0.006)
Adjusted R2 0.898 0.899 0.905 0.897
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*time Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836
Note: Regressions control for year fixed effects (FEs), country FEs, and country-specific linear
trends (Country*time). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% nominal level, respectively.
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Table 3.8: Effect of protected areas on deforestation
PA categories PA1 PA2 PA3 PA4 PA5 PA6
Deforestation
PA 0.264 0.245 0.005 0.213 0.243 0.203
(0.216) (0.204) (0.195) (0.143) (0.267) (0.161)
REDD × POST
First 2 years -0.189 -0.281 -0.158 -0.285 -0.282 -0.251
(0.267) (0.266) (0.245) (0.260) (0.213) (0.259)
Years 3-4 -0.331 0.422 -0.298 -0.424 -0.423 -0.391
(0.271) (0.264) (0.245) (0.265) (0.223) (0.272)
Years 5-6 -0.617* -0.707* -0.581* -0.711* -0.706** -0.679*
(0.297) (0.303) (0.278) (0.303) (0.257) (0.300)
Years 7-8 -0.774* -0.863* -0.736* -0.867* -0.861* -0.838*
(0.379) (0.389) (0.369) (0.392) (0.358) (0.386)
Years 9-10 -1.173* -1.263** -1.139* -1.265** -1.256** -1.239**
(0.461) (0.472) (0.455) (0.467) (0.460) (0.466)
Adjusted R2 0.908 0.908 0.908 0.908 0.908 0.908
Emissions
PA 0.012 0.009 0.0002 0.008 0.009 0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
REDD × POST
First 2 years -0.008 -0.011 -0.006 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Years 3-4 -0.013 -0.016 -0.011 -0.016 -0.016* -0.015
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Years 5-6 -0.022* -0.025* -0.021* -0.026* -0.025** -0.025*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
Years 7-8 -0.028* -0.031* -0.026* -0.031* -0.031* -0.030*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014)
Years 9-10 -0.044* -0.047** -0.042* -0.047** -0.046** -0.046**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Adjusted R2 0.898 0.897 0.897 0.897 0.897 0.898
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country*time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836
Note: Regressions control for year fixed effects (FEs), country FEs, and country-specific linear
trends (Country*time). Columns (PA1)-(PA6) contain the estimates of the six protection cate-
gories, along with the UN-REDD programme effects over time. Standard errors in parentheses
are bootstrapped with 1000 replications. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%,
5% and 10% nominal level, respectively.
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3.7 Discussions and concluding remarks
The development goal of the the United Nations UN-REDD programme is to
enhance carbon stocks in tropical forests through the provision of results-based
payments to member countries for their efforts in decreasing deforestation. The
UN-REDD programme was first launched in 2008 and developing countries started
the implementation of the programme since 2009. To date, there is no compre-
hensive evaluation of the programme success using policy evaluation econometric
techniques. In this study, we employ a novel econometric technique, the stag-
gered difference-in-differences approach, to show that the UN-REDD programme
has been successful in curbing deforestation and emissions over time in develop-
ing countries. While smaller policy impacts on deforestation and emissions are
observed in the first few years of the policy adoption, much larger effects are ev-
idenced over time. Clearly, the longer a country is exposed to the UN-REDD
programme, the stronger the resulting effect is. This finding supports the belief
that as time evolves, the UN-REDD programme incentives might have overridden
its transaction costs to deliver a positive impact (Libecap, 2014).
Despite these common patterns among countries, heterogeneous policy effects
are also observed across regions and economic development levels. In particular,
while the UN-REDD programme has been relatively successful in the Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean region, developing countries in Africa and Asia-Pacific have
not seen the same impact. Similarly, upper-middle and high income countries are
better off compared to lower-middle and low income countries. By emphasizing
on these heterogeneous policy effects across regions and income levels, our study
clearly shows that the impact of the UN-REDD programme is not uniform across
economic development levels and geographical locations. As such, incorporating
this heterogeneity in the decision making process is paramount to amplifying the
global efforts to protect tropical forests.
Our results on regional differences corroborate the literature on payments for
environmental services (PES) schemes on deforestation, which demonstrates the
existence of substantial variation in deforestation across regions (Jayachandran
100
et al., 2017, Libecap, 2014, Robalino and Pfaff, 2013, Scullion et al., 2011). This
may be due to variation in transaction costs that are often higher for less develop-
ing countries (Alston and Andersson, 2011), low level of pre–programme compli-
ance, low opportunity cost of participation and poorly-established property rights.
Scullion et al. (2011) suggest that the inclusion of risk-integrated payments, ro-
bust monitoring and enforcement programmes will ensure environmental policy
effectiveness. Also, PES schemes such as the REED programme are different from
traditional policy instruments that are abide by legal regulations, sanction mech-
anisms or taxes (Börner et al., 2017), therefore their effectiveness is not often
guaranteed.
Our finding on heterogeneous UN-REDD programme effects across economic
development levels is similar to that of the literature on economic growth im-
pact on income inequality and environmental degradation (Ota, 2017). Indeed,
low income economies often have competing needs over conservation and eco-
nomic/social welfare. Economic growth impacts on environmental degradation
are generally larger for countries with lower income. Environmental policies are
almost non-existent in many low income countries, and some developing nations
in their quest to economic prosperity through increased income often triggers the
introduction of environmental regulations at varying degrees. This may explain
why deforestation and emissions have reduced in UN-REDD programme adopt-
ing upper-middle and high income countries but have increased in UN-REDD
programme adopting lower-middle and low income countries. One of the policy
implications of environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) is that the development pro-
cess should not exceed the ecological threshold. The financial incentives provided
by the UN-REDD can be used by developing countries to tunnel through the EKC.
Restructuring the development process to achieve sustainable development is thus
encouraged for developing countries in order to flatten the EKC curve (Bhattarai
and Hammig, 2001). From policy perspective, it is vital for developing economies
to avoid the same level of environmental damage caused by industrialised nations
during their initial growth stages, without hindering economic development. In
this context, global environmental policies play a major role. The negative im-
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pacts of development policies could be restrained within the limits of ecological
thresholds by employing prudent environmental policies. Seeing the success of UN-
REDD programme in upper-middle and high income countries, lower-middle and
low income economies will benefit from using this policy to combat deforestation
while partaking in a sustainable growth process.
The success of UN-REDD could have led the development path of developing
countries towards positive forest cover changes by shortening the forest transition
period. The heterogeneous policy effect provides guidance for decision makers
at global and national levels. Financial incentives and other technical assistance
must be focused on country requirements. Accounting for this heterogeneity in
the decision making process could help to anticipate changes toward achieving
environment protection in a more sustainable way. Considering the importance of
the socio-economic environment, improvements to agricultural and forestry sector
policies at the national level are also encouraged.
102
Appendix B
Figure B.1: Global and regional deforestation trends
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Figure B.2: Tropical emission trends in UN-REDD policy adoption
Note: Figure shows the average emissions against the number of developing countries that
have adopted the UN-REDD policy, 2009-2018. The average emissions expressed in gigatonnes
of carbon dioxide emissions.
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Table B.1: Treated and control countries by region
Africa Asia–Pacific Latin America & Caribbean
Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated
Algeria Benin Afghanistan Bangladesh Brazil Argentina
Angola Burkina Faso Brunei Bhutan Cuba Bolivia
Botswana Cameroon China Cambodia Haiti Chile
Burundi Central African Rep. Iran Fiji Nicaragua Colombia
Djibouti Chad Iraq India Uruguay Costa Rica
Egypt Congo, Dem. Rep. Jordan Indonesia Venezuela Dominican Rep.
Eritrea Congo, Rep. Korea, Dem. Lao PDR Ecuador
Eswatini Cote d’Ivoire Korea, Rep. Malaysia El Salvador
Gambia Equatorial Guinea Lebanon Mongolia Guatemala
Mali Ethiopia Oman Myanmar Guyana
Mauritania Gabon Syria Nepal Honduras
Mozambique Ghana Timor-Leste Pakistan Mexico
Namibia Guinea Turkey PNG Panama
Niger Guinea-Bissau UAE Philippines Paraguay
Rwanda Kenya Yemen Solomon Islands Peru
Sao Tome & Principe Liberia Sri Lanka Suriname
Senegal Madagascar Thailand
Sierra Leone Malawi Vanuatu









Note: The sample consists of 102 developing countries. Of which, control (C) and treated (T)
countries are 40 and 62 respectively, located in Africa (46 countries in total; C=19, T=27), Asia-
Pacific (34 countries in total; C=15, T=19) and Latin America and the Caribbean(22 countries
in total; C=6, T=16).
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Table B.2: UN-REDD programme adoption by country, 2009-2018
Adoption Year : Africa Asia–Pacific Latin America & Caribbean
2009 : (9) Demo. Republic of Congo Indonesia Bolivia
Tanzania Papua New Guinea Panama
Zambia Vietnam Paraguay
2010 : (20) Central African Republic Bangladesh Argentina
Congo, Rep. Bhutan Colombia
Gabon Cambodia Costa Rica
Kenya Nepal Ecuador
Nigeria Philippines Guatemala
Sudan Solomon Islands Guyana
Sri Lanka Mexico
2011 : (12) Benin Mongolia Chile
Cameroon Myanmar Honduras
Cote d’Ivoire Pakistan Peru
Ethiopia Suriname
Ghana
2012 : (4) Morocco Lao PDR
Uganda Malaysia
2013 : (3) Madagascar
Tunisia
Zimbabwe






2015 : (6) Burkina Faso India Dominican Republic
Guinea Vanuatu El Salvador
2018 : (1) Thailand
Total: 62 27 19 16
Note: Three countries (South Sudan, Samoa, and Jamica) were omitted from the sample due
to lack of data. South-Sudan adopted the UN-REDD programme in 2011, while it was adopted
in 2015 in both Samoa and Jamaica. Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of countries
that adopted the programme that year.
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Table B.3: Regional classification of countries by income level
Regions Africa Asia-Pacific Latin America & Caribbean
Income levels Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated
Low (30) Burundi Benin Afghanistan Nepal Haiti
Eritrea Burkina Faso Korea, Dem.
Gambia Central African Rep. Syria












Lower-middle (36) Angola Cote d’Ivoire Timor-Leste Bangladesh Nicaragua Bolivia
Djibouti Cameroon Bhutan Honduras
Egypt Congo, Rep. Indonesia El Salvador
Mauritania Ghana India
Sao Tome & Principe Kenya Cambodia










Upper-middle (28) Botswana Gabon China Fiji Brazil Colombia
Algeria Equatorial Guinea Iran Malaysia Cuba Costa Rica
Namibia Iraq Thailand Venezuela Dominican Rep.











Source: World Economic Situation Prospects 2019. Country in red color are non-adopters of
the UN-REDD programme. Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of countries in each
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Table B.4: Classification of countries by institutional quality
Moderately Free Mostly Unfree Repressed
Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated
Botswana *Chile Afghanistan Argentina Algeria Bolivia
Brunei Colombia Angola Bangladesh Burundi Central African Republic
Jordan Costa Rica Brazil Benin Cuba Congo, Dem. Rep.
*Korea, Rep. Cote d’Ivoire China Bhutan Eritrea Equatorial Guinea
Namibia Dominican Rep. Djibouti Burkina Faso Iran Liberia
Oman El Salvador Egypt Cambodia Iraq Sudan
Rwanda Fiji Eswatini Cameroon Korea,Dem. Suriname
Turkey Guatemala Gambia Chad Syria Zimbabwe
*UAE Indonesia Haiti Congo,Rep. Timor-Leste
Uruguay *Malaysia Lebanon Ecuador Venezuela





Peru Sao Tome & Principe Guyana
Philippines Senegal Honduras
Tanzania Sierra Leone India















Note: Using the Index of Economic Freedom, all countries categorized into three categories: 1.
Moderately Free; 2. Mostly Unfree; and 3. Repressed (Heritage, 2021) . *In our sample the four
countries - Chile, Republic Korea, Malaysia and United Arab Emirates - belong to ‘Mostly Free
category’ have been placed in the ‘Moderately Free category’ due to low prevalence of countries
with high economic freedom.
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Table B.5: List of variables
Variable Description Source
Outcome variables
Deforestation (df) Tree cover loss at national level by 30% canopy cover, GFW
in hundred thousand hectares per year
Emissions (emi) CO2 emissions from above ground biomass loss GFW
at national level by 30% canopy cover, in gigatonnes
Explanatory variables
GDP growth (∆gdp) Real GDP growth rate, in annual % WDI
Population growth (gpop) Population growth, in annual % WDI
Trade openness (open) Sum of exports and imports, in % of GDP WDI
Agricultural exports (agexp) Agricultural raw materials exports, WDI
in % of merchandise exports
Rural population (rpop) Rural population, in % of total population WDI
Employment in agriculture (emp) Employment in agriculture, in % of total employment WDI
Agricultural land (agland) Agricultural land, in % of land area WDI
Arable land (arable) Arable land, in % of land area WDI
Note: GFW ≡ Global Forest Watch; WDI ≡World Development Indicators of the World Bank
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Table B.6: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Before Policy (N = 1364)
Outcome variables
Deforestation 0.903 3.731 0 53.788
Emissions 0.031 0.123 0 1.765
Controls
Real GDP growth 4.337 6.934 -99.670 64.081
Population growth 2.039 1.388 -4.537 15.177
Trade openness 73.618 39.019 0 351.110
Agricultural exports 5.498 11.753 0 79.536
Rural population 50.195 22.217 4.666 91.540
Employment in agriculture 40.215 23.758 0.550 92.548
Agricultural land 41.944 22.204 0.450 85.490
Arable land 13.310 12.919 0.043 63.786
After Policy (N = 472)
Outcome variables
Deforestation 1.545 2.972 0 24.221
Emissions 0.055 0.113 0 0.850
Controls
Real GDP growth 4.572 3.589 -36.040 17.291
Population growth 1.860 0.863 -0.267 4.172
Trade openness 73.506 36.059 0.200 200.380
Agricultural exports 6.461 12.333 0 98.947
Rural population 52.054 20.959 8.130 87.020
Employment in agriculture 40.996 20.353 0.059 81.706
Agricultural land 37.298 20.408 0.470 79.050
Arable land 12.988 12.881 0.333 59.853
Note: Data are from 102 countries covering 2001-2008 (pre-programme period) and 2009-2018
(adoption period). Deforestation is measured by hundred thousand hectares of tree cover loss
per year. Emissions measure is in gigatonnes of carbon dioxide emissions per year. GDP per
capita is in constant 2010 US Dollar. Real GDP growth and population growth are given as
annual percentages. Trade openness is the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP.
Agricultural exports is the agricultural raw material exports as a percentage of merchandise
exports. Employment in agriculture is given as a percentage of total employment. Agricultural
land and arable land are expressed as a percentage of land area.
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Table B.7: Correlation matrix, deforestation
df ∆gdp gpop open agexp rpop emp agland arable
df 1.0000
∆gdp 0.0799* 1.0000
gpop 0.0650* 0.6589* 1.0000
open 0.0526* 0.6481* 0.7585* 1.0000
agexp -0.0125 0.2846* 0.4323* 0.3651* 1.0000
rpop 0.0516* 0.7309* 0.8324* 0.7949* 0.4508* 1.0000
emp 0.0649* 0.6850* 0.8719* 0.7350* 0.4510* 0.9405* 1.0000
agland 0.0476* 0.6708* 0.7672* 0.6400* 0.2275* 0.7494* 0.7055* 1.0000
arable 0.0160 0.5565* 0.5699* 0.4706* 0.2202* 0.6859* 0.5863* 0.8066* 1.0000
Note: *Denotes statistical significance at 10% level.
Table B.8: matrix, emissions
emi ∆gdp gpop open agexp rpop emp agland arable
emi 1.0000
∆gdp 0.0916* 1.0000
gpop 0.0768* 0.6589* 1.0000
open 0.0649* 0.6481* 0.7585* 1.0000
agexp -0.0095 0.2846* 0.4323* 0.3651* 1.0000
rpop 0.0641* 0.7309* 0.8324* 0.7949* 0.4508* 1.0000
emp 0.0812* 0.6850* 0.8719* 0.7350* 0.4510* 0.9405* 1.0000
agland 0.0425* 0.6708* 0.7672* 0.6400* 0.2275* 0.7494* 0.7055* 1.0000
arable 0.0170 0.5565* 0.5699* 0.4706* 0.2202* 0.6859* 0.5863* 0.8066* 1.0000
Note: *Denotes statistical significance at 10% level.
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Table B.9: Programme effect on Deforestation and Emissions– preliminary analysis
Before Policy After Policy
DID
Treated Controls Treated Controls
Developing countries
Deforestation 2.821 0.719 1.481 1.044 -1.665
(0.467) (0.118) (0.138) (0.244)
CO2 emissions 0.101 0.024 0.053 0.035 -0.059
(0.018) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
Africa
Deforestation 1.886 0.166 1.190 0.265 -0.795
(0.404) (0.017) (0.181) (0.032)
CO2 emissions 0.074 0.006 0.043 0.008 -0.033
(0.018) (0.001) (0.043) (0.002)
Asia–Pacific
Deforestation 3.922 0.298 2.192 0.365 -1.797
(1.138) (0.050) (0.385) (0.068)
CO2 emissions 0.153 0.012 0.084 0.015 -0.072
(0.043) (0.002) (0.014) (0.003)
Latin America & Caribbean
Deforestation 1.511 1.712 1.483 2.020 -0.336
(0.246) (0.457) (0.134) (0.547)
CO2 emissions 0.040 0.054 0.041 0.062 -0.007
(0.006) (0.015) (0.004) (0.017)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table B.10: Estimates of policy effects on deforestation over time (χ2 test)
(1) (2)
First 2 years 0.225 -0.156
(0.253) (0.286)
Years 3-4 0.300 -0.297
(0.264) (0.287)
Years 5-6 0.277 -0.579
(0.261) (0.312)
Years 7-8 0.416 -0.734
(0.334) (0.390)
Years 9-10 0.600 -1.138*
(0.377) (0.460)
Covariates Yes Yes
Year fixed effects χ2(17)=30.84 (p-value=0.021) χ2(17)=20.14 (p-value=0.267)
Country fixed effects χ2(101)=3,761.39 (p-value=0.000) χ2(101)=5,581.57 (p-value=0.000)
Country*time No χ2(101)=672.91 (p-value=0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.895 0.908
Observations 1,836 1,836
Note: Column (1) controlling for year fixed effects and country fixed effects; and column (2)
controlling for year fixed effects, country fixed effects and country-specific linear trend. Standard
errors in parentheses are bootstrapped with 1000 replications. Finally, ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at nominal level 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table B.11: Estimates of policy effects on emissions over time (χ2 test)
(1) (2)
First 2 years 0.011 -0.006
(0.009) (0.010)
Years 3-4 0.013 -0.011
(0.010) (0.010)
Years 5-6 0.013 -0.021
(0.009) (0.011)
Years 7-8 0.018 -0.026
(0.012) (0.014)
Years 9-10 0.021 -0.042*
(0.015) (0.017)
Covariates Yes Yes
Year fixed effects χ2(17)=27.67 (p-value=0.049) χ2(17)=17.76 (p-value=0.404)
Country fixed effects χ2(101)=3,403.25 (p-value=0.000) χ2(101)=5,623.01 (p-value=0.000)
Country*time No χ2(101)=822.97 (p-value=0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.880 0.898
Observations 1,836 1,836
Note: Column (1) controlling for year fixed effects and country fixed effects; and column (2)
controlling for year fixed effects, country fixed effects and country-specific linear trend. Standard
errors in parentheses are bootstrapped with 1000 replications. Finally, ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at nominal level 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table B.12: Aggregate DID estimates– Deforestation (χ2-test)
(1) (2)
REDD × POST 0.446 -0.229
(0.337) (0.436)
Covariates Yes Yes
Year fixed effects χ2(17)=33.56 (p=0.010) χ2(17)=21.44 (p=0.207)
Country fixed effects χ2(101)=3,912.24 (p=0.000) χ2(101)=6,411.32 (p=0.000)
Country*time No χ2(101)=765.65 (p=0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.896 0.908
Observations 1,836 1,836
Note: Column (1) controlling for year fixed effects and country fixed effects; and column (2)
controlling for year fixed effects, country fixed effects and country-specific linear trend. Standard
errors in parentheses are bootstrapped with 1000 replications. Finally, ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at nominal level 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.





Year fixed effects χ2(17)=34.88 (p=0.007) χ2(17)=18.89 (p=0.335)
Country fixed effects χ2(101)=3,664.42 (p=0.000) χ2(101)=6,496.60 (p=0.000)
Country*time No χ2(101)=956.76 (p=0.000)
Adjusted R2 0.880 0.897
Observations 1,836 1,836
Note: Column (1) controlling for year fixed effects and country fixed effects; and column (2)
controlling for year fixed effects, country fixed effects and country-specific linear trend. Standard
errors in parentheses are bootstrapped with 1000 replications. Finally, ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at nominal level 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table B.14: Protected area classification
Type of protection Description
PA1 (Ia). Strict Nature Reserve Protected areas that are strictly set aside to protect biodiversity and also possibly geological/geomorphological features, where human visitation, use and
impacts are strictly controlled and limited to ensure protection of the conservation values. Such protected areas can serve as indispensable reference areas
for scientific research and monitoring.
PA1 (Ib). Wilderness Area Protected areas that are usually large unmodified or slightly modified areas, retaining their natural character and influence, without permanent or significant
human habitation, which are protected and managed so as to preserve their natural condition.
PA2. National Park Large natural or near natural areas set aside to protect large-scale ecological processes, along with the complement of species and ecosystems characteristic of
the area, which also provide a foundation for environmentally and culturally compatible spiritual, scientific, educational, recreational and visitor opportunities.
PA3. Natural Monument or Feature Protected areas set aside to protect a specific natural monument, which can be a land-form, sea mount, submarine cavern, geological feature such as a cave or
even a living feature such as an ancient grove. They are generally quite small protected areas and often have high visitor value.
PA4. Habitat/Species Management Area Protected areas aiming to protect particular species or habitats and management reflects this priority. Many category 4 protected areas will need regular,
active interventions to address the requirements of particular species or to maintain habitats, but this is not a requirement of the category.
PA5. Protected Landscape/Seascape A protected area where the interaction of people and nature over time has produced an area of distinct character with significant ecological, biological,
cultural and scenic value; and where safeguarding the integrity of this interaction is vital to protecting and sustaining the area and its associated nature
conservation and other values.
PA6. Protected area with sustainable Protected areas that conserve ecosystems and habitats, together with associated cultural values and traditional natural resource management systems. They
use of natural resources are generally large, with most of the area in a natural condition, where a proportion is under sustainable natural resource management and where low-level
non-industrial use of natural resources compatible with nature conservation is seen as one of the main aims of the area.
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This paper investigates the effectiveness of Kyoto’s Clean Development Mech-
anism (CDM) on emissions reduction in developing countries. Using a quantile
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economies. Reforms in the design and implementation of the CDM are therefore,
necessary to receive anticipated policy outcomes.
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4.1 Introduction
The actions against climate change need to be collective and follow a credible in-
ternational approach (Frankel, 1999, Kolstad and Toman, 2005, Olmstead and
Stavins, 2006). In this context, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),
pledged under the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, has been designed to engage developing economies in climate
change mitigation while also promoting sustainable development. The CDM pro-
vides greenhouse gas (GHG) emission credits for developed economies through
projects implemented in those countries.
Assessment of the success of the CDM is vital in framing an effective interna-
tional policy architecture on climate change (Banuri and Gupta, 2000). Most of
the existing empirical analyses assessing the CDM’s success have employed mean–
type regression analysis (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2008, He et al., 2014, Huang and
Barker, 2012, Zhang and Wang, 2011), and thus cannot capture the effect of the
policy along the distribution of emission measures. As countries show a tendency
to implement CDM projects differently (Flues, 2010, Silayan, 2005, Winkelman
and Moore, 2011), it is important to assess its heterogeneous effects, taking into
account the distribution of emissions across countries. Another shortfall is that
the majority of the studies consider the impact of the CDM only on carbon diox-
ide emissions, whereas approximately 30% of GHG emissions consist of methane,
nitrous oxide and fluorinated gases. Each of these gases has a different lifetime
(period it remains in the atmosphere) and radiative efficiency (the ability to ab-
sorb energy). Further, the Paris Climate Accord binds only the developed coun-
tries who had historically high emissions whereas the developing countries have
no commitment to emission reduction targets when ratifying, despite having high
emissions in the recent past (Figure C.2).
A successful emission reduction strategy needs to be holistic and addresses
heterogeneities across all sectors and types of emissions. Therefore, our study
fill this gap by using the CDM to examine the impact of international climate
policies in developing economies. As such, this study mainly evaluates whether
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the implementation of CDM projects has triggered a reduction of GHG emissions
in developing countries, and whether countries have responded differently to the
policy.
Using a quantile treatment effect approach in a difference–in–differences set-
ting, we find notable heterogeneous effects for the CDM across the GHG emissions
distribution of developing countries. In particular, improvement in emissions re-
duction is observed only at the lower tail of the emissions distribution, whereas
the policy has resulted in an increase in GHG emissions in the middle and high
quantiles of the emission variables. This indicates that although the CDM may
not have benefited the medium– to high–emitting countries, it does benefit low–
emitting developing countries. On the other–hand, we find very strong evidence
for reduced carbon intensity over the entire distribution of CDM host countries
during the post–policy period. Policy adoption has therefore triggered favourable
responses not in net emissions, but in carbon intensities. In high–emitting coun-
tries, the CDM was successful in reducing only fluorinated gases. Moreover, the
policy has a significant heterogeneous effect across sectors of the economy. At
the upper tail of the emissions distribution, the CDM has been a success for the
agricultural and industrial sectors, although it is failed to reduce emissions in the
energy, land—use change and forestry (LUCF) and waste sectors. In addition,
policy response in developing countries exhibit regional and income–based hetero-
geneities. In particular, compared to the rest of the developing world, the policy
was effective in reducing GHG emissions in the region of Latin America and the
Caribbean. However, we do not find strong evidence across income levels. Specif-
ically, we have seen GHG emissions reduction only for low–income economies, but
the policy effect shows no significant improvement in emissions reduction above
the median quantile for other income categories.
Our findings are in line with the Weitzman price–quantity theorem on the
best policy to reduce GHG emissions. According to this theorem, the prevail-
ing technological uncertainty makes taxes (price–based approaches) more effective
than cap–and–trade (quantity–based approach) policies (Pizer, 1997). The Kyoto
Protocol has followed the tradable quantity–type approach, and this could be a
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reason for its failure as an emissions abatement policy. In a price–type policy, the
structure of costs and damages in climate change is important (Nordhaus, 2006).
In a climate policy, the benefits are the stock of GHGs, and the costs are the flow
of GHG emissions. Therefore, the marginal cost of emission reduction is related
to the level of reduction, whereas the marginal benefit of emission reduction is
invariant to the current level of emissions. When the damages are caused by stock
externalities, the damage function in terms of current emissions is likely to be lin-
ear. On the other hand, abatement costs are a non–linear function of emissions.
When there is uncertainty, emission taxes are therefore considered a more efficient
solution for climate change than quantitative targets. Another advantage of the
tax mechanism is its importance as a revenue–generating mechanism in the fiscal
policy stance. This effect is explained as the ‘double burden’ where inefficiency
losses of the overall tax system increase due to the increase in price and reduction
in real income.
Our study contributes to the literature firstly by identifying the causal effect of
the CDM as a global climate policy while addressing the ambiguity of its success
in the extant literature. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study
that employs quantile difference–in–differences regression analysis to evaluate the
impact of a global climate policy. The results confirm and even strengthen earlier
results, indicating the high likelihood of CDM failure for high–emitting countries if
the policy continues in the same manner. Secondly, the current study adds a new
dimension by investigating the impact of the CDM at various disaggregations of
types and sector–wise emissions. Therefore, we have employed a holistic approach
in our analysis, without limiting it to carbon dioxide emissions. We have included
emissions of four major GHG component gases and five sectors in investigating
the differential policy response. Thirdly, we carry out region– and income–based
heterogeneity analyses, which may aid in advancing the existing knowledge on the
CDM’s effectiveness in developing countries.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section, 4.2, briefly outlines the
GHG emission trends and the background of Kyoto’s Clean Development Mech-
anism. Section 4.3 describes the data used, followed by the empirical strategy
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in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 reports the results across all heterogeneous specifica-
tions and Section 4.6 discusses the empirical findings. Section 4.7 presents some
robustness checks. Section 4.8 shares the conclusion.
4.2 GHG emissions and the Clean Development
Mechanism
Climate change intensifies and fabricates new risks for natural and human systems
(Pachauri et al., 2014). In general, these risks are distributed unevenly and detri-
mental for developing economies. The severity of climate change depends on the
growth of anthropogenic emissions – the primary cause of climate change – and is
driven by population size, economic activity, technology and climate policy.
Historically, it is the developed countries that have been most responsible for
climate change. Their wealth has been achieved from heavy industry and en-
ergy use leading to stockpiling of emissions in the atmosphere, but now, slowly,
the process has begun to decouple. While developed countries still produce large
amounts of carbon emissions, increasingly developing countries are doing so as well
(Figures C.1 and C.2 in the Appendix). In 2016, developing countries produced
66% of the annual emissions whereas developed and economies in transition pro-
duced only 26% and 8%, respectively (Table C.1 in the Appendix). Conversely,
annual average emissions are always highest for the developed countries and lie
above the world averages. In developing countries, the Asia–Pacific region and
upper–middle income category record the highest emissions. Carbon dioxide is
the leading greenhouse component gas and the energy sector produces the most
emissions of any sector (Figure C.3 in the appendix).
The Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) is a framework for reducing global GHG emissions. Partici-
pating countries are grouped as Annex I and Non-Annex I parties, corresponding
to developed and developing nations. Whereas developing countries are not re-
stricted in their GHG emissions, developed countries are bound to GHG reduction
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targets that must be met primarily through national measures. In addition, three
market–based mechanisms have been introduced to meet the emission commit-
ments: Emission Trading, Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mecha-
nism. These flexibility mechanisms create ‘carbon markets’, where reduced car-
bon dioxide emissions are considered as commodities to be traded on the market.
The CDM is the only mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol that involves developing
countries8. By using the CDM, industrialised nations can meet their emission
commitments in developing countries where no binding targets are recorded in
the Kyoto Protocol9. The expectation of the CDM is to assist the industrialised
nations to reduce their GHG abatement costs while helping developing countries
to achieve emission reduction and sustainable development.
The CDM, established in 1997 and fully operational in late 2004, is the first
global project–based offset mechanism for GHG abatement transfers from devel-
oping to developed countries. Currently, there are more than 7,600 registered
projects with substantially uneven project distribution. More than 75% of the
projects are implemented in only three countries: China, India and Brazil. More
advanced developing countries with greater abatement potential host more CDM
projects while least developed countries remain under–represented in the CDM
(Cosbey et al., 2006). Apart from its unequal distribution, the market–based
environmental policy instruments (i.e. taxes, cap–and–trade systems) typically
include offset mechanisms to allow for cost–effective abatement (OECD, 2006,
Stavins, 2003). However, compared to direct government regulations, their per-
formance is not as anticipated. Design failures and institutional and technological
limitations coupled with poor political interest, remain major obstacles in effective
implementation.
8Eligibility to host a CDM project requires that developing countries first ratify the Kyoto
Protocol and establish a Designated National Authority within the country to manage and
supervise the CDM registration process.
9The CDM allows emission reduction (or emission removal) projects in developing countries
to earn certified emission reductions (CERs), each equivalent to one tonne of CO2. These CERs
can be traded and sold, and used by industrialized countries to meet a part of their emission
reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol.
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The success of the CDM as a global climate policy has been questioned due
to its environmental integrity. From forward–looking research, Banuri and Gupta
(2000) argue that the adoption of less GHG–intensive technologies has not only
reduced emissions but created additional benefits for developing countries. This
idea is supported by He et al. (2014) and Huang and Barker (2012) in their
cross–country impact assessments of the CDM. By contrast, Schneider (2008) and
Schneider et al. (2007) argue that the CDM has not achieved the emission reduc-
tion targets as the carbon market functions depend considerably on the presence
of caps for CDM credit issuance. According to Wara and Victor (2008), failure
to reflect the actual CDM–provoked emission reductions calls for an immediate
introduction of comprehensive design and functional reforms to carbon markets.
Such reforms may further aid in avoiding unanticipated price fluctuations of the
emission permits. Despite the high expectations of the global community, unre-
solved design failures and accounting responsibilities of the participating countries
create much ambiguity around the CDM’s credibility in global climate governance.
The CDM receives criticism for allowing developed countries to choose to in-
vest in favorable, low–cost reduction options and leaving developing countries with
the most expensive options for their own reductions (Stahlke, 2020). This is re-
ferred to as the ‘low–hanging fruit’ issue,10 because the CDM is placing developing
countries at a higher level on their marginal abatement cost curve while developed
countries receive emission credits for tapping the cheapest abatement costs (Ba-
nuri et al., 2001, Narain and van’t Veld, 2008). By characterising the low–hanging
fruit problem as compensation for the forgone opportunity costs of CDM projects,
Narain and van’t Veld (2008) suggest mandating a ‘virtual option’ clause in CDM
projects. Accordingly, developing countries would be compensated for immediate
project costs and for the forgone option value. Further, the host–country gov-
ernments should not approve CDM projects unless full compensation is received.
The authors do however, show their concern that political and practical obstacles
could influence mandating such a virtual option for the CDM.
10This is also called the ‘sold-out hypothesis’, the ‘cherry-picking’ or the ‘cream-skimming’
problem.
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On a positive note, Castro (2012) found that although the low-hanging fruits
problem does exist in some sectors and countries, its effect would dissipate in fu-
ture. Technological progress and the transfer of knowledge and information are
some co-benefits of the CDM that prevent the low-hanging fruit problem from
occuring (Dechezleprêtre et al., 2008, Popp, 2011). As technology transfers reduce
marginal abatement costs, the risk on future abatement options is minimised,
making CDM a more appealing policy choice for developing countries. CDM
is however, not instrumented for technology transfer, nor does it guarantee the
successful adaptation of foreign technology to local conditions. For this reason,
Hübler (2015) stresses the importance of introducing an integrated multidimen-
sional funding mechanism that overcomes the aforementioned limitations of the
CDM.
Reversing or halting the impact of climate change is a daunting task. Economists
have repeatedly questioned the feasibility of achieving the climate targets set by
the UNFCCC. Nordhaus (2018) shows that even with reasonable technology and
ambitious abatement strategies, combating climate change may be unfeasible ow-
ing to projected rapid economic growth in developing countries. In this context,
the prospects of strong policy measures appear to be dimming rather than bright-
ening. There is substantial uncertainty about the path of climate change and its
impacts – future emissions, concentrations and damages. However, this does not
reduce the urgency of adopting climate change policies today. We understand that
policy failures are unavoidable, and the best practice is to learn from the mistakes
and develop a new system. The need for credible policies to slow climate change
is more pressing and therefore early action is always preferred.
4.3 Data
In this empirical investigation, we use a balanced panel of 104 developing countries
in the regions of Africa (47), the Asia–Pacific (32) and Latin America and the
Caribbean (25) over the period 1996–2016. Long term strategies are essential
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to halt climate change as ‘greening’ economic activities includes implementing
multidimensional policy reforms. Policy evaluation on climate change thus requires
considerable pre- and post- policy time spans. Our analysis focuses on the period
1996-2016, which includes a considerable pre-treatment period. This observation
of the historical pattern of emissions is crucial in emission reduction assessments.
The data on the CDM projects are sourced from the project pipeline available
on the UNFCCC website (UNFCCC, 2020). The CDM project cycle comprises of
different stages - project activities that should be completed before issuing certi-
fied emission reduction (CERs): project identification; project design document
development; host country approval; validation; registration; implementation and
monitoring; verification and certification; and CER issuance. The year of first
policy adoption is considered as 2005 and only the projects at the registration
stage are included in the analyses. After the registration phase, CDM projects
take time to show the effect. After 2010, only four countries adopted the CDM
policy (2011: Bhutan and Liberia; 2012: Kenya and Ethiopia). Therefore, we have
considered 2010 as the cut–off year of policy adoption. In our sample, 48 countries
with approximately 7,600 registered CDM projects are placed in the treated group.
The remaining developing countries, with no registered projects or with projects
registered beyond 2010 are placed in the control group. The CDM is therefore, an
indicator variable taking the value 1 in the year in which a country has a CDM
project registered during 2005-2010 and in all years afterwards for the period from
1996–2016, and 0 otherwise.
We use GHG emissions and carbon intensity as the main outcome variables.
Data for GHG emissions were extracted from the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool
(CAIT) developed by the World Resource Institute (WRI, 2017). The CAIT aids
mainly in the decisions made by the UNFCCC and other forums on national and
global progress on climate change. The significance of this data set lies in its
completeness and relative accuracy, as country data sets are produced by apply-
ing a consistent methodology. The CAIT provides comprehensive emissions data
at both aggregated and disaggregated levels. We use country–level total GHG
emissions in the main analysis. This is supplemented with the estimations on four
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other GHG component gases: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous
oxide (N2O) and fluorinated gases (F-Gas). The main component gas, carbon
dioxide, contributes to more than 73% of the total emissions followed by methane
(18%), nitrous oxide (7%) and fluorinated gases (2%). All emissions are expressed
in metric tons of CO2 equivalents (MtCO2.e) and the logarithm of the emissions
is used in the estimations.
The decomposition of GHG emissions comprises five main sectors: energy, in-
dustrial processes, agriculture, land-use change and forestry (LUCF) and waste
(WRI, 2017). Energy sector emissions includes emissions from five sub–sectors:
electricity/heat, manufacturing/construction, transportation, other fuel combus-
tion and fugitive emissions. Energy sector emissions are partly due to carbon
dioxide emitted from the fossil fuel combustion and partly from methane and ni-
trous oxide. The industrial processes sector includes emissions from cement man-
ufacture, adipic and nitric acid production and other non-agriculture industries.
Agriculture sector emissions cover the emissions from livestock, rice cultivation,
agricultural soils and other agricultural sources (eg: crop residues and savanna).
The LUCF includes net emissions and removals due to land use changes. Waste
sector emissions are a result of landfills, wastewater treatment, human sewage and
other waste. According to the reporting framework used by the UNFCCC, inter-
national bunkers is another main sector; however, the emissions from international
bunkers (aviation and marine bunkers) are not included as a sector in the CAIT
national GHG emissions.
Carbon intensity is measured in kilograms of CO2 per unit of GDP (mea-
sured in international dollars in 2011 prices). The data on carbon intensity were
extracted from the “Our World in Data” web platform (OWD, 2020). These
data have been compiled using three sources: carbon dioxide emissions data from
the Global Carbon Project and the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Cen-
tre (Le Quéré et al., 2014) and long-term GDP data from the Maddison Project
Database (Bolt and Van Zanden, 2014).
The control variables, GDP per capita, GDP per capita squared, popula-
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tion, trade openness and world governance indicators are obtained from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI, 2020) and financial openness is ex-
pressed by the Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN) (Chinn and Ito, 2006). A brief de-
scription of all the variables used in our analyses are shown in Table C.2 in the
Appendix.
The choice of explanatory variables reflects the literature on Environmental
Kuznets Curve (Cole et al., 1997, Dasgupta et al., 2002, Dinda, 2004, Huang
and Barker, 2012, Stern, 2004). Our study, therefore includes the logarithm of
GDP per capita and its squared term. The logarithm of GDP and population
is used as a proxy for overall economic demand. Trade share, the sum of total
exports and imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP, is used to
denote trade openness. Financial openness is expressed using the Chinn-Ito index
(KAOPEN) which measures a country’s degree of capital account openness. World
governance indicator control for the quality of governance. It is derived averaging
six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability, political stability and
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and
control of corruption.
Our empirical strategy involves examining the effect of CDM projects imple-
mented in Non-Annex I developing countries (host countries) compared with non-
host developing countries. This is implemented within a difference–in–differences
quantile treatment effects setting as described in Section 4.4. The Non-Annex I,
developing countries with CDM projects registered before 2010 are in the treated
group and non–host developing countries are in the control group. We allow the
CDM policy to show its effect over a six year period and therefore, countries who
adopt the policy after 2010 are placed in the control group.
Our identification assumption is that pre–treatment trends and changes in
outcome variables in both treated and control countries are the same in the pre–
policy period. Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.3 for emissions and carbon intensity show
that, visually the pre–existing trends are quite similar for treated and control
groups. Figures 4.2 and 4.4 show the emissions and carbon intensity before and
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after the policy, respectively. After CDM implementation, there is a slight increase
in emissions, but the carbon intensity has fallen marginally. The distributions
of the emissions and carbon intensity of the treated group show no significant
difference after the policy was introduced. Table 4.1 shows the mean difference of
two outcome variables in treated and control groups. The DID calculation shows
a negative policy effect for both variables. Descriptive statistics of all the variables
are presented in Table C.4 of the Appendix.
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Figure 4.1: GHG emissions: control countries and treated countries
Figure 4.2: Distribution of GHG emissions
Note: The kernel is Epanechnikov. The vertical lines indicate control and treated country
group means.
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Figure 4.3: Carbon intensity: control countries and treated countries
Figure 4.4: Distribution of carbon intensity
Note: The kernel is Epanechnikov. The vertical lines indicate control and treated country
group means.
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Table 4.1: Means of outcome variables by treatment
Treated countries Control countries DID
Log of GHG emissions
Before policy 4.517 3.073 -0.049
(0.066) (0.067)
After policy 4.645 3.250
(0.100) (0.093)
Log of carbon intensity
Before policy -1.457 -1.658 -0.081
(0.026) (0.033)
After policy -1.615 -1.736
(0.032) (0.040)
Note: Estimates are the means of treated and control countries. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses.
4.4 Empirical strategy
We employ the quantile treatment effects approach of Powell (2016) in a difference–
in–differences framework to identify the policy effect. We closely follow two studies
that uses the same approach: Ampofo and Doko Tchatoka (2019), who examine
the effectiveness of wage policies in Ghana, and Smith (2017), who examines the
impact of US school food programs on the distribution of child dietary quality.
We specifically estimate the following specification:




itγ(Uit) + µi(Uit) + ηt(Uit) (4.4.1)
where Yit refers to the outcome variables, log of GHG emissions or log of carbon
intensity, of country i at time t; (CDM × POST )it is the variable of interest,
CDMi captures the difference in the outcome variable between treated and control
countries over the sample period and POSTt shows the period after the policy
adoption. The coefficient of interest, β(Uit), therefore captures the effect of the
policy adoption on GHG emissions or carbon intensity for the treated countries.
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Xit contains exogenous covariates: GDP per capita, GDP per capita squared,
population, world governance indicators, trade openness and financial openness,
and its coefficient γ(Uit) captures the effect of a change in these covariates on
the log of GHG emissions or log of carbon intensity. µi(Uit) and ηt(Uit) account
for the country and year fixed effects (FE). Here, the error term, Uit, represents
time–varying individual heterogeneity, which is defined as a function of time–
invariant individual country characteristics, Ai and an idiosyncratic term, Vit;
so that Uit = f(Ai, Vit). Therefore, our policy effect, β(Uit), is time–varying.
The identification assumption for standard quantile regression (QR) is that the
error term is distributed in a conditionally uniform way over the unit interval,
Uit|(CDM × POST )it, Xit ∼ U(0, 1). This is due to the possible correlation of
Ai, which is embedded in Uit, with both Yit and (CDM × POST )it. Thus, these
omitted factors in Uit thus, can correlate with Yit and (CDM ×POST )it inducing
endogeneity.
The coefficients in quantile regression vary according to a nonseparable error
term, known as the rank variable (Smith, 2017). The rank variable, Uit, defines the
conditional quantiles over which estimation occurs – a high value of rank means the
country is at the top of the conditional distribution, and likewise for a low value of
rank. The ranking structure decides the interpretation of coefficients in quantile
regression and to the definition of the counterfactual distribution. In our study,
the counterfactual is the distribution of GHG emissions in the absence of policy
adoption. In a potential outcomes framework, this counterfactual implies preserv-
ing rank such that low quantiles are defined by low–emissions and high quantiles
by high–emissions. This ranking structure gives coefficient estimates the desirable
interpretation for the research question, ‘How does the CDM policy impact GHG
emissions prone to countries with low GHG emissions separately from those with
high GHG emissions’. In the identifying process, the quantile regression for panel
data (QRPD) of Powell (2016), estimates the impact of CDM policy (treatment
variable) on the outcome distribution (GHG emissions) using ‘within’ variation in
the treatment variables. Powell’s estimators contain nonadditive individual fixed
effects in quantile regression and thus are not directly comparable to an additive
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approach.
The identifying assumption in Powell’s model is that changes in (CDM ×
POST )it and Xit are uncorrelated with changes in the conditional ranking struc-
ture Uit|(CDM×POST )it, Xit once controlling for Ai (Chernozhukov et al., 2013).
To the extent that endogenous characteristics are fixed over the sample period, the
remaining change in the ranking structure should be idiosyncratic conditional on
the choice of policy adoption and country fixed effects. Further, it is assumed that
the ranking structure is ‘conditionally stable’ over the 21 year period from 1996–
2016, Ui1|(CDM × POST )i1, Xi1 ∼ Ui2|(CDM × POST )i2, Xi2. This suggests
that a country with high GHG emissions in year 1 also has high GHG emissions
in year 2.
There is no functional form placed on f(Ai, Vit) (Powell, 2016). As in OLS-
FE, individual country fixed effects Ai are allowed to be arbitrarily correlated
with (CDM ×POST )it and Xit. The estimator is consistent for a fixed T , so this
will be the case in study as T = 21 years. The estimator is directly comparable
to pooled quantile regression in terms of interpretation (Smith, 2017). This is
because estimates vary with Uit in both models, but the pooled regression does
not control for Ai.
There are two moment conditions in the QRPD of Powell (2016). The first
sample moment highlights the ‘within transformation’ of the data. For simplicity,









where τi(b) = 1T
∑T
s=1 1(Yis ≤ D
′
isb). This moment shows the estimator uses within
individual comparisons for identification by controlling for Ai without having to
estimate each Ai. This approach is the same as the de–meaning approach of OLS
fixed effects.
The second moment condition of QRPD ensures that E[τi(b)] = τ , a condition
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The second moment condition maintains the rank of the counterfactual policy
as described above by ensuring that, on average, the probability of the outcome
being less than or equal to the quantile function is equal to τ .
Equation 4.4.2 shows that QRPD is directly comparable to pooled quantile re-
gression: if we constrain τi(b) = τ , we arrive at the sample moment corresponding








itb)− τ ] (4.4.4)
Our estimation strategy uses the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM). As
















where mi(b) is a set of moment conditions satisfying E[mi(b) = 0, and the weight-





. To estimate QRPD, we
use the two moment conditions found in equations 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 and follow the
estimation procedure outlined in Powell (2016). Pooled QR can be estimated fol-
lowing Koenker and Bassett Jr (1978) and the moment condition of li(b) from
equation 4.4.4.
In the case of both QR and QRPD, the quadratic objective function LN(b)
is highly non–convex with many local optima owing to its ‘blocky’ nature, but it
does have a well–pronounced global optimum. Computation is further hindered
by the dimension of the parameter set. Therefore, we follow Chernozhukov and
Hong (2003) and use Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm to maximise
equation 4.4.5. Inferences are then drawn from the posterior distribution.
We use the logarithm of the variables in the estimation except for shares
(trade and financial openness) and indicators (world governance indicators). We
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bootstrap the standard errors with 1000 replications. The coefficient of interest, β,
measures the impact of CDM policy on the GHG emissions of the treated countries.
The identification of our parameter of interest is that changes in GHG emissions
in the treated countries is post 2010 are the result of CDM policy adoption. This
means that any difference in GHG emissions between the treated and control
countries prior to policy adoption should be same or statistically insignificant.
The inclusion of country fixed effects and year fixed effects aids identification.
Country fixed effects capture any economic development that may influence the
countries’ GHG emissions other than the reduced emissions made possible by the
CDM policy. The year fixed effects account for any decisions that influence the
emissions over the years. Not accounting for these factors may wrongly attribute
their effects to the policy adoption.
4.5 Results
Estimates of the CDM effects are presented as aggregated effects (sub section
4.5.1) and decomposed effects: on type of emissions (sub section 4.5.2) and on
sectoral emissions (sub section 4.5.3). Then region– and income–based heteroge-
neous policy effects are shown in sub sections 4.5.4 and 4.5.5, respectively.
4.5.1 Aggregated policy effects on emissions
Table 4.2 presents the estimates of the CDM policy effect on log of GHG emissions
for two models: QRPD and Pooled QRs. For comparison, we include FE and OLS
estimates in respective panels. The FE estimate shown in Panel A of Table 4.2
shows a statistically insignificant impact of CDM, on average. Across quantiles,
significant negative policy effect is observed only at the lower tail of the emissions
distribution. The low–emitting CDM–host countries show a 10.3% reduction in
GHG emissions over the post–policy period. The policy effect then turns positive
over the remainder of the distribution. The largest significant positive effect of a
6.5% increase in emissions is seen at the 75th quantile. Figure 4.5 shows the graph
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of the estimates in Panel A of Table 4.2, with 95% confidence bands shaded.
Table 4.2: CDM effect on log of GHG emissions
Quantiles
A: QRPD FE 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
CDM ×POST -0.083 -0.103*** 0.029** 0.028*** 0.065*** 0.092
(0.068) (0.026) (0.015) (0.007) (0.017) (0.119)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165
B: Pooled QR OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
CDM ×POST -0.037 -0.042 0.058 0.064 0.005 0.219**
(0.089) (0.093) (0.114) (0.065) (0.078) (0.093)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165
Note: The QRPD estimates with controls in Panel A and the pooled QR estimates with controls
in Panel B. The individual control variables are GDP per capita, GDP per capita squared,
population, trade openness, world governance indicators and financial openness. MCMC
algorithm is used for Panel A and the bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications are
shown in parentheses for Panel B. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Figure 4.5: CDM effect on GHG emissions
Figure 4.6: CDM effect on carbon intensity
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In our analysis, the expected negative policy effect is seen only for countries at
the lowest quantile. The statistical insignificance of the average estimate justifies
the use of quantile regression approach in assessing the impact of CDM on GHG
emissions in the host countries. The policy effect measured using pooled QR in
Panel B are qualitatively similar to the QRPD estimates of Panel A of Table 4.2.
However, note that their magnitudes differ from that of the QRPD estimates.
Overall, our findings reveal that although CDM stimulates emissions reduction
in low–emitting countries, we cannot rule out its ineffectiveness in high–emitting
developing countries.
Table 4.3 presents the estimates using carbon intensity as the outcome vari-
able. In contrast to the GHG results, we find very strong evidence for reduced
carbon intensity over the entire distribution for CDM host countries during the
post–policy period, see Figure 4.6.
The policy adoption has led to a 7.9% reduction in carbon intensity at the lower
tail. The effect increases to a maximum of 15.2% reduction in carbon intensity
at the upper tail. Comparing Tables 4.2 and 4.3, we conclude that the policy
adoption has triggered heterogeneous responses in carbon intensities across CDM–
host countries but it is not so for net GHG emissions.
Figures C.4 and C.5 in the Appendix show the full policy effects for emissions
and carbon intensity, respectively across all quantiles. As we are not focusing on
the monotonocity of the policy effect, only selected estimates at 10th, 25th, 50th,
75th and 90th quantiles are reported in the rest of our analyses.
4.5.2 Decomposed policy effects on type of emissions
Previous analysis focuses on the impact of CDM on emissions at the aggregate
level. The effect of the CDM may vary across emission type, however. We thus,
estimate equation (4.4.1) using QRPD for each greenhouse component gas. The
results are presented in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.7.
The estimates in Table 4.4 reveal that, for high–emitters, with the exception
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Table 4.3: CDM effect on log of carbon intensity
Quantiles
A: QRPD FE 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
CDM ×POST -0.124* -0.079*** -0.104*** -0.148*** -0.071*** -0.152***
(0.066) (0.001) (0.002) (0.024) (0.025) (0.010)
B: Pooled QR OLS 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
CDM ×POST -0.125** -0.074 -0.092* -0.085 -0.106 -0.265**
(0.052) (0.089) (0.053) (0.056) (0.075) (0.132)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057
Note: The QRPD estimates with controls in Panel A and the pooled QR estimates with controls
in Panel B. The individual control variables are GDP per capita, GDP per capita squared,
population, trade openness, world governance indicators and financial openness. MCMC
algorithm is used for Panel A and the bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications are
shown in parentheses for Panel B. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
of F-Gas, the CDM policy has not been successful in reducing any other type
of emissions. In particular, the policy is associated with a significant increase in
CO2 (22.3%) and N2O (10.3%) emissions for high–emitters. As the policy effect
on CO2 emissions is quite similar to that of the aggregate effect, CO2 emissions
must have driven it. This is anticipated, as CO2 is the major constituent of GHG,
contributing more than 70% to total GHG emissions. The strong policy effect
on F-Gas, however, muted in the aggregate effect as it contributes to less than
2% of the total GHG emissions. The results thus confirm that the CDM is not
effective in reducing GHG emissions except the F-Gas for high–emitting countries.
It is, therefore, important that developing countries choose CDM projects based
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Table 4.4: CDM effect on emissions, by type of emissions
Quantiles
FE 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
All GHGs
CDM × POST -0.083 -0.103*** 0.029** 0.028*** 0.065*** 0.092
(0.068) (0.026) (0.015) (0.007) (0.017) (0.119)
CO2 emissions
CDM × POST -0.013 -0.077*** -0.297** 0.139*** 0.061*** 0.223***
(0.084) (0.011) (0.125) (0.008) (0.019) (0.016)
CH4 emissions
CDM × POST -0.018 0.189*** -0.059*** -0.080*** -0.007 0.029**
(0.034) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.013)
N2O emissions
CDM × POST -0.041 0.073*** 0.174*** -0.099*** -0.002 0.103***
(0.032) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.014)
F-Gas emissions
CDM × POST -0.034 -0.128*** -0.069** -0.207*** 0.113*** -0.082***
(0.095) (0.012) (0.029) (0.025) (0.018) (0.014)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications are shown in parentheses for FE
and the MCMC for QRPD. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
on their emissions composition, rather than accepting any CDM investment from
a developed country.
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Figure 4.7: CDM effect on disaggregated emission groups
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4.5.3 Decomposed policy effects on sectoral emissions
The estimates of equation (4.4.1) on sectoral decomposition of GHG emissions
are presented in Table 4.5 and Figures C.6 and C.7 in the Appendix. There is
substantial variation in policy response in each sector. Agriculture– and industry–
related emissions show a significant reduction at the upper tail. Agriculture sector
with only 3.2% and the industry sector with a large significant reduction of 33.6%.
One major role of the CDM is to boost transfers of clean, less polluting tech-
nologies to developing countries. CDM projects benefit big industries by employing
such technologies in the manufacturing process. Our finding that the CDM has
reduced industrial emissions of adopting countries over the entire distribution is
similar to Schneider (2007), who shows that the CDM was successful in reducing
emissions from industrial plants and landfills. He further argues that if concerns
over the CDM are properly addressed, it would continue to be an important toll
in climate change mitigation for developing countries.
On the other hand, energy, LUCF and waste sectors are the least to benefit
from the CDM. Contributing more than 60% to total GHG emissions, both low
and high–emitters in the energy sector show an 8.7% and a 17.5% increase in
emissions over the post–policy period, respectively. Only the medium–emitters in
the energy sector show emissions reduction: 11.1% at the 25th quantile, 7.3% at
the median quantile, and 5.0% at the 75th quantile. The LUCF sector shows emis-
sion reduction of 7.2% and 20.3% at the median and 75th quantiles, respectively.
Similarly, waste sector emissions are not responsive to policy adoption except at
the 25th quantile with 3.1% emission reduction.
The positive policy estimate seen at the upper quantiles of the emissions dis-
tribution in the energy sector could be a result of the link between CDM and
carbon leakage (Figure C.7). Sijm et al. (2005) define carbon leakage as the ratio
of policy–induced emission increase in non–abating country over the reduction of
emissions by an abating country. According to Kallbekken (2007) and Bollen et al.
(1999), the non–responsiveness of the energy sector to the CDM could have been
driven by market leakages, which are transmitted through price fluctuations. For
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Table 4.5: CDM effect on log of GHG emissions, by sector
Quantiles
Sector FE 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Energy
CDM ×POST -0.006 0.087*** -0.111*** -0.073*** -0.050*** 0.175***
(0.038) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.013) (0.005)
Agriculture
CDM ×POST -0.018 -0.022 0.106*** -0.186*** -0.083*** -0.032
(0.033) (0.014) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.042)
LUCF
CDM ×POST -0.177 0.170*** 0.063* -0.072** -0.203*** 0.052***
(0.144) (0.049) (0.038) (0.028) (0.030) (0.013)
Industry
CDM ×POST -0.156 -0.486*** -0.259*** -0.321*** -0.215*** -0.336***
(0.099) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.024)
Waste
CDM ×POST 0.059 0.002 -0.031** 0.028*** 0.098*** 0.037
(0.041) (0.015) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) (0.036)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications are shown in parentheses for FE
and the MCMC for QRPD. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
a single CDM project, such price fluctuation is insignificant and often neglected;
however, the aggregate effects might be significant. The CDM investments could
reduce the unit production costs of energy–intensive industries in host–countries.
This can lead to an expansion of those industries at the cost of other countries’
market share. As a result, the low–energy industries in developing countries end
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up having higher total energy use. Ultimately instead of lowering emissions, the
CDM may even increase emissions to unprecedented levels in developing countries.
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4.5.4 Heterogeneous effects across regions
Table 4.6 and Figure C.8 show the policy effect on GHG emissions by geographic
region. The African region receives the fewest benefits from the CDM policy
as estimates are positive across the entire distribution of GHG emissions. In
contrast, the Asia–Pacific countries show negative policy estimates over the entire
distribution of GHG emissions except at the 90th quantile. This indicates that
the CDM is effective in reducing emissions in low– to medium–emitters but not
for high–emitters. We find a strong policy effect for the Latin America and the
Caribbean region as we move across the GHG distribution. The emission reduction
is as large as 100.3% at the lower tail and 24.1% at the upper tail.
The policy estimates are not compatible with the geographical distribution of
CDM projects. The Asia–Pacific region owns the largest share, 85%, of the CDM
projects (>6,000 projects) followed by 13% (>1,000 projects) in Latin America
and the Caribbean and 2% (>100 projects) in Africa. Although the Asia–Pacific
region owns the largest share of CDM projects, the policy is more effective in the
Latin America and the Caribbean region. This indicates that geographical dis-
tribution of CDM projects has minimal impact, whereas other contextual factors
(institutional quality, corruption, governance quality and political will, etc.) play
a key role in the policy success. Having a level of emissions similar to the Latin
America and the Caribbean region but with the fewest CDM project implementa-
tions, Africa reveals the importance of considering regional– and country–specific
needs in policy designing and implementation. It is advisable not to compensate
the country needs over global efforts in combating climate change.
Table C.5 in the Appendix shows the estimates for disaggregated regional
emissions by emission type. Results reveal that CDM has reduced the carbon
dioxide emissions along the entire distribution of emissions. African region shows
reductions only in N2O and F-Gas emissions. Further, all four GHG component
gases show significant reduction in the upper tail for the Asia-Pacific region. These
results are encouraging as the region houses the biggest emitters of the developing
economies, China and India. Therefore, we can conclude that although the CDM
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Table 4.6: CDM effect on log of GHG emissions, by region
Quantiles
Region FE 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Africa
CDM ×POST 0.048 0.158*** 0.104*** 0.067*** 0.105*** 0.252***
(0.048) (0.014) (0.006) (0.007) (0.037) (0.011)
Observations 972 972 972 972 972 972
Asia–Pacific
CDM ×POST -0.089 -0.042*** -0.144*** -0.026 -0.170*** 0.087***
(0.089) (0.016) (0.010) (0.019) (0.014) (0.011)
Observations 671 671 671 671 671 671
Latin America and the Caribbean
CDM ×POST -0.416* -1.003*** -0.281*** -0.211*** -0.191*** -0.241***
(0.219) (0.139) (0.031) (0.049) (0.028) (0.011)
Observations 522 522 522 522 522 522
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications are shown in parentheses for FE
and the MCMC for QRPD. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
acts favorably, it requires major improvements in implementing country-specific
projects to make effective contribution to combat climate change.
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4.5.5 Heterogeneous effects across income levels
The heterogeneous policy effects across income levels11 are shown in Table 4.7 and
Figure C.9. As seen, for high–emitters, the policy effect is observed only for the
low income category, with a marginal 1.2% emission reduction at the upper tail of
the GHG distribution. Beyond the median quantile, the CDM shows no benefit for
higher income developing countries (lower–middle income, upper–middle income
and high income). Emission increases are as large as 33.3% and 10.5% for high–
emitters in lower–middle and high income categories, respectively.
Looking at income groups, the poorest countries are responsible for only 5%
of the emissions in developing countries and a marginal 3% of the global emis-
sions. On the other hand, the medium income developing countries contribute
to 86% and 57% of developing country and global emissions, respectively. The
world’s highest emerging country emitters, China, India and Brazil, are in this
medium income category, which explains the reason for high emissions. In terms
of population, the low income category includes only 9% of the developing coun-
tries’ population12, whereas the population share in medium–income categories is
88%13. We understand that an increase of a few billions in low income countries
would therefore have a lesser impact on GHG emissions compared to that of the
increasing population in medium-income countries.
11Aggregation by income is based on the total emissions of countries within each of the World
Bank income groupings: low income, lower–middle income, upper–middle income and high in-
come.
12Low income countries are home to a population of 0.6 billion.
13Lower-middle income and upper–middle income countries combined are home to a population
of 5 billion.
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Table 4.7: CDM effect on emissions, by income
Quantiles
FE 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Low Income
CDM ×POST -0.043 0.016 -0.038 -0.106*** 0.039*** -0.012
(0.086) (0.010) (0.045) (0.009) (0.009) (0.044)
Observations 561 561 561 561 561 561
Lower–Middle Income
CDM ×POST 0.004 -0.133*** 0.117*** -0.044*** 0.269*** 0.333***
(0.082) (0.015) (0.022) (0.014) (0.007) (0.024)
Observations 683 683 683 683 683 683
Upper–middle Income
CDM ×POST -0.188 -0.053*** -0.303*** 0.188*** 0.168*** 0.042
(0.123) (0.015) (0.033) (0.023) (0.009) (0.076)
Observations 588 588 588 588 588 588
High Income
CDM ×POST -0.419 -0.413*** -0.289*** -0.227*** 0.077*** 0.105***
(0.369) (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.005)
Observations 333 333 333 333 333 333
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications in parenthesis for FE and the
MCMC for QRPD. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
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4.6 Discussion
Our results indicate that the CDM benefits the region of Latin America and the
Caribbean the most compared to the rest of the developing world. This region
probably satisfies the notion that the inflow of CDM projects is determined by
the institutional and technological developments in host countries. According to
Acemoglu et al. (2006), technological innovation is vital for high-tech countries,
whereas for others it is technological adaptation that matters. As GHG abatement
technology is comparatively advanced, more advanced developing countries gen-
erally attract more CDM projects. The least developed countries, therefore, may
not benefit optimally from the CDM policy. This explains why the lagging African
region benefits less from the CDM compared to the regions of Latin America and
the Caribbean and the Asia–Pacific. The CDM project distribution for Latin
America and the Caribbean and for Africa is 13% and 2%, respectively. However,
countries may not benefit at all if they are left–out of the system. Therefore, it
is the duty of the policy makers to create conducive environments to obtain the
maximum benefits from global environmental policies while partaking effectively
in combating climate change.
The CDM’s top priority is to engage the highest–emitting developing coun-
tries in the emissions abatement process. This has already been accomplished with
more than 75% of projects disbursed in China, India, Brazil and Mexico; however,
as to the CDM’s dual goal of emission reduction and promoting sustainable de-
velopment, the latter is questionable, if the least developed countries are left out.
Ultimately, the CDM should work in all development settings, not exclusively in
emerging markets.
The CDM’s capacity–building efforts are believed to aid developing countries
in attracting more CDM investments (Winkelman and Moore, 2011); however, the
CDM has not been successful in overcoming the existing predicaments of the least
developed countries. It is not because these countries have fewer opportunities:
A World Bank study by De Gouvello et al. (2008) reveals that the African region
has the potential to implement 3,200 clean energy projects equivalent to an annual
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emission reduction of 740 million tonnes of CO2.e. Therefore, the CDM clearly
has not been an effective vehicle for incentivising CDM investments in a fair and
equitable manner across developing countries.
With increasing emissions, extreme poverty has decreased in the Asia–Pacific
whereas the opposite is observed in Sub-Saharan Africa (Goldstein, 2015). The
reduction in emissions in Sub-Saharan Africa has increased the number of peo-
ple living in poverty. However, Aden (2016) reports that 21 developing countries
have decoupled emissions and economic growth successfully. This indicates that
efforts towards carbon emission abatement must be determined by national cir-
cumstances. Although carbon-intensive industries are discouraged, the abatement
efforts should not act as a deterrent to development potential in developing coun-
tries. Similarly, efforts need to differentiate between countries at different levels of
development. Low income countries need to focus more on building technological
capabilities, whereas high-income developing countries, which they already have
the capability to address climate change, should invest in cooperative activities.
The International Energy Agency recognises renewable energy as the best op-
tion to support economic growth while reducing emissions (IEA, 2020). Africa
has the richest solar resources but only 43% of Africans have access to a reliable
power supply. Renewable energy delivers economic benefits with zero effects on cli-
mate change. Although decarbonisation is not a priority for developing countries
compared to economic growth and poverty alleviation, investments in renewable
energy would supplement both objectives while supporting global emissions abate-
ment efforts. In this context, global climate governance should consider designing




The validity of the identification strategy for the impact of CDM policy on outcome
variables is determined by the parallel trend assumption. Using the year before
the policy adoption, i.e. 2004, as the falsification year, we test the parallel trend
assumption. The impact of the CDM policy is estimated by interacting the two
indicator variables: the 2004 post–policy adoption variable and the treated (in our
analysis, the CDM policy) country indicator.
Table 4.8: Placebo test
Quantiles
FE 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
A: Log of GHG emissions
CDM×POST2004 -0.048 -0.134*** 0.115*** 0.009 0.067 0.050
(0.068) (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) (0.056) (0.047)
Observations 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165
B: Carbon intensity
CDM×POST2004 -0.095 -0.072*** -0.132*** -0.089*** -0.005 -0.205***
(0.066) (0.007) (0.001) (0.006) (0.018) (0.005)
Observations 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057 2,057
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications are shown in parentheses for FE
and the MCMC for QRPD. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
We presume to have estimates with no significant difference before policy
implementation. If there is a significant difference, it is presumed to be in the
same direction as the post–policy estimates. As shown in Table 4.8, we observe
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significant estimates at the lower tail only, but in the same direction for both
outcome variables – GHG emissions and carbon intensity.
4.7.2 Different control group
The validity of the identification strategy for the impact of CDM policy on out-
come variables depends on the pre-existing trends in treated and control country
groups before the policy adoption. Although in our analysis we focus only on the
developing countries, the CDM policy is designed to engage all Non-Annex I par-
ties with the Kyoto Protocol in the emissions reduction process. This includes not
only the developing countries, but economies in transition as well14. The choice of
control group is vital. Although the treated and control groups are not equivalent,
they need to be comparable in the DID setting prior to CDM policy adoption.
Therefore, we estimate the policy effect using the same treatment group but a
different control, the transition economies, and report the results in Table 4.9. We
observe qualitatively similar policy effects for GHG emissions, with the exception
of the 25th and median quantiles. However, the carbon intensity depicts opposite
results to those generated in our main analysis. We conclude that our results are
quite robust to the baseline when estimated with GHG emissions, but not when
estimated with carbon intensity.
4.7.3 Different time of policy adoption
The impact of the CDM policy could be driven by the differences in the time
of policy adoption. By decomposing the policy effect into extensive and intensive
margins, based on the year of policy adoption, we observe whether such differences
have any influence on the policy effect. Countries that adopted the policy in 2005
are considered the early adopters and other countries, which adopted the policy
14We classify all countries into three groups: developed countries, economies in transition and
developing countries, based on the United Nations World Economic Situation and Prospects
2019 report (UN, 2019)
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Table 4.9: Different control group
Quantiles
FE 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
A: Log of GHG emissions
CDM ×POST -0.096 -0.375*** -0.213*** -0.166*** 0.085*** 0.185***
(0.111) (0.019) (0.020) (0.041) (0.012) (0.006)
Observations 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172 1,172
B: Carbon intensity
CDM ×POST 0.330*** 0.134*** 0.251*** 0.336*** 0.278*** 0.609***
(0.088) (0.002) (0.004) (0.017) (0.021) (0.008)
Observations 1,176 1,176 1,176 1,176 1,176 1,176
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications are shown in parentheses for FE
and the MCMC for QRPD. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
after 2005, the late adopters. We then re-estimate the baseline model in equation
(4.4.1) and display the results in Table 4.10.
The policy estimates for the early adopters are positive for the entire distri-
bution of the GHG emissions. In contrast, the late adopters show a favourable
response to the CDM, but with significant emission reductions only at the lower
quantile (18%) and the median quantile (3%). Despite receiving benefits for a
longer period of time, the early adopters are not responding favourably to the
CDM. This indicates that the time of the policy adoption has no impact on the
emissions reduction. We observe that the highest emitters of the developing coun-
try group – China, India, Brazil and Mexico – fall in the early adopter category.
This explains why the CDM is less beneficial to early adopters.
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Table 4.10: Different time of policy adoption
Quantiles
FE 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
A: Log of GHG emissions
CDM×POST -0.083 -0.103*** 0.029** 0.028*** 0.065*** 0.092
(0.068) (0.026) (0.015) (0.007) (0.017) (0.119)
Early adopters
CDM×POST -0.089 0.066*** 0.002 0.050*** 0.081*** 0.007
(0.117) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.024) (0.080)
Late adopters
CDM×POST -0.028 -0.181*** 0.008 -0.030 0.061* 0.045***
(0.074) (0.015) (0.013) (0.022) (0.035) (0.008)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications are shown in parentheses for FE
and the MCMC for QRPD. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
4.8 Policy implications and concluding remarks
Coping with climate change remains a daunting task for both scientists and
economists. Amidst the adoption of various policies to slow climate change, im-
provement in emissions trends remains minimal. In this context, effective decar-
bonisation is recognized as being everyone’s responsibility.
In this paper, we explored the impact of Kyoto’s CDM on GHG emissions
in developing countries. The CDM was designed to encourage developing coun-
try participation in reducing emissions and promoting sustainable development.
Since 2005, developed countries have implemented emission reduction projects in
developing countries and received CERs for the reduced emissions. Using a quan-
tile treatment effect approach in a DID framework, we find improvement only at
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the lower tail of the emissions distribution. The CDM shows no benefit to high–
emitting developing countries. The policy effect across emission types and sectors
shows that the CDM has not benefited the key emission contributors: carbon
dioxide and the energy sector. In addition, the region of Latin America and the
Caribbean benefits the most from the CDM, but we did not see any success of the
policy across income levels in developing countries.
Our results confirm the idea that the CDM alone is likely not sufficient to
combat climate change. The success of a global climate policy depends on the
widespread participation over a long time. These policies should not challenge
national sovereignty, must be clear on the accountability of participating countries,
and must be flexible and transparent for adopting countries.
Climate change puts both sustainable economic growth and good development
outcomes at risk. Through climate action, countries can unlock new economic and
employment potentials. Acting on climate change also allows countries to develop
sustainably. Global climate governance should thus design policies that provide
financial and technical competencies to combat climate change while ensuring the
achievement of sustainable development in developing countries.
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Appendix C
Figure C.1: Global total GHG emissions
Figure C.2: Global mean GHG emissions
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Figure C.3: Heterogeneities in emissions
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Figure C.4: Policy effect on GHG emissions
Figure C.5: Policy effect on carbon intensity
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Figure C.6: CDM effect on sectoral emissions
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Figure C.7: CDM effect on GHG emissions in the energy sector
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Figure C.8: Region–based CDM effect on emissions
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Figure C.9: Income–based CDM effect on emissions
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Table C.1: Emissions trends
Total emissions Mean emissions Change Share
(Gt.CO2.e) (Gt.CO2.e) (%) to total
(%)
1996 2006 2016 1996 2006 2016 1996– 2006– 1996– 2016
2006 2016 2016
GLOBAL EMISSIONS
World 34.35 41.43 47.00 0.25 0.27 0.28 20.62 13.44 36.83 100.00
Developed 13.43 13.73 12.16 0.37 0.38 0.34 2.18 - 11.43 - 9.50 25.86
Transition 3.68 3.55 3.62 0.22 0.21 0.21 - 3.47 2.03 - 1.52 7.70
Developing 17.24 24.16 31.23 0.17 0.23 0.30 40.12 29.25 81.11 66.43
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
By gases
CO2 11.48 17.13 22.78 0.11 0.16 0.22 49.22 32.97 98.42 72.94
CH4 4.15 4.91 5.62 0.04 0.05 0.05 18.35 14.49 35.50 18.00
N2O 1.54 1.84 2.18 0.01 0.02 0.02 19.39 18.37 41.31 6.98
F-Gas 0.07 0.28 0.65 0.00 0.00 0.01 291.29 133.91 815.26 2.08
By sector
Energy 8.37 13.80 20.06 0.08 0.13 0.19 64.77 45.37 139.53 64.24
Agriculture 3.44 3.86 4.32 0.03 0.04 0.04 12.25 11.91 25.61 13.84
LUCF 4.20 4.60 3.90 0.04 0.04 0.04 9.71 - 15.38 - 7.16 12.48
Industry 0.58 1.21 2.11 0.01 0.01 0.02 107.49 73.81 260.65 6.74
Waste 0.84 0.86 1.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 3.36 20.84 24.89 3.34
By region
Africa 3.57 3.98 4.58 0.08 0.08 0.10 11.38 15.16 28.26 14.66
Asia–Pacific 9.95 16.24 22.62 0.31 0.51 0.71 63.25 39.23 127.29 72.42
Latin America 3.72 3.94 4.03 0.15 0.16 0.16 5.86 2.34 8.34 12.91
& Caribbean
By income
Low Income 1.26 1.36 1.61 0.05 0.05 0.06 8.05 18.40 27.93 5.15
Lower-Middle Income 5.67 7.89 9.37 0.17 0.24 0.28 39.07 18.73 65.12 30.01
upper–middle Income 8.87 12.90 17.62 0.32 0.46 0.63 45.53 36.50 98.65 56.41
High income 1.44 2.01 2.63 0.09 0.13 0.16 38.91 31.35 82.46 8.44
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Table C.2: List of variables
Variable Description Source
Outcome variables
GHG emissions Greenhouse gas emissions, WRI
metric tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2.e)
CO2 emissions Carbon dioxide emissions, MtCO2.e WRI
CH4 emissions Methane emissions, MtCO2.e WRI
F-Gas emissions Fluorinated gas emissions, MtCO2.e WRI
N2O emissions Nitrous oxide emissions, MtCO2.e WRI
Carbon intensity Kilograms of CO2 emissions per unit of GDP, OWD
PPP in 2011 prices
Controls
GDP per capita GDP per capita, constant 2010 thousand USD WDI
Squared GDP per capita Square of GDP per capita, constant 2010 thousand USD WDI
Population Total Population WDI
WGI Worldwide Governance Indicators for quality of WDI
governance, -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)
Trade Trade openness, sum of exports and imports of goods WDI
and services, percentage of GDP
KAOPEN Chinn-Ito index measures financial openness, Chinn and Ito (2006)
2.33 (most open) to -1.92 (least open)
Note: OWD = Our World in Data sourced from Global Carbon Project, Carbon Dioxide
Information Analysis Centre and Maddison Project Database; WDI = World Development
Indicators of the World Bank and WRI = World Resource Institute
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Table C.3: Control and treated country groups
Africa Asia–Pacific Latin America & Caribbean
Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated
Algeria Congo, Dem.Rep. Bahrain Bangladesh Bahamas Argentina
Angola Egypt Kiribati Cambodia Barbados Bolivia
Benin Ghana Kuwait China Belize Brazil
Botswana Madagascar Lebanon India Guyana Chile
Burkina Faso Morocco Maldives Indonesia Haiti Colombia
Burundi Namibia Myanmar Iran Jamaica Costa Rica
Cameroon Nigeria Oman Israel Paraguay Dominican Rep.
Cape Verde Senegal Qatar Jordan Trinidad & Tobago Ecuador
Central African Rep. Sierra Leone Saudi Arabia Korea, Rep. Venezuela El Salvador
Chad South Africa Solomon Islands Laos Guatemala
Comoros Tunisia Turkey Malaysia Honduras
Congo Uganda Yemen Mongolia Mexico
Côte d’Ivoire Nepal Nicaragua






















Note: In our sample, 48 countries are in the treated group. Another 56 non-host developing
countries in the control group.
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Table C.4: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. N
Before Policy
Outcome variables
Log GHG emissions 3.747 1.930 -3.219 9.104 1441
Log CO2 emissions 3.251 2.072 -4.605 8.898 1385
Log CH4 emissions 2.322 1.920 -3.912 6.933 1456
Log F-Gas emissions -1.389 1.911 -4.605 5.124 1372
Log N2O emissions 1.232 2.056 -4.605 6.171 1442
Log carbon intensity -1.560 0.788 -3.930 0.922 1372
Controls
Log GDP per capita 7.916 1.913 5.234 22.469 1456
Log Squared GDP per capita 66.323 46.227 27.393 504.835 1456
Log population 16.021 1.772 11.276 21.009 1456
WGI -0.369 0.676 -2.100 1.528 1456
Trade 76.047 48.056 0.167 437.327 1456
KAOPEN -0.017 1.484 -1.920 2.334 1455
After Policy
Outcome variables
Log GHG emissions 3.891 1.959 -2.526 9.358 725
Log CO2 emissions 3.325 2.129 -2.996 9.172 698
Log CH4 emissions 2.515 1.906 -3.912 7.143 728
Log F-Gas emissions -0.349 1.901 -4.605 5.536 703
Log N2O 1.432 2.032 -4.605 6.323 722
Log carbon intensity -1.677 0.676 -3.526 0.415 686
Controls
Log GDP per capita 8.157 1.926 5.393 22.948 728
Log Squared GDP per capita 70.244 48.869 29.089 526.600 728
Log population 16.245 1.745 11.542 21.044 728
WGI -0.401 0.653 -1.887 1.608 728
Trade 79.653 44.138 0.200 379.099 728
KAOPEN -0.024 1.521 -1.920 2.334 728
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Table C.5: CDM effect on emissions, by regional emissions
Quantiles
FE 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Africa
CO2 emissions 0.112 0.804*** 0.506*** 0.139*** 0.086*** 0.268***
(0.105) (0.028) (0.010) (0.012) (0.033) (0.015)
CH4 emissions -0.005 -0.103*** -0.018 -0.091*** -0.057*** 0.054***
(0.053) (0.006) (0.019) (0.015) (0.018) (0.005)
N2O emissions -0.017 0.144*** 0.229*** -0.096*** -0.059*** -0.183***
(0.044) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.024)
F-Gas emissions -0.004 0.085*** -0.038*** -0.152*** 0.029* -0.131***
(0.122) (0.009) (0.014) (0.020) (0.016) (0.023)
Asia-Pacific
CO2 emissions -0.106 -0.060*** -0.195*** -0.126*** -0.028 -0.023***
(0.135) (0.014) (0.027) (0.037) (0.050) (0.008)
CH4 emissions 0.025 0.330*** 0.313*** 0.114*** 0.251*** -0.067***
(0.043) (0.020) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
N2O emissions -0.115 0.115*** 0.077*** 0.120*** -0.216*** -0.191***
(0.071) (0.029) (0.011) (0.007) (0.068) (0.005)
F-Gas emissions -0.256* -0.725*** -0.611*** -0.339*** -0.206*** -0.349***
(0.146) (0.030) (0.093) (0.029) (0.010) (0.028)
Latin America and the Caribbean
CO2 emissions -0.255 -0.048*** -0.401*** 0.023 -0.325 -0.236***
(0.176) (0.014) (0.017) (0.050) (0.000) (0.031)
CH4 emissions -0.040 0.090*** -0.191*** 0.049*** 0.257*** 0.155***
(0.077) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008)
N2O emissions -0.091 0.050*** 0.054*** -0.092*** 0.107*** 0.120***
(0.068) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.021) (0.038)
F-Gas emissions -0.259* -0.549*** -0.339*** -0.367*** -0.171*** 0.037***
(0.153) (0.037) (0.012) (0.025) (0.022) (0.010)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165 2,165
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications are shown in parentheses for FE
and the MCMC for QRPD. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively. 174
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Tackling the twin development crises, public debt and climate distress, is paramount
to support developing countries pursue sustainable economic development. This
thesis investigates the presence of debt thresholds and the effectiveness of global
climate policies in emissions reduction in developing countries. The thesis contains
three independent chapters, covering the public debt–growth nexus (first chapter)
and climate policies (second and third chapters).
Results from the first chapter show debt threshold effects are not common
across developing countries. Only Latin America and the Caribbean region have
shown threshold effects. Heterogeneous threshold effects are also seen across coun-
tries with respect to income and governance quality levels, with only the lowest
income and lowest governance quality countries showing a debt threshold effect.
Furthermore, beyond the debt threshold, high debt does not impede growth for
developing economies.
The second chapter examines the effectiveness of the United Nations Pro-
gramme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD)
in conserving tropical forests for emissions reduction. The findings indicate that
the policy effect takes time to materialise, i.e., the longer a country is exposed
to the policy, the stronger the policy effect is. Countries in the Latin America
and the Caribbean region and the low income group show stronger response to
the REDD policy. Further, minimising the transaction costs seems critical to the
success of the REDD policy.
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The third chapter assesses the Kyoto’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
for its efficiency in reducing emissions in developing countries. The results show
that the CDM has not been very effective for reducing emissions in high–emitting
developing countries. Although a positive policy response is seen for certain green-
house gases and sectors, design and implementation changes are necessary to re-
ceive anticipated policy outcomes.
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